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Fostering activism has always been central to progressive law-
yering theory. Every approach to the progressive practice of law has
contemplated as an essential ingredient some form of client activity-
be it collective mobilization, civic participation or simply empower-
ment. This Article traces the conceptualization of client activism in
progressive legal scholarship and argues that its complex and dy-
namic nature has been undertheorized. Historicizing and disaggregat-
ing its various forms, the Article calls for a socially contextualized
analysis and differentiation of divergent aims and methods as precur-
sors to defining the lawyer's role in popular activism and fundamen-
tal social change.
INTRODUCTION
Fostering activism has always been central to progressive law-
yering theory. Without exception, every approach to the progressive
practice of law has contemplated some form of client activity or con-
nection with other activism-be it mass movement and mobilization,
militant protest, direct action, organization-building, civic participa-
tion or simply individual empowerment-as an essential ingredient.
For many progressive lawyers, in fact, client activism is the primary
object of legal advocacy. It is both means and end, powering efforts at
reform and fulfilling the promise of democracy-even revolutionary
transformation. For these lawyers, the key question driving legal prac-
tice is not what will ensure legal victory, but what will motivate, sup-
port and further effective activism. Only organized, politicized mass
action from below, these lawyers hold-not law reform-produces
fundamental, lasting social change. Indeed, this unique objective dis-
tinguishes progressive lawyering from liberal-legalist practice, which
focuses intently on legal reform, secured by expert litigators, policy
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana. I owe an enormous debt to many
people for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this paper: the 2007 NYU Law-
yering Faculty, especially Tigran Eldred and Brent White; and the 2008 Clinical Law Re-
view writers' workshop, especially Ascanio Piomelli, Mary Helen McNeal, Kate Kruse and
Steve Berenson. I also thank Diana Yoon, Rina Pal, Derf Johnson and Amanda Hill for
their excellent research assistance. Finally, I thank Rebecca Weston, who not only read,
commented and provided invaluable insight on this paper, but also sustained me through-
out the long process of writing it.
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analysts and lobbyists.'
1 In this Article, I use the term "liberal-legalist practice" to describe lawyering aimed
primarily at legal reform. As Karl Klare describes, liberal-legalism is
the particular historical incarnation of legalism ("the ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule-following"), which characteristically serves as
the institutional and philosophical foundation of the legitimacy of the legal order in
capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to general "democrati-
cally" promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and the
radical separation of morals, politics and personality from judicial action. Liberal
legalism also consists of a complex of social practices and institutions that comple-
ment and elaborate on its underlying jurisprudence. With respect to its modern An-
glo-American form these include adherence to precedent, separation of the
legislative (prospective) and judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to for-
mulate legal rules on a general basis (the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to
complex procedural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of analysis
("legal reasoning"). The rise and elaboration of the ideology, practices and institu-
tions of liberal legalism have been accompanied by the growth of a specialized, pro-
fessional caste of experts trained in manipulating "legal reasoning" and the legal
process.
Liberal legalist jurisprudence and its institutions are closely related to the classi-
cal liberal political tradition, exemplified in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume.
The metaphysical underpinnings of liberal legalism are supplied by the central
themes of that tradition: the notion that values are subjective and derive from per-
sonal desire, and that therefore ethical discourse is conducted profitably only in in-
strumental terms; the view that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous
individuals; the separation in political philosophy between public and private inter-
est, between state and civil society; and a commitment to a formal or procedural
rather than a substantive conception of justice.
Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123, 132 n.28 (1979). See also LAURA KAL-
MAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996) (confining definition of legal
liberalism to court-oriented reform). Thomas Hilbink calls this type of practice
"proceduralist" or "elite/vanguard." Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type...: Catego-
ries of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC'L INQUIRY 657 (2004) [hereinafter Hilbink, Cate-
gories of Cause Lawyering]; see also Thomas Hilbink, The Profession, the Grassroots & the
Elite [hereinafter Hilbink, Profession, Grassroots & Elite] in CAUSE LAWYERS & SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 60-83 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., 2006) [hereinafter CAUSE
LAWYERING III].
The prototypical example of this type of practice is that done by the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Education Fund or the
American Civil Liberties Union, in which lawyers choose cases-and plaintiffs-based on
social change strategies they formulate with little or no input from clients and client organi-
zations. For other summaries of liberal-legalist practice, see Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics
& Collective Mobilization, 14 CLIN. L. REV. 355, 413, n.224 (2008) (summarizing Ascanio
Piomelli's description of liberalism as marked by "its extreme preference for individual
rather than group identity, analysis, and remedies; its aversion to focusing on issues of
power, rather than formal rights; its discomfort with radical democracy and its fear of pop-
ular passions/excesses; its assumption that the legal system alone is sufficient to make the
very small, incremental adjustments necessary to move from status quo to social justice; its
presumption of rational expert professionals' greater ability to diagnose, design, and imple-
ment necessary social remedies; and its concomitant skepticism or hostility toward the abil-
ity of low-income and working-class people to do the same; its valorization of judicial
review and the importance of checking popular opinion and democratic agitation") (inter-
nal citation omitted); Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, & Difference in Pov-
erty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1020-22 (1994) (describing liberal legalist
practice as "incremental and procedural" in nature). It bears noting, however, that even
[Vol. 16:109
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Yet legion though the literature is that has enshrined this bedrock
commitment, progressive lawyers and theorists have paid insufficient
attention to the full range of factors that define this unusual profes-
sional project. At times, client activism is an unexamined given, war-
ranting no more mention than as a perfunctory, even utilitarian,
statement of purpose. 2 And when progressive scholars, practitioners,
activists and other commentators do examine it, they tend to do so
within the confines of formalist, apolitical and transhistorical legal and
organizing method, imparting important-indeed, for those of us com-
mitted to this project, canonical-lessons, but remaining disappoint-
ingly impressionistic about their analyses of the attendant, extra-legal
forces that shape their mercurial objective.
This should not be surprising. After all, client activism is not for-
mally a province of traditional lawyering theory. Mainstream prac-
tice-individualist to begin with-contemplates a passive client reliant
upon an attorney who acts, typically alone, on his or her behalf. In-
deed, it is only with the "lawyering" 3 and "law and organizing ' '4 litera-
ture that client activism has cohered as a distinct focus of scholarly
inquiry.
But there are other reasons. Although birthed by the social
movements of the 1960s and early '70s, progressive lawyering the-
ory-the broad set of strategies and tactics progressive lawyers and
their activist partners have developed to advance their cause 5-ma-
liberal-legalist practice has roots in and is intertwined with client activism. See, e.g., SA-
MUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990)
(discussing grassroots activism that led to founding of ACLU).
2 See, e.g., Ann Fagan Ginger, The Movement & the Lawyer, 26 GUILD PRACTITIONER
1, 12 (1967) (acknowledging existence of, but not defining, "movements"); Note, The New
Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L. J. 1069, 1077, 1081, 1085 (progressive lawyers ac-
knowledging need for, but not defining, "community base," "political base," "political
power," or "support of a vocal public"); Santa Barbara Legal Collective, Is Anybody
There? Notes on Collective Practice in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY & SOCIAL CHANGE 247,
252 (Frank Lindenfield & Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, eds., 1982) (stating "fundamental" mis-
sion of "serving the people," but seeing "little need to define the people with analytical
precision").
3 For an excellent annotated bibliography of scholarship on lawyering theory and prac-
tice, see J. P. Ogilvy & Karen Czapanskiy, Clinical Legal Education: An Annotated Bibliog-
raphy (third edition), CLIN. L. REV. (Special Issue) 1 (Fall 2005).
4 For summaries of the "law and organizing" literature, see Scott L. Cummings & In-
grid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443
(2001); Loretta Price & Melinda Davis, Bibliography: Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic
Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 615 (2001).
5 The terrain of "progressive lawyering," and therefore "progressive lawyering the-
ory," is contested ground, with radical and left-liberal variants. Thus, the difference be-
tween "liberal-legalist" and "progressive" lawyers does not always cut cleanly-nor should
it, as progressives and liberals are, more often than not, allies in the same struggles. As
discussed in Section II.B.4, see infra notes 215-60 and accompanying text, even lawyers
who may be described as "liberal-legalist" consider client activism as a goal, albeit for
Fall 2009]
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tured during a subsequent period of prolonged political conservatism
that has been defined largely by the absence of sustained mass move-
ments and the eclipse 6 of the radical political ideologies and militant
organizations that propelled them. For the past three decades, ne-
oconservative and neoliberal politics have reigned supreme. In this
period, two divergent, but equally limited, theoretical currents
emerged. On the one hand, under the banner of liberal public interest
law, lawyers substituted their own advocacy and leadership (usually
through litigation) for grassroots activist efforts. On the other hand,
influenced by postmodernist, post-structural and identity-based social
theories, many progressive lawyers turned inward, to ideological and
parochial concerns, eschewing "meta" theories-the political econ-
omy and class analysis in particular-in favor of a narrower preoccu-
pation with the local dimensions of political activism, the lawyer-client
relationship and the lawyer's professional role. 7
Despite key differences-the most important of which is the ex-
plicit centrality of client activism in the latter approach-both theoret-
ical currents share common ground. First, notwithstanding progressive
lawyering theorists' commitment to fundamental social change and so-
cial movement-building, proponents of both camps either accept ex-
isting institutional arrangements (albeit critically) or are reluctant,
utilitarian purposes, for example, to support ongoing litigation (as opposed to more pro-
gressive lawyers who see client activism as an end in itself). See Ruth Buchanan & Louise
G. Trubek, Resistances & Possibilities: A Critical & Practical Look at Public Interest Law-
yering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687, 689 (1992) ("We understand public inter-
est lawyering to include ... radical lawyering, poverty lawyering, and specialized advocacy
for diffuse interests such as consumers and the environment.") By the same token, the
character of progressive practice changes as well, depending on the circumstances. Nancy
Polikoff captures this dynamic relationship between practice and circumstance in describ-
ing the "role confusion" of J. L. Chestnut, a Black lawyer, during and after the civil rights
movement in Selma. Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer
Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 455-58 (1996). As I argue throughout this Arti-
cle, "progressive lawyering" is a dynamic term as much as it is a categorical approach and
identifying characteristic.
6 1 thank Ascanio Piomelli for suggesting this word, which, I believe, captures the dy-
namic between the radical and left-liberal/liberal-legalist variants of progressive lawyering
theory.
7 Of course, other causes of progressives' flight from Marxist political economy, class
analysis and emphasis on the broad working class as the foremost agent of social change
also include the collapse of the Soviet Union (which many equated with socialism), the
reemergence of free market capitalism in China and Cuba, and the key role of a stratum of
the white working class in the United States in enabling and supporting the Republican
neo-conservative agenda. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor
Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORD. URB. L.J. 813, 827 (1998) (Soviet col-
lapse marked "the demise of socialism as a plausible way to organize a complex society").
For the argument that the Soviet Union-and by extension China and Cuba-were or are
"state capitalist" and not socialist regimes, see TONY CLIFF, STATE CAPITALISM IN RussIA
(1955).
[Vol. 16:109
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unable or unwilling to articulate alternative normative visions.8 Sec-
ond, while scrutinizing legal practice, progressive theorists, like their
liberal-legalist rivals, undertheorize the concomitant historical, social,
economic and political forces at work and the state of client activism
writ large. And third, while committed to grassroots activity, progres-
sive lawyering theorists rely presumptively-and often uncritically-
on a similarly narrow band of approaches-"community organizing"
and "mobilization," rather than litigation and policy advocacy-as the
primary and, at times, only models for political activism.
In short, progressive legal scholars have paid too much attention
to lawyering (by which I mean professional role) and too little atten-
tion to carefully scrutinizing client activism-in particular its aims,
contexts and methods. The result: mechanical prescriptions that, at
best, reinforce formalist (if pluralist) strategy and, at worst, miscalcu-
late the lawyer's role in promoting client activism and social change.
In this Article, I argue that the aims, contexts and methods of
client activism are paramount in progressive lawyering theory, and
therefore precede and define the question of how progressives should
lawyer. Progressive lawyering scholarship-in the fields of poverty
law, clinical practice, critical theory, public interest law, and law and
society-is an invaluable resource for activists. Making full use of this
literature, I suggest, requires precursory paradigms that: clarify the ul-
timate political goals to which activism is and should be directed; ana-
lyze the social conditions shaping and defining grassroots activity; and,
specify and systematize the myriad methods that can and should be
used to further these ends. Progressive lawyers engage in these analy-
ses by necessity and know intuitively that there are no mechanical
lawyering formulae to building, sustaining and growing client activism.
In critiquing prevailing theoretical formulations that relate to these
considerations, I argue that progressive lawyers need to go beyond
law, lawyering, community organizing, mobilization and social move-
ment-building, and develop a framework for more finely analyzing po-
litical aims, contexts and activist methods.
In Part I, I summarize the various, at times conflicting, lawyering
approaches to fostering activism. In Part II, I trace the evolution of
these approaches since "people's" and "poverty" lawyers began ad-
8 See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 66 (1992) (grand narratives are suspect); Gary Bellow,
Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV 297, 302 (1996) ("new generation [should] define an adequate social vision ... for
today's complicated times"); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project & the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 407, 450 (1995) (social alternative as product of social struggle).
Fall 2009]
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dressing the question in the 1960s.9 Situating discussion of lawyering
theory in historical context, my aim is to sketch an intellectual history
of progressive lawyering and illustrate the decisive role of social, polit-
ical and economic circumstances on theoretical development and em-
phases. In Part III, I critique the theoretical limitations I have
identified and argue that activists need to clarify their alternative nor-
mative visions, carefully analyze the overarching nature of ever-
changing social conditions, and broaden, deepen and systematize their
understanding of popular activism. Here, I join the efforts of other
scholars to situate the development of progressive lawyering theory in
historical context 10 and move it in a broader, interdisciplinary direc-
tion, including taking such "macro" historical factors into account,"
examining its political foundations1 2 and "pass[ing] through the door"
of social movement and organizing literature.
13
I. LAWYER AS AcTIVIST: A BROAD, DEEP CANON
In contrast to liberal-legalist practice, progressive lawyering rests
on the sound assumption that no fundamental social change-be it the
eradication of racism, poverty, war, sexism, homophobia or other soci-
etal ills-can come about solely through legal reform.14 Only organ-
9 Progressive lawyering has been around for as long as the bar has been in existence.
See, e.g., RAYMOND CHALLINOR, A RADICAL LAWYER IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: W. P.
ROBERTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS (1990); WILLIAM CHEEK & AIMEE
LEE CHEEK, JOHN MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FIGHT FOR BLACK FREEDOM, 1829-1865
(1989); WENDELL PHILIPPS GARRISON, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805-1879, THE
STORY OF HIS LIFE, TOLD BY HIS CHILDREN (Vol. I) (1885); ANN FAGAN GINGER, CAROL
WEISS KrNG: HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER, 1895-1952 (1993); JOHN MERCER LANGSTON,
FROM THE VIRGINIA PLANTATION TO THE NATIONAL CAPITOL (1894); JOHN A. SALMOND,
THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER: CLIFFORD J. DURR AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES,
1899-1975 (1990); J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAW-
YER, 1844-1944 (1993); Water J. Leonard, The Development of the Black Bar, 407 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 134 (1973). I begin my survey of progressive lawyering
theory in the 1960s because it is then that a significant cadre of lawyers began thinking self-
consciously about their practice as such. Some scholars date the proliferation of literature
extolling such an approach to lawyering to the past two decades. See, e.g., Ascanio Pi-
omelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 541, 542
(2006) (dating theory and practice of "collaborative lawyering" to mid-1980s).
10 See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 1001 (examining "social, historical, and political con-
ditions during the two periods of scholarly proliferation" on poverty law).
11 See Michael McCann & Jeffrey Dudas, Retrenchment ... and Resurgence? Mapping
the Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING
III, supra note 1, at 37-59.
12 See Piomelli, supra note 9.
13 See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy
Between Law and Organizing: Experiences From the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 339 (2008); Price & Davis, supra, note 4.
14 See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 233 (1978)
("[L]aw reform activity by social-reform groups will not result in any great transformation
[Vol. 16:109
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ized, politicized mass activism from below, 15 aimed at constantly
enhancing and enforcing that social change 16 or revolutionizing the
entire social and economic order 17 can achieve and maintain such
goals.
18
Nevertheless, in contrast to what Steve Bachmann has called the
of American society. Instead, it is, at its most successful level, incremental, gradualist, and
moderate. It will not disturb the basic political and economic organization of modern
American society"); Ashar, supra note 1, at 407, n.209 ("We remain conscious of the need
for poor people to create the conditions for their own liberation and skeptical of the check-
ered history of lawyer-led reform efforts."). Unless otherwise specified, I use the terms
"progressive" and "activist" lawyering interchangeably. Hilbink, in his typology, calls them
"grassroots." Hilbink, Categories of Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 681-690.
15 See, e.g., Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, & Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 1, 21 (1984-85) ("The primary motor of social change is social struggle, not
legal struggle. The question thus becomes: to what extent can lawyers and the law have an
impact in this 'extra-legal' area? The answer is that lawyers can play meaningful roles in
actual social struggles, though their role relates more to the preconditions for social mobili-
zation than to substantive issues. The lawyer's role is more the oiler of the social change
machine than its motor; the motor of the machine remains masses of people."); Michael J.
Fox, Some Rules for Community Lawyers, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 1 (1980) ("Organ-
ized groups of low- and moderate-income people are potentially the most powerful agents
for social change in modern America.").
16 See, e.g., Bachmann, supra note 15, at 6 ("social vision" is "participatory democ-
racy"); Piomelli, supra, note 9, at 548 ("collaborative lawyering" is "deeply rooted in dem-
ocratic participation. At its core, collaborative lawyering is an effort to practice, promote,
and deepen democracy-more precisely, a participatory democracy in which individuals
and communities flourish by unleashing their full energies and potential in joint public
action.").
17 See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root Cause of
Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 101 (2006). As discussed in Section III.A,
see infra notes 413-36 and accompanying text, there is an irreconcilable difference between
these two approaches: one is reformist and the other is revolutionary. For the classic state-
ment on this difference, see ROSA LUXEMBURG, REFORM OR REVOLUTION (Integer trans.,
Bookmarks, 1989) (1898).
18 As discussed in Section III.C, see infra notes 451-64 and accompanying text, activism
can take on an infinite variety of forms and requires disaggregation and systematization. It
includes public protest, mass mobilization and civil disobedience, of course, but it can also
include boycotts, teach-ins, alternative radio, street theatre, fasting-and more. For a good
discussion of social and political activism, see Brian Martin, Social and Political Activism,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ACTIVIsM & SOCIAL JUSTICE 19-27 (Gary L. Anderson & Kathryn
G. Herr, eds., 2007). In this Article, I use the term to refer the entire range of grassroots
activity, including manifestations of individual "empowerment." Thus, I borrow and ex-
pand upon the definition used by sociologists Sarah A. Soule and Jennifer Earle in describ-
ing their data set of protest activity between 1960 and 1986:
First, since we are interested in collective action, there must be more than one par-
ticipant at the event . . . .Second, the participants must articulate some claim,
whether this be a grievance against some target or an expression of support of some
target. Finally the event must have happened in the public sphere or have been open
to the public ....
Sarah A. Soule & Jennifer Earl, A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the
United States, 1960-1986, 10 MOBILIZATION: AN INT'L JOURNAL 345, 348 (internal citation
omitted).
Fall 2009]
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"a-legal" or "crude Marxist" approach, 19 progressive activists recog-
nize that the legal arena remains a forum for social struggle. 20 This is
so for three reasons: First, activists often do not have a choice but to
work within the legal system, as when they are arrested or otherwise
prevented from engaging in activism by state authorities. Second, be-
cause law is relatively autonomous from economic and political inter-
ests, 21 campaigns for legal reform can win substantial gains and are
frequently the only vehicles through which more far-reaching change
takes shape; struggles for reform, in other words, beget more radical
possibilities and aspirations.22 And third, law is constitutive of the so-
cial order. Law-or, more accurately, the concept of it-is not (again
as some crude analysts would argue) simply a tool of one ruling class
or other, but rather an essential component of a just society.23
Commentators observe that lawyers who base their practice on
these three premises are "hungry for theory,"24 for theory checks the
"occupational hazards [of] reformism or cynicism. 25 The theoretical
project is thus a dialectic: while law reform alone cannot "disturb the
basic political and economic organization of modern American soci-
19 See Bachmann, supra note 15, at 33.
20 See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975) (law as "arena of struggle");
Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 447 ("Unique to the law and organizing paradigm is
its insistence that lawyers can advance social justice claims and shift power to low-income
constituencies through a particular type of legal advocacy-one that is intimately joined
with, and ultimately subordinate to, grassroots organizing campaigns."); Hilbink, Catego-
ries of Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 682 ("Law is but one locale through which society
expresses itself. And it presents a place on which battles for social change can be fought.").
21 See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights
From Theory & Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 604, 606 (2009), citing RICHARD L.
ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-
1995, at 1 (1995); see also Klare, supra note 1, at 128.
22 See, e.g., LUXEMBURG, supra note 17, at 21 ("The daily struggle for reforms.., offers
to the social democracy the only means of engaging in the proletarian class war and work-
ing in the direction of the final goal ... Between social reforms and revolution there exists
for the social democracy an indissoluble tie. The struggle for reforms is its means; the social
revolution, its aim."); cf Bachmann supra, note 15, at 33-36 (describing "a-legal" approach
eschewing legal activism as misguided and "utopian").
23 See, e.g., ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW & SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITU-
TIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993); EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND MARXISM (2003); Klare, supra note 1.
24 See Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (David Kairys, ed., 1982).
25 See Klare, supra note 1, at 135; see also Richard Abel, Lawyers and the Power to
Change, 7 LAW & POL'Y 9, 9-10 (1985) (identifying three characteristics of progressive
lawyering: subordinating law to other modes of activism and disciplines; concentrating on
state and capital as main sources of injustice; and merging the personal and the political);
Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63
(2007) (discussing practitioners who "strategically deploy[ ] law in a way that is neither
utopian in its hopes for legal reform nor rejectionist in its dismissal of legal avenues of
transformation").
[Vol. 16:109
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ety,"2 6 law and lawyering are "a complex, contradictory, and open-
textured setting that provides opportunities to challenge the status
quo." 2
7
Activist lawyering has been around for as long as the bar has
been existence.28 But it was not until the 1960s that a sizeable cadre of
activists began cohering and institutionalizing, in practice and in the
academy, a theory of progressive lawyering.29 "In the United States,"
Richard Abel writes:
... it was police action against anti-war protesters that first brought
together their defense lawyers and forged the bonds that led to pro-
gressive law practices and collectives. Thus, it is collective social,
political, and economic activism outside the legal system that gener-
ates legal activism (first by individuals and then by groups) rather
than the reverse .... 30
Thereafter, continues Abel, the
expansion of activist lawyering coincided with the worldwide
growth of the welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s, itself a product
of the rediscovery of poverty within the postwar economic boom.
The proliferation of legal rights and state funding of legal aid both
stimulated the growth of new forms of progressive law practice.
These practices, in turn, became critical supporters of legal aid, urg-
ing more funding, liberalized means tests, extension to new subject
matters, and innovative tactics. 31
26 See HANDLER, supra note 14, at 233.
27 See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILIES 8-9 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., 1998) [hereinafter
CAUSE LAWYERING I].
28 See supra note 9.
29 Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal Education for
this Millenium: The Third Wave, 7 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 12 et seq. (2000). But see McCann &
Dudas, supra note 11, at 49 ("[c]ause lawyers... who dedicate their careers to the pursuit
of specific political and/or moral commitments, first emerged in substantial numbers and
public identity during the New Deal period") (internal citations omitted); Cummings &
Eagly, supra note 4, at 447 (latter day "law and organizing" model "both builds upon and
departs from previous discussions of law and social movements by presenting sophisticated
theoretical analyses and concrete practical examples of how legal advocacy and community
organizing can be integrated as a credible social change strategy"); see also William H.
Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 553-
554 (1980) ("Psychological Vision" of legal practice as one response to politicization of
legal doctrine, offering "an approach to legal theory and education which concedes the
failure of the doctrinal tradition and yet meets the claims of professional legitimation and
professorial consolation"); Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing Cause Lawyering: Profes-
sionalism, Politics, & Social Change in 1960s America (2006) ) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, NYU) (on file with author) (documenting how cause lawyering became permanent
fixture of the legal profession) [hereinafter Hilbink Dissertation].
30 Abel, supra note 25, at 7 (emphasis in original).
31 Id. at 11.
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In the academy, the social ferment of that era propelled the de-
velopment of a progressive critique of law-led by the critical legal
studies movement-and progressive critique of legal practice-led by
the "second wave" of clinical teachers.32 Together, these scholars and
practitioners have produced a progressive lawyering canon of excep-
tional breadth and depth. In the past four decades, progressives have
called for a variety of paradigmatic practices aimed at stimulating
client activism-labeling themselves "people's, '33 "movement,
'34
"poverty, ' 35 "public interest, '36 "political, ' 37 "critical, '38 "three-
dimensional," 39  "long-haul," 40  "community," 41  "rebellious,"
42
"facilitative", 43 "collaborative ,' 44 "cause,"45 "empowerment, '46 "so-
32 See Barry et al., supra note 29, at 12 (it was "student demands for relevance" pro-
duced by the "zeitgeist of the 60's" that led to second wave of clinical legal education;
"[w]hile clinical teachers were working with law students to use the law as an instrument
for social justice and change, proponents of CLS [critical legal studies] were using the class-
room to demystify the law and to teach students that political conviction plays an impor-
tant role in adjudication and that the shape of the law at any time reflects ideology and
power as well as what is wrongly called 'logic.' However, unlike some CLS adherents
whose critique of law and the legal system leads them to skepticism or nihilism, clinical
faculty struggled to maximize law's potential for remedying injustice and inequity.") (inter-
nal citations omitted).
33 See, e.g., ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER
(1983).
34 See, e.g., Ginger, supra note 2.
35 See, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049
(1970).
36 See, e.g., Note, supra note 2.
37 See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 8; Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287 (1996).
38 See, e.g., Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 5; Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building
Power & Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC'L CHANGE 369 (1982-83); Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Prac-
tice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Pub-
lic Interest Practice, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded
Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 415 (1996).
39 See Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering
and Power, 1988 WISCONSIN L. REV. 699 (1988) [hereinafter White, To Learn and Teach];
Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric
to Practice, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 157 (1994) [hereinafter White, Collaborative Lawyering].
40 See Susan D. Bennett, On Long-Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771
(1998).
41 See, e.g., Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1363 (1993);
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Envi-
ronmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619 (1992).
42 See, e.g., LOPEZ supra note 8.
43 See Richard Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is
There a Role for 'Facilitative' Lawyering?, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 639 (1995).
44 See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLIN. L. REV.
427 (2000); White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 39.
45 See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERING I, supra note 27; CAUSE LAWYERING 1II, supra note 1;
see also THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE & AGENCY IN LEGAL PRAC-
TICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., 2005) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING II].
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cial justice,' 47 "grassroots, 48 "democratic 49 and "revolutionary 50
lawyers, as well as practitioners of "law and organizing" 51 and "mobil-
ization lawyering. '52 What makes these approaches or strains within
them distinctive is that they do not measure professional success pri-
marily or exclusively in terms of creating favorable law or serving
more clients-practices we have come to know as impact litigation/
law reform or "access to justice." Rather, they measure success by
how practice raises political consciousness, motivates and strengthens
client activity and supports effective grassroots activism generally.
A. 'The Front is Everywhere'
53
In reviewing this literature, two logistical issues bear discussion at
the outset: the array of organizational formations with which progres-
sive lawyers undertake this work, and the varying roles they play
within them.
1. A Spectrum of Organizational Affiliations
Because nonprofit organizations have become ubiquitous in pro-
gressive legal advocacy, it is worth noting that beyond the traditional
formations modeled after the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People Legal Defense and Education Fund (NAACP LDF), and more
modern organizations like the Workplace Project 54 and "Make the
Road New York, '55 we have today a wide variety of organizations that
make primary use of law to cultivate activism. Many progressive law-
yers of course work in private firms.56 Some devote their practices
46 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 41; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Or-
ganizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIo N.U. L.
REV. 455 (1994).
47 See, e.g., Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4.
48 See, e.g., Hilbink, Categories of Cause Lawyering, supra note 1.
49 See Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1383 (2009).
50 See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 17.
51 See, e.g., Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4.
52 See Ashar, supra note 1.
53 This quotation is taken from WILLIAM R. KINTNER, THE FRONT IS EVERYWHERE
(1954).
54 See Gordon, supra note 8.
55 See Make the Road New York, Homepage, http://www.maketheroad.org/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2009).
56 See Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private
Public Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 293
(1993) (arguing that private public interest law firm structure is "best suited" to litigating
civil rights and civil liberties cases); see also Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 97,
n.222 (discussing National Lawyers Guild theory of training Southern Black lawyers to
become "more competent and more effective personal injury lawyers (because that's
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primarily or exclusively to this effort. For example, Bachmann
founded Bachmann and Weltchek to represent the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). 57 Others
work in law schools. For example, clinics run by Michael Wishnie at
Yale, Nancy Morawetz at New York University and Sameer Ashar at
the City University of New York represent organized collectives
whose primary aim is collective mobilization. 58 Beyond the nonprofit
context reside activist lawyers perched in a variety of organizations.
2. Varied Professional Roles
Whatever their organization affiliation, Michael McCann and He-
lena Silverstein delineate the roles that lawyers play in this endeavor:
staff lawyers ... work (usually for a mix of salary and case fee) in
established organizations such as unions or women's rights groups;
independent cause lawyers .. .work for fee as special counsel on
particular movement cases; and nonpracticing lawyers ...have
stepped out of professional roles to contribute in other ways to the
cause. 5
9
Staff lawyers, continue McCann and Silverstein, may be distinguished
further into two ideal types: "technicians" and "activists." As they
explain:
The major difference between these two types [is] the degree to
which they display[ ] independent initiative and leadership in press-
ing their organizations to support movement causes. Staff techni-
cians... tend to restrict themselves to executing the more narrowly
technical legal aspects (consultation, negotiation, litigation) of cam-
paigns initiated by others. Staff activists, by contrast, distinguish
themselves as leaders in formulating group demands, developing
group strategies, waging broader political campaigns, and even chal-
lenging their own organizations on behalf of constituent interests or
principles.
60
Within this matrix of roles, scholars have debated the question of
whether lawyers should be organizers in their own right or instead
delimit their role to that of lawyer qua technician and simply partner
where the money was) [so] they could increase their income through the handling of per-
sonal injury litigation and in effect thereby become subsidized to give more time to han-
dling civil rights work for which they were not going to get any compensation.").
57 Steve Bachmann, Bachmann & Weltchek: ACORN Law Practice, 7 LAW & POL'Y 29
(1985).
58 See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 1.
59 Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's Allurements: A Relational
Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING I, supra
note 27, at 265-66.
60 Id.; see also Narro, supra note 13 (discussing various roles of lawyers in campaigns to
organize garment and car wash workers).
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with organizers. Proponents of the latter view point to confusion that
can arise from playing a dual role,61 the power imbalance between
lawyer and client that can lead to lawyer domination, 62 and the con-
servatizing influence law and lawyers can exert on grassroots organiz-
ing campaigns. 63 Instead of playing the role of organizer, they argue,
lawyers instead should proactively seek collaboration with existing or-
ganizations64 and then abide by certain rules in working with them.
65
"Know your role within the group and stay within it unless the group
gives you clear instructions otherwise," warns Michael Fox. "Avoid
dominance of the group at all costs. Deal with your own different
identity for what it is and don't try too hard to be 'one of the folks."'
66
Adherents of this view urge lawyers to abstain from the political
and organizational matters of their clients. 67 In representing farm
workers, for example, California Rural Legal Assistance prohibited its
lawyers from joining client organizations, serving as organizational of-
ficers or spokespeople, and taking sides in community disputes.68 The
same perspective informed the work of other civil rights lawyers in the
1960s. "[T]he volunteer civil-rights lawyer is not a leader of the civil-
rights movement," said an instructional memorandum by the Lawyers'
Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC). "We are there to help
the movement with legal counsel and representation, not to tell the
movement what it should do."'69 The LCDC urged lawyers to refrain
from joining picket lines and making policy decisions. 70 As Stephen
Wexler admonished in the context of his work with National Welfare
Rights Organization activists:
61 See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 5.
62 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 15, at 5 ("through ... recognition of [lawyers'] education,
articulateness and professional mystique, they "may quickly come to dominate" client
groups if they interject "too frequently" into nonlegal aspects of group meetings).
63 See Wexler, supra note 35, at 1053 ("Poverty will not be stopped by people who are
not poor .... The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of
helping poor people organize themselves .... ").
64 See Ashar, supra note 1 (documenting outreach to immigrant and refugee rights or-
ganizations in Baltimore and New York); Fox, supra note 15.
65 See Fox, supra note 15; Quigley, supra note 46.
66 Fox, supra note 15, at 6; see also Quigley, supra note 46, at 474, 477 ("Be wary of
speaking for the group;" "Never become the leader of the group").
67 See Fox, supra note 15, at 5 (lawyer should not intervene too frequently regarding
nonlegal matters); Quigley, supra note 46, at 474 (lawyer should "never" become group
leader); David R. Rice, The Bus Rider's Union: The Success of the Law & Organizing
Model in the Context of an Environmental Justice Struggle, 26 ENVIRONs ENV. L. & POL'Y
J. 187, 197 (2003) (lawyers should not get involved in organization-building or campaign
strategizing); Wexler, supra note 35, at 1063 ("lawyer must not lead his clients"); Note,
supra, note 2, at 1121 (lawyers "should not want to control the Movement").
68 See Note, supra note 2, at 1124.
69 Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 116.
70 See id.
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No lawyer has a right to deny them . . . victory by structuring the
alternatives as they see them or by denying them the chance to
choose their own way and use their lawyer to achieve their end. A
lawyer must help them do their thing, or get out.
71
A contending school of thought sees little problem with lawyers
functioning as both technicians and organizers.72 In his influential
book, for example, Gerald L6pez calls for "rebellious lawyers" to be
"co-eminent" practitioners with their clients. 73 Instead of a hierarchi-
cal attorney-client relationship in which the lawyer always formally
represents the client, L6pez envisions a problem-solving, collaborative
approach in which the client's expertise is accorded equal weight.
74
Michael Diamond sees activist lawyers as
not only interact[ing] with the client on a non-hierarchical basis, but
also participat[ing] with the client in the planning and implementa-
tion of the strategies that are designed to build power for the client
and allow the client to be a repeat player at the political bargaining
table. The activist lawyer views the client's world in broader terms
than merely its legal implications. He or she not only considers the
political, economic, and social factors of the client's problem, but
assists the client in developing and implementing enduring solu-
tions, legal and non-legal, to these problems and to similar problems
that may arise in the future.
75
Yet a third school of thought sees the role issue more ambigu-
ously. As Diamond and Aaron O'Toole observe, irrespective of law-
yers' acknowledged roles, "[t]he distinction between representing an
organization as a lawyer and organizing it as an activist does not cut
clearly, whether applied to poverty or corporate law." They elaborate:
The distinction between lawyering and directing the development of
organizations [is] especially artificial when applied to poverty law-
yers. Lawyers cannot work for an organization without working
through the medium of particular individuals who claim the right to
represent the entity. If struggles for internal control are in progress,
any advice the lawyer gives will have the strategic character of ad-
vice given to a particular faction. If the advice influences the ability
71 Wexler, supra note 35, at 1065; see also Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Le-
gal Services Representation-The Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39,
57-58 (1993) (lawyer should rein in desire to lead).
72 See JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 98-99 (1982); Michael Di-
amond & Aaron O'Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: The Community Lawyer's
Dilemma when Representing Non-Democratic Client Organizations, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 481, 547 (2004).
73 See LOPEZ, supra note 8.
74 See id.
75 See Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32
COLUM. HUM. Ris. L. REV. 67, 109-10 (2000); see also Narro, supra note 13 (discussing
lawyer-led campaign to organize car wash workers in L.A.).
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of one side to prevail, the lawyer's representation will literally have
an organizing effect.
76
Thus, a more nuanced examination of lawyers' actual roles yields
a theoretical divergence that may be less real than rhetorical. That is,
within the matrix of potential professional roles, how lawyers foster
activism is a question of the degree to which they do so, not whether or
not they do.
B. Same Strategies, Different Tactics
The same can be said for the amalgamation of legal organizing
strategies and tactics that have developed over the past four decades.
Despite pitched debates-over the use of litigation, for example, or
the lawyer's stance vis-A-vis his or her client-practices upon closer
examination differ less in kind than in nuance. 77 In general, progres-
sive lawyers use all available tools at their disposal to nurture activism
among their clients and, depending on the situation, prioritize certain
methods over others. The tactics may differ depending on circum-
stance, but the arsenal of strategies remains the same.
1. 'Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right'
78
Lucie White has observed that lawyers who engage in this en-
deavor are "all over the map."'79 This always has been so. Long before
many progressive lawyers of the 1990s heeded L6pez's "rebellious"
call to "refuse to privilege any particular strategy or category of strate-
gies [but] focus on what might work - through assessments that regu-
larly feel ad hoc, concrete and provisional,"8 0 Gary Bellow-and
many of his contemporaries in the 1960s and 70s-pursued progres-
sive practice characterized not by the legal tactics used, but rather by
"a particular, 'politicized' orientation to the goals, commitments, and
relationships reflected in the [various] strands of a practitioner's ap-
76 Diamond & O'Toole, supra note 72, at 547.
77 Indeed, there is great similarity in earlier and later typologies of activist lawyers. Cf.
Note, supra note 2, at 1072 (public interest lawyers as fitting into three categories: lawyers
"aiding the poor; representing political and cultural dissidents and radical movements;
[and] furthering substantive but neglected interests common to all classes and races, such
as environmental quality and consumer protection") with Hilbink, Categories of Cause
Lawyers, supra, note 1, at 662-63 (cause lawyers as fitting into three categories:
"proceduralist", "elite/vanguard" and "grassroots").
78 I borrow this term from the singer/songwriter and activist Ani DiFranco's song, "My
IQ." See http://www.righteousbabe.com/ani/puddledive/lmyiq.asp (last visited Sept.17,
2009).
79 See Panel III, Creating Models for Progressive Lawyering in the 21st Century, 9 J.L.
& POL'Y 297, 309 (2001) (comments of Lucie White) [hereinafter White, Creating Models];
see also Bachmann, supra note 15, at 21-29 (arguing that progressive lawyers should prac-
tice First Amendment, corporate, tax, criminal, procedural and ethics law).
80 See LOPEZ, supra, note 8, at 69.
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proach to legal work."' 81 As Bellow described of his own work:
In some of the efforts, we sought rule changes or injunctive relief
against a particular practice on behalf of an identified class. In other
situations, we pursued aggregate results by filing large numbers of
individual cases. Some strategies were carried out in the courts. At
other times we ignored litigation entirely in favor of bureaucratic
maneuvering and community and union organizing. Even when pur-
suing litigation, we often placed far greater emphasis on mobilizing
and educating clients, or strengthening the entities and organiza-
tions that represented them, than on judicial outcomes. And always,
we employed the lawsuit, whether pushed to conclusion or not, as a
vehicle for gathering information, positioning adversaries, asserting
bargaining leverage, and adding to the continuing process of defini-
tion and designation that occurs in any conflict. 82
Similarly, three decades before Jennifer Gordon used legal ser-
vices "as a draw," law "as a measure of justice," and law and law-
yering "as part of... larger organizing campaign[s]" in founding the
Workplace Project in Long Island, New York,83 the "people's" and
"poverty" lawyers of the 1960s and '70s did much the same.84 As long
as a politicized orientation exists, progressive lawyers have always
looked to any and all legal (and non-legal) methods as potential
tools-litigating, lobbying, counseling, researching, investigating, edu-
cating, organizing, engaging in dialogue and transactional work,8 5 and
building leadership 86-all for the purpose of stimulating and support-
ing activism. Every tool is and always has been a weapon-so long as
it is used to motivate and further effective client activism.
2. Some Methods Are Better than Others
Critics of this catholic approach point to the dilution and devolu-
tion of the lawyer's professional role in what amounts to a broad in-
junction to organize. Paul Tremblay, for example, argued that L6pez's
rebellious approach failed to account for the "triage"-like qualities of
street-level legal services practice. 87 Similarly, Ann Southworth ar-
gued that the rebellious approach "take[s] the lawyer out of progres-
81 Bellow, supra note 8, at 300. Note, however, that Bellow wrote these observations in
a retrospective article published in 1996, four years after L6pez's book. See also KINOY,
supra note 33.
82 Bellow, supra note 8, at 300.
83 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 438 et seq.
84 See, e.g., KINOY, supra note 33.
85 See, e.g., White, Creating Models, supra note 79, at 309.
86 See id. at 309-10.
87 See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, & Street Level Bit-
reaucracy, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 947 (1992).
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sive lawyering." s88 Of course, some methods are better-suited than
others in specific situations-but these are tactical contingencies, not
dogma.
The touchstone of this more discriminating view usually has been
a critique of litigation.89 But as with the debate over the lawyer's role,
it bears noting here that the critics of litigation have never argued that
it not be used, but rather that it not be a default strategy and be used
with greater reflection and caution. As Ascanio Piomelli puts it, the
skepticism is of "isolated litigation conducted as a stand-alone ap-
proach to social change, unconnected to and uninformed by collective
public action."90 That is, even those who advocate prioritizing other,
non-litigation, methods recognize that litigation remains an option.
Below, I summarize prescriptions from the full range of progressive
lawyering theory that, today, constitute the array of strategies and tac-
tics in each dimension in which progressive lawyers operate: litigation,
legal services, legislative and administrative "policy" advocacy, and
grassroots outreach, education and organizing.
a. Litigation
Affirmative and defensive litigation remain vital to progressive
practice. Proponents urge lawyers to use litigation creatively, defen-
sively and counteroffensively. 91 They urge its use to generate public
discussion of issues, 92 influence opinion,93 build coalitions and alli-
ances, 94 gather information, position adversaries, and assert bargain-
ing leverage.95 For example:
An effective political challenge to [an administrative] agency may
88 See Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 213 (1993).
89 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 455 (cataloguing critics' arguments that
litigation "discouraged client initiatives, diverted resources away from more effective strat-
egies, and [left] larger social change undone" and noting that some view litigation as "im-
pediment[ ] to social change due to ...[its] potential to 'co-opt social mobilization."')
(quoting White).
90 See Piomelli, supra note 49, at 1385-86.
91 See KINOY, supra note 33.
92 See Note, supra note 2, at 1087.
93 See id.
94 See id.; see also Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of
Same Sex Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERING III, supra note 1, at 84-100.
95 See Bellow, supra, note 8, at 300; see also Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on
Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L. J. 1317, 1335-47 (1964) (lawyers can use case
and controversy focus to organize people with too little energy to focus on anything more
than immediate needs and short-term goals); Narro, supra, note 13, at 348-57 (discussing
use of litigation in garment worker organizing campaign); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v.
Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 869-71 (1990)
(discussing how Goldberg v. Kelly remedy provided welfare activists a "versatile, tactical
weapon").
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be impossible without the type of detailed documentation that only
systematic discovery techniques can provide. It is on this base that
coalitions and publicity can be built, and that groups can be organ-
ized to limit previously invisible authority.
96
Similarly, politically motivated trials can reveal facts and information
about the government that otherwise would have been hidden, and, in
their repressive and contradictory nature, undermine the legitimacy
of-or demystify-the law and courts. 97
Litigation also can be used to provide a "frame" for lived exper-
iences, as a measure of justice, and to increase client confidence. 98
Discussing Goldberg v. Kelly,99 White observed that it:
responded to the needs of [the welfare rights] movement. In addi-
tion to securing the tactical resource of a constitutionalized entitle-
ment, the case also provided a rhetorical resource for all
subordinated groups. For by enlisting the Constitution's authority
on behalf of poor people seeking to participate in welfare decisions,
the case emboldened other groups to voice similar demands. It has
given poor people a state-sanctioned basis-a "right"-to seek dig-
nity from the government on a wide scale.
Legal remedies that are designed by lawyers to impose improved
conditions upon the poor aren't likely to do much to challenge sub-
ordination in the long run ... Yet when legal remedies respond to
strategic needs that emerge as poor people mobilize themselves,
those remedies can, indeed, make a difference. 100
Litigation has other uses. Advocates have litigated to exit losing
organizing campaigns, for example.101 And there are times when liti-
gation, and therefore litigation strategy, are unavoidable. Lawyers are
96 Note, supra note 2, at 1087.
97 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 370, 375 (progressive lawyers should use trials
to raise "authentic or unalienated political consciousness" to demystify and delegitimize
capitalism); Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 305 ("Demystification involved 'ex-
ploiting the contradictions of the system and heightening them until the courts are forced
to vindicate human rights, expose their hackish fascism or be hoisted with their own pe-
tard' ... [the goal was] to force a confrontation-in the courts or on the streets-whereby
the state would demonstrably violate its own laws, its own constitution, showing that injus-
tice occurred in a supposedly just system.") (internal citations omitted).
98 See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1989); White, supra note 95; see
also Gordon, supra note 8; Note, supra note 2, at 1087 (quoting Bellow on uses of litigation
to organize).
99 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
100 White, supra note 95, at 871-72; see also Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litiga-
tion: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 525-26, 541-44 (1994)
(environmental justice litigation can build morale, raise profile of community struggle, and
educate public and government officials).
101 See, e.g., Bachmann, supra note 15; Cole, supra note 32.
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forced to litigate when their clients are prosecuted for political activ-
ity.102 The political trials of the 1960s and '70s-the Chicago Eight,
Oakland Seven and Panther 21 trials, to name a few' 3-are the pro-
totypical examples of the use of litigation-in particular courtroom
tactics-to defend and motivate further client activism. Similar to the
use of affirmative litigation, lawyers have used political trials "as fo-
rums for 'truth,' as a means of challenging authority, as a way of edu-
cating the public about the defendant's political stance, and as a way
of organizing the movements around a shared experience. ' 10 4 In this
context, Peter Gabel and Paul Harris have called on practitioners to
use litigation as a way to raise an "authentic or unalienated political
consciousness" to demystify and delegitimize capitalism.105 This is par-
ticularly applicable to jury trials. In political trials, the audience for
organizing is not merely clients, courtroom attendees and the larger
public through the media, but the captive audience of the jury. 106 The
New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, founded by Arthur
Kinoy, Bill Kunstler and others, is a prime example of an organization
that uses litigation for "movement support.'
10 7
In sum, as Derrick Bell summarizes, litigation "can and should
serve lawyer and client as a community-organizing tool, an educa-
tional forum, a means of obtaining data, a method of exercising politi-
cal leverage, and a rallying point for public support." 10 8
b. Legal Services
Practitioners also use the provision of legal services to motivate
and support client activism. State-funded legal services programs in
fact originated with this goal in mind. The precursor to the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, the Office of Equal Opportunity, envisioned the
participation of clients and client organizations in its operations. 10 9
Later, as mentioned, proponents would frame this approach as using
102 See Bachmann, supra note 15; Note, supra note 2.
103 See, e.g., Robert Davis, The Chicago Seven Trial and the 1969 Democratic National
Convention, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 24, 1969, available at http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/politics/chi-chicagodays-seventrial-story,0,6172471.story; Anti-Draft Trial Hear-
ing in SF, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1968, at 14.
104 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 295.
105 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 370, 375.
106 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 298 n.795 (discussing juries' role in effect-
ing participatory democracy, and difference between juries and prosecution and judge).
107 See Center for Constitutional Rights, Movement Support, http://ccrjustice.org/
movement-support (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
108 Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 513 (1976).
109 See KATZ, supra note 72, at 69.
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legal services to draw and then organize clients. 110 In founding the
Workplace Project, for example, Gordon selectively provided legal
services to ensure the continued involvement of key organizers in a
community-based immigrants' rights organization."' This is not un-
like the NAACP's practice of providing free legal assistance only in
cases that are consistent with its campaign to implement Brown, 112 or
the practice of using attorneys as "lures" in organizing anti-war oppo-
sition in the military during the Vietnam War.113
c. Legislative and Administrative "Policy" Advocacy
Legislatures are, at least by definition, democratic institutions
whose specific function is to invite popular participation. Legislative-
or "policy"-advocacy, then, is often used to rally clients. In the ad-
ministrative arena, the public interest law movement pioneered citizen
access to administrative agencies in the 1970s. 114 Progressive lawyers
have capitalized on these democratic openings to organize client
participation.
115
In an essay exploring the difference between "rule-shifting" and
"culture-shifting," Tom Stoddard argued that because legislatures are
majoritarian institutions, legislative advocacy is superior to litigation
in the latter regard.
Judicial lawmaking... ought not to be abandoned by public interest
lawyers ... Lawsuits are effective at highlighting problems. They
may be effective at forcing governments to face up to problems. But
they are often ineffective at this long-term resolution of issues with
deep cultural roots, for they focus on rules rather than the culture
that sustains those rules, and as a result frequently fail to engage or
connect with the public.'
16
Compared to litigation, legislative and administrative advocacy are
110 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8.
111 See id.; see also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMI-
GRANTS RIGHTS (2005).
112 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 39.
113 See id. at 291 (internal citation omitted).
114 See Charles R. Halpern & John M. Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Inter-
est Law: Theory & Practice at the Center for Law & Social Policy, 59 GEORGETOWN L.J.
1095, 1109 (1971) (commitment of public interest lawyers is neither liberal nor conserva-
tive, but rather "to the adversary system itself, and specifically, to the principle that every-
one affected by corporate and bureaucratic decisions should have a voice in those
decisions, even if he cannot obtain conventional legal representation"); see also Section
II.B., infra at notes 174-272 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 41, at 634-36 (1992) (discussing how "second-wave" envi-
ronmental activist lawyers helped write most environmental legislation); Narro, supra note
13; Rice, supra note 67.
116 Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 985 (1997).
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more conducive to public participation and, therefore, arguably better
vehicles by which to motivate client activism and shift dominant
culture.
d. Grassroots Outreach, Education, Mobilization and
Organizing
Grassroots outreach, education, mobilization and organizing-
which some writers understandably conflate, 117 but nonetheless re-
quire disaggregation and systematization-are, of course, the most di-
rect methods by which progressive lawyers catalyze client activism.
But these methods are outside the monopoly or dominance of law-
yers. Only lawyers can litigate and provide legal services. And they
can play dominant, specifically defined, roles in legislative and admin-
istrative advocacy. Not so for grassroots outreach, education, mobili-
zation and organizing. In McCann's and Silverstein's parlance, here
lawyers play the role of both technician and activist; the "independent
cause lawyers" and "staff technicians" give way to the "nonpracticing
lawyers" and "legal staff activists. 1 18 Because of the myriad ways in
which one can organize, there is a breadth of tactics on offer. As Scott
Cummings and Ingrid Eagly observe, "[o]rganizing is often used as
shorthand for a range of community-based practices, such as organiza-
tion building, mobilization, education, consciousness raising, and legis-
lative advocacy."1 19 There is a distinction, as well, between organizing
and "popular education." As Cummings and Eagly explain, with pop-
ular education, it is the process of arriving at "a more critical under-
standing of the mechanisms of power and oppression[,] ... rather than
action taken as a result, that constitutes the core of the popular educa-
tion technique. '1
20
II. HISTORICIZING CLIENT ACTIVISM: THEORETICAL
EVOLUTION IN CONTEXT
As summarized above, progressive lawyering theory can be read
117 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services
Practice, 4 CLIN. L. REv. 433 (1998) (discussing community education and community or-
ganizing as separate undertakings, but nonetheless conflating them); Bill Ong Hing, Rebel-
lious Lawyering, Settlement, & Reconciliation: Soko Bukai v. YWCA, 5 Nev. L. J. 172
(2004) (same); Saru Jayaraman, Letting the Canary Lead: Power and Participation Among
Latinalo Immigrant Workers, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 103 (2002) (discussing
community outreach, education and organizing together); Zenobia Lai, Andrew Leong &
Chi Chi Wu, The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6
ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J. 1 (2000) (same). But see Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 481-82
(discussing distinction between popular education and community organizing).
118 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 59.
119 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 481.
120 Id. at 482.
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as a set of, at times, conflicting prescriptions relating to professional
affiliation, role and method. My argument is that our shared pur-
pose-popular activism-needs also to be understood from the per-
spective of (1) clients' ultimate political goals, (2) the larger societal
organizing context and (3) the entire panoply of activist methods. In
this Part, I place the evolution of progressive lawyering theory in his-
torical context to disaggregate client activism along these three axes.
In the most basic sense, the ebbs and flows of theoretical development
are not so much the product of one lawyering approach's superiority
over another, but rather of necessity and ingenuity-of progressive
practice being both a product and agent of historical circumstance. We
base our work primarily on the changes we want to see, the circum-
stances we find ourselves in, and the activism we choose to pursue
with clients. This always has been the case. But precisely because the-
oretical debate largely has been confined to professional affiliation,
role and method, progressive lawyering scholarship often has passed
over these threshold considerations and launched into examinations
of practice without first clarifying what those practices ought to be
about.
As described below, the evolution of progressive lawyering the-
ory has gone through five distinct, if overlapping, phases: people's,
movement and poverty lawyering in the 1960s and early '70s (collec-
tively, "movement" lawyering); public interest lawyering in the 1970s
and beyond; critical lawyering "on the margins" in the 1980s; commu-
nity or "rebellious" lawyering in the 1990s; and "social justice" law-
yering or "law and organizing" in the millenium.
In condensed form, the historical evolution progressed as follows.
The movement lawyers rode the crest of militant mass activism and
embraced radical objectives. Having won some of those objectives and
unable to sustain its momentum in the face of well-funded and organ-
ized counterattacks by regrouped adversaries, that activism collapsed
and fragmented as the country began to turn rightward politically. In
that period, the public interest lawyers (with whom the movement
lawyers tangled) became ascendant and paved a reversion to liberal-
legalist practice by reconceptualizing clients as an abstract and passive
"public," transforming clients into "causes," and raising the banner of
"access" to legal institutions (rather than the attainment of their cli-
ents' substantive objectives) as their goal. Prototypically, public inter-
est lawyers used litigation as their preeminent tool. (Indeed, the term
"public interest law" has become so pervasive that for many law stu-
dents and lawyers it now encompasses nearly all forms of progressive
lawyering.) In the 1980s, as the prospect of sustained activism in the
United States dimmed even further, progressive lawyering theory re-
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fashioned its role to that of "critic" (of liberal-legalist lawyering) and
was pushed, in the words of at least two writers, to "the margins."
'121
In the 1980s, scholars simultaneously turned inward and concentrated
on catalyzing activism by refining the lawyer-client relationship, and
outward, to struggles outside the United States for inspiration (nota-
bly resistance struggles against Apartheid in South Africa and dictato-
rial, military rule in Central America). Informed by critical legal and
lawyering theory, the turn inward sought to end liberal-legalist domi-
nance and its adverse impact on activism but assumed claustrophobic
proportions as postmodernism dominated the academy in the 1990s.
Not coincidentally, perhaps, the debate over progressive lawyers'
domination of their clients' political agenda occurred precisely during
a more promising political landscape that nonetheless saw little on-
the-ground, sustained activism (the Clinton era). Despite eight diffi-
cult years of the George W. Bush (Bush II) Administration, the politi-
cal pendulum may have finally swung back to the left, providing
renewed hope for a return to mass activism (as seen in the anti-global-
ization protests at the turn of the century, post-September 11, 2001
anti-war and pro-immigrant demonstrations, and the groundswell of
support for Barack Obama's presidential campaign). In this current
period, it seems that progressive lawyering theory has once again re-
oriented outwards.
Let me emphasize a few points before beginning this discussion.
First, the historical periods I summarize are contested and overlap,
sometimes substantially. I do not profess to render a definitive ac-
count of any of them. If anything, my account is revisionist insofar as
legal scholarship is concerned. Rather, in taking a historical perspec-
tive, I seek only to identify the central dynamic that, I argue, defined
progressive lawyering theory in each of these phases. Second, a com-
prehensive account of popular activism in this long period is also
outside the scope of my inquiry. I rely only on selected areas of activ-
ism-chief among them, around civil rights, poverty and war-and
write an anecdotal rendition of the periods from the perspective of
these clients and the lawyers who represented, and continue to re-
present, them. By placing theoretical development in this perspective,
I hope to show that certain lawyering approaches to client activism
dominated because of broader social circumstances and not because
any given approach is transhistorically relevant or effective.
121 See Bachmann, supra note 15, at 4 ("role that lawyers play in the development and
articulation of value and law in society is rather marginal"); White, Mobilization on the
Margins, supra note 98.
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A. 'Revolution': The 'New Social Movements' and People's and
Poverty Lawyering in the 1960s and '70s
The radical social movements of the 1960s and early '70s plucked
many lawyers from traditional, commercial law practice, and turned
them into prolific civil rights, "people's," "poverty" and "movement"
lawyers. 122 In turn, these lawyers emulated their clients politically and
culturally, a prototypical relationship that would provide an enduring
cast on progressive legal practice.
1. The New Social Movements
Raising the banner of radical democracy and revolution, the era's
mass movements against racism, war, poverty and sexism-combined
with union combativeness toward the end of the period123-not only
won sweeping reforms124 but, by the late 1960s, shook the very foun-
dations of American capitalism.12 5 The year 1968 best captures the
122 Writers have used the term "people's lawyer" in various ways. For example, Diana
Klebanow and Franklin Jonas consider Bella A. Lockwood, who practiced in the 19th to
early 20th century, as well as Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as such. DI-
ANA KLEBANOW & FRANKLIN L. JONAS, PEOPLE'S LAWYERS: CRUSADERS FOR JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2003). I use the term here to refer to the cohort of lawyers who
practiced in the 1960s in the service of the new social movements. See MARLISE JAMES,
THE PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (1973).
123 As Loren Goldner observed: "From 1966 to 1973, American workers, often led by
black workers, became increasingly combative. The strike wave of 1969-70 (the most
important since World War II) and the famous wildcats in auto in 1972-73 showed that
both 'business unionism' and management were losing control of the working class." See
Loren Goldner, A Critique of Kim Moody's An Injury to All, http://home.earthlink.net/
-lrgoldner/moodyll.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). The convergence of the new social
movements and union militancy saw its high point in the Dodge Revolutionary Union
Movement (DRUM), which challenged the Ford Motor Company's treatment of African
Americans in its workforce and sought to bring New Left revolutionary politics into the
union movement. See DAN GEORGAKAS & MARVIN SURKIN, DETROIT: I Do MIND DYING:
A STUDY IN URBAN REVOLUTION (1998).
124 Among the legal reforms of the era in the legislative arena were: the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and 1968, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq and 18 U.S.C. § 245 et seq. (2000)); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (2000)); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-284, Title
VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 etseq. (2000)); Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 5629 (1963) (codified at U.S.C. § 201 (2000)); Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000)). Among the reforms in the executive arena: Executive Order
No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 684 (1966-70) (requiring federal contractors to establish affirmative
action programs for women); Executive Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965) (requiring
private contractors receiving federal funds to adopt affirmative action plans, including
timetables for giving preferences to women and racial minorities; mandating smaller em-
ployers to comply with non-discrimination requirements and imposing more substantive
requirements for employers with contracts of more than $50,000).
125 For a summary of the social movements of the 1960s and '70s, see VAN GOSSE, THE
MOVEMENTS OF THE NEW LEFT 1950-75: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (2004); see
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militancy of the 1960s. That "watershed year," Max Elbaum summa-
rizes, saw the "emergence of a revolutionary-minded layer of activ-
ists."' 126 As he recounts:
Beginning with the explosion of the Vietnamese Tet offensive at the
end of January, that year's extraordinary calendar included Lyndon
Johnson's forced withdrawal from the presidential race in March;
the assassination of Martin Luther King in April followed by Black
uprisings in more than 100 cities; Robert Kennedy's assassination in
June; and the nomination of Hubert Humphrey as Democratic can-
didate for president that August while police battered demonstra-
tors in the streets of Chicago.
127
"[Tlhe nation," warned Newsweek magazine, is "building toward
organized insurrection within the next few years. z12 8 Echoed Business
Week: "This is a dangerous situation. It threatens the whole economic
and social structure of the nation. ' 129 "[E]verything was possible,"
wrote Chris Harman. 130 And in the succeeding few years, these prog-
noses seemed to bear fruition. Social revolution seemed squarely on
the agenda.
131
The frequency of protest activity and the size, militancy and influ-
ence of leading organizations are, by now, legend. Closely examining
such activity as reported in the New York Times between 1960 and
1986, sociologists Sarah Soule and Jennifer Earle report a peak of
1,052 protest events in 1965-nearly three daily.132 Protesters engaged
in "outsider tactics," such as "rallies, demonstrations, marches, vigils,
pickets, civil disobedience, physical or verbal attacks, riots, melees, or
boycotts. ' 133 Their numbers were massive. At its height, the civil
rights movement commanded the following of hundreds of
also TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1988);
JAMES MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS: FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF
CHICAGO (1987); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2003).
Mass left-wing militancy was not confined to the United States. Nineteen sixty-eight was
also the year of the French May general strike, "Prague Spring," Italian "Hot Autumn"
and Portugese revolution. See MAX ELBAUM, REVOLUTION IN THE AIR: SIXTIES RADICALS
TURN TO LENIN, MAO AND CHE (2002); CHRIS HARMAN, THE FIRE LAST TIME: 1968 AND
AFTER (1988).
126 See ELBAUM, supra note 125, at 16.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1.
129 Id.
130 HARMAN, supra note 125, at viii.
131 See White, supra note 95, at 873 (Justice Brennan wrote Goldberg v. Kelly opinion in
context of "widespread frustration ... real fears, among the nation's elites, of full-scale
social revolution"); see, generally, FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 181-359 (1979); ZINN,
supra note 125, at 435-528.
132 See Soule & Earle, supra note 18, at 350. Protest activity declined thereafter. Id.
133 See id. at 352.
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thousands-if not millions-of Americans. The landmark March on
Washington on August 28, 1963, for example, (in which Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., gave his famous "I Have A Dream" speech) broke
records by drawing more than 250,000 to the Lincoln Memorial.
134
A slew of stalwart organizations provided the backbone for these
historic mobilizations. At its height, Dr. King's Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC), an umbrella organization of civil
rights organizations, had 247 organizational members and worked in
16 Southern and border states.135 Other organizations, including the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which also
led civil rights organizing in the South; the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), which led the anti-war movement nationally; the Black
Panther Party, which spearheaded the Black Power movement; and
the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), which led the
welfare rights movement, were also sizeable and influential. 136 In an
interview with CNN in August, 1996, Black Panther co-founder Bobby
Seale recalled that after Dr. King's assassination in 1968,
my party was jumping by leaps and bounds. In a matter of six
months, we swelled; in 1968, from 400 members to 5,000 members
and 45 chapters and branches ... Our newspaper swell[ed] to over
100,000 circulation. By mid-1969, we had 250,000 circulation... We
got 5,000 full-time working members in the Black Panther Party,
mostly college students ... 137
Martha Davis estimates that at one point, the membership of the
NWRO "stabilized at about 20,000. ' ' 138
Among these activists were approximately three million who con-
sidered themselves "revolutionary," 139 many of them organized cadre
of leading radical organizations. The largest and most dominant of
134 See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 125, at 132.
135 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 762 (Margaret Fisk ed., 6th ed., 1970). The 1980
edition of the Encyclopedia reports that the SCLC had 80 chapters and 12 staff members.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 904 (Denise S. Akey ed., 15th ed., 1980). See also Adam
Fairclough, The Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-59, 52 J. OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 403, 404 (1986).
136 See, e.g., EMILY STOPER, THE STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE:
THE GROWTH OF RADICALISM IN A CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATION 71, 79 (1989) (discuss-
ing SNCC's growth to nearly 200 paid staff members in 1964 and "large number of local
volunteers, some of them full time"); see also HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLI-
TIONISTS (1965).
137 See Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAseale.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2009).
138 See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS & THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT, 1960-1973, at 55 (1993).
139 See ELBAUM, supra note 125, at 18; see also Geoff Bailey, SDS and the Struggles of
the 1960s, SOCIALIST WORKER, Apr. 28, 2006, at 10, available at http://socialistworker.org/
2006-1/586/586 10 SDS.shtml.
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these were the "New Left" activists, avowed "Marxist-Leninists" who
looked to the revolutions in China, Cuba and Vietnam, among other
militant struggles, for inspiration. 140 In contrast to classical Marxism,
which looked to the "working class," these aspiring revolutionaries-
prefiguring a key element in progressive lawyering theory- looked
primarily to the "oppressed"-people of color, the poor, women, gays
and lesbians-as the primary agents of social change. 141 The New Left
theorists of the period dismissed the predominantly white working
class in the United States-which they equated with the "middle
class"-as "bought off" by their affluence and "white privilege. '142
Working class whites, they argued, were too economically comfortable
and benefited too much from racism, imperialism, sexism and
homophobia to be allies in struggle. 143 Progressives therefore sought
to organize autonomously among African-Americans and other peo-
ple of color, poor people, women and other oppressed groups, which,
in the 1960s, were the motors for social struggle. By then, the radical-
ism of the organized, predominantly white, working class, which led
the anti-poverty and union struggles of the 1930s and '40s, indeed had
waned-in turn the result of McCarthyism, Stalinism and middle-class
affluence. To the disappointment of classical Marxists and other radi-
cals, for example, many unions at the time supported the Vietnam
War.144
2. People's and Poverty Lawyering
Activated by these movements, the progressive lawyers of the
1960s and '70s adopted like perspectives and tactics-even lifestyles.
They took mass activism and civil disobedience as givens, questioned
the legitimacy of "the Establishment" and sought to forge co-equal
partnerships with their clients in their pursuit of radical social
change.
145
Ann Fagan Ginger's view was shared by many: "What is the
movement? I won't attempt a definition, but certainly there is a peace
140 See ELBAUM, supra note 125, at 110.
141 See id. at 129-44.
142 See Bailey, supra note 139.
143 See id.
144 See STEVE BABSON, THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE: TURNING POINTS IN AMERICAN
LABOR, 1877-PRESENT 160-61 (1999); WALTER GALENSON, THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT, 1955-1995, 123-25 (1996); PHILLIP S. FONER, U.S. LABOR & VIETNAM WAR
(1998); FRAN KOSCIELSKI, DIVIDED LOYALTIES: AMERICAN UNIONS & THE VIETNAM
WAR (1999); RONALD RADOSH, AMERICAN LABOR & UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
443-444 (1967); Labor Endorses Vietnam Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,1965, at 88; David R.
Jones, Labor Vows 'Unstinting Support' of Vietnam Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1965, at 2.
145 See Anthony P. Sager, Radical Law: Three Collectives in Cambridge, in Co-ops,
COMMUNES & COLLECTIVES 136, 138 (John Case & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, eds., 1979)
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movement, a student movement, a movement of the poor for welfare
rights and tenants' rights, and movements of the Negro people, the
Spanish-American people, and the immigrants. ' 146 Clients-or "the
people" (as movement lawyers sought to demystify the lawyer-client
relationship and saw themselves as co-equal activists)-were in mo-
tion: organizing, challenging, radicalizing.
The focal point of that activism was "the System." Hence, al-
though the various movements sought reform-civil rights, an end to
the war in Vietnam, free speech, gay and lesbian rights, immigrant
rights-taught by their own experiences and New Left ideology, they
also simultaneously questioned the ability of the legal system (and
capitalism, in general) to meaningfully effectuate their demands. The
New Left activists saw their goal as replacing the current system with
something different, which some articulated as a "radical democratic
vision" 147 or socialism.1 48 The "System" and "Establishment"-capi-
talism and the state-were the problem and enemy, to be confronted
or avoided as circumstances warrant, or to be manipulated when pos-
sible or necessary. While progressive lawyers at the time did not have
a common political ideology (indeed, they disagreed on any number
of political issues 149), they all pursued progressive lawyering as an ex-
plicitly politicized endeavor. This, of course, was the era of the Gulf of
Tonkin, Richard Nixon, and the Chicago Democratic National Con-
vention. People saw government duplicity and complicity firsthand.
"What characterize[d] this period in legal relationships as contrasted
with earlier periods," observed Robert Lefcourt, at the time a mem-
ber of a legal commune in New York,
[was] precisely an 'erosion of the concept of legality.' The erosion
[was] characterized by (1) a belief that the law and legal institutions
are not only unresponsive but illegitimate; (2) a condemnation of
the bureaucratic delays, judicial indifference, and overt racism of
most courts; (3) a rejection, and in many instances a contempt for
Establishment officials-police, judges and lawyers; and (4) an affir-
146 Ginger, supra note 2, at 12.
147 See ZIrN, supra note 136 (discussing SNCC's and Ella Baker's vision of radical de-
mocracy). For a good discussion of SNCC's and Ella Baker's radical democratic vision, see
Piomelli, supra note 9, at 587-95.
148 See JAMES, supra note 122; LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW,
ORDER & THE COURTS (Robert Lefcourt, ed., 1971).
149 For example, while Bill Kunstler, Michael Tigar and Stephen Wexler expressed trepi-
dation about engaging their clients' politics, Robert Lefcourt argued that the relationship
between lawyer and client was one "in which political convictions and the exposition of a
political program and beliefs are not outside the lawyer's province and not reserved for
comment by the client alone." LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 148, at 4. Ralph
Nader also argued against the influence of Marxism, which the New Leftists espoused:
"Who needs Marxist-Leninist rhetoric when you can get them on good old Christian eth-
ics?" Note, supra note 2, at 1105.
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mation of individual rights and an identification with group, class,
racial and sexual liberation. 1
50
"In the past," echoed Bill Kunstler, "lawyers, myself included,
viewed the law as sacred and inviolate. But movement law considered
the legal system as something to be used or changed, in order to gain
the political objectives of the clients in a particular case. ' 151 Progres-
sive lawyers would enforce or create laws that suited their agenda,
violate and challenge those that did not, and change "the System" to
benefit their clients' interests.
In the era of civil disobedience and radical ideals, "[tihe task of
the litigator ... is a combination of offense and defense to protect the
Movement against attack and to use the rules of the courtroom game
to keep its leaders out of jail and to prevail in particular confronta-
tions which circumstances dictate must take place in the court-
room. '152 In this period, progressive lawyers unanimously believed
that social movements-not the law or lawyers-were the agents of
social change. "The thing I understood after six months there [Wash-
ington, D.C.]," said Marian Wright Edelman, who was working with
the Jackson, Mississippi, office of the NAACP LDF at the time, "was
that you could file all the suits you wanted to, but unless you had a
community base you weren't going to get anywhere. 1 53 Test case liti-
gation by itself, echoed Bellow, was "a dead end . . . 'rule' change,
without a political base to support it, just doesn't produce any sub-
stantial result because rules are not self-executing: they require an en-
forcement mechanism." 154 Bellow, who represented the Black
Panther Party and United Farm Workers, used a series of class action
suits to "encourage[ ] clients to give mutual aid to others in similar
situations, to join or create organizations that permitted them to act
collectively in pressing their grievances, and to educate themselves
about the systemic nature of many of the problems they
encountered ."155
The lawyer's role was "serv[ing] the movement" 156-i.e., support-
ing activism. Presaging arguments made by Anthony Alfieri, L6pez
150 LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 148, at 11.
151 WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, My LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 103 (1994).
152 Michael E. Tigar, Lawyer's Role in Resistance, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra
note 148, at 12.
153 Note, supra note 2, at 1081.
154 Id. at 1077. Many attorneys at the time echoed this sentiment. Jim Lorenz of Califor-
nia Rural Legal Assistance talked about the need for a strong client base and "political
power." See id. at 1085. Ralph Nader talked about the need for the support of a vocal
public. Id. at 1099.
155 Bellow, supra note 8, at 298.
156 JONATHAN BLACK, RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN
THE COURTS 302 (1971) (quoting Kunstler).
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and Gordon decades later, Wexler, then a NWRO attorney, argued
that traditional legal practice was "either not relevant to poor people
or harmful to them. ' 157 To strengthen client organization, argued
Wexler, a lawyer should "refuse to handle matters for individuals not
in the organization."'158 Lawyers should train clients to do legal work,
he argued, and must not lead them.159
Movement lawyers also used the courtroom as a forum for politi-
cal education and advocacy. In criminal trials, for example, they used
the proceedings to raise larger political issues instead of presenting
traditional legal claims. They attempted to discuss discriminatory hir-
ing policies, the civil rights movement, the legality of the Vietnam
War, post-colonial practices, free speech, police brutality, and other
issues. 160 As commentators have noted, Kunstler made a staple of
attacking the presiding judge with gusto, identifying with the radical
ideology of the defendants, using the trial to make political state-
ments of his own, engaging in theatrics to attract attention, depart-
ing from the accepted standards of courtroom behavior, seeking
publicity to give a positive spin on his clients, turning tables on the
prosecution by putting the legal system on trial, and employing hu-
mor as a tactic of the defense.'
61
In criminal trials, Kunstler-like other movement lawyers-aimed to
collaborate with clients in courtroom tactics. As contrasted with tradi-
tional practice, in which lawyers spoke for their clients, Kunstler and
others sometimes used the tactic of "self-defense," in which clients
spoke to the court and, more importantly, the jury, directly. This tactic
aimed to demystify the law.16
2
Through the use of the full range of legal tools, the lawyer's goal
was the self-organization of, and partnership with clients to sustain, a
social movement capable of radically transforming society. "[T]he test
of success for a people's lawyer," argued Arthur Kinoy was
not always the technical winning or losing of the formal proceeding.
Again and again, the real test was the impact of the legal activities
on the morale and understanding of the people involved in the
struggle. To the degree that legal work helped to develop a sense of
strength, an ability to fight back, it was successful. This could even
157 See Wexler, supra note 35, at 1054. By traditional legal practice, Wexler meant the
formal, often paternalistic representation of the client by his lawyer. See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 303-04.
161 KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note 122, at 308; see also Hilbink Dissertation, supra
note 29, at 131 (citing example of attorney telling state judge to "drop dead" while using
civil rights removal statute).
162 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 113-14 (quoting and summarizing Father
Robert Drinan, former Dean of Boston College Law School).
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be achieved without reaching the objective of formal victory.' 63
As he continued: "If it helped the fight, then it was done, even if the
chances of immediate legal success were virtually nonexistent.
164
Indeed, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the prede-
cessor to the Legal Services Corporation, which attracted thousands
of law graduates into "poverty" lawyering, attempted to institutional-
ize client activism by requiring the poor's "maximum feasible partici-
pation" in the war on poverty. 165 The OEO sought to develop
"indigenous leaders" among the poor. 166 Here, too, poverty lawyers,
like their counterparts in the other movements, were closely allied
with the welfare rights movement. The landmark case Goldberg v.
Kelly, White later observed, "was part of a grassroots movement for
the poor. Its remedy expanded the movement's tactical options and
gave legal expression to its normative vision[.]"'
167
Again, presaging later formulations, movement lawyers consid-
ered themselves co-equal activists with their clients. 168 "The role of
the radical lawyer," said Kinoy, "was the same as the role of the radical
in any arena of life."'1 6 9 In trying to forge these co-equal relationships,
however, they were also mindful of dominating the movements, orga-
nizations and clients they represented. These lawyers worried that
they would unnecessarily conservatize activism or co-opt it into legal
channels.1 70 Some believed that because lawyers were not typically of
163 KINOY, supra note 33, at 57-58.
164 Id. at 71.
165 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, H.R. 11377, Section 202(a)(3), 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1964. See generally Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community
Development & Social Change, 6 CLIN. L. REv 217 (1999). As Jack Katz explained in the
context of poverty law: "'Community' legal counsel, 'neighborhood' offices, representation
of poor clients on the board, and 'community education' all resonated with themes that ran
through national social welfare policy in the 1960s: 'outreach,' 'maximum feasible partici-
pation,' 'community control."' KATZ, supra note 72, at 69. For a history of civil legal ser-
vices in the United States, see ALAN HOUSEMAN & LINDA PERLE, SECURING LEGAL
JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF LEGAL HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (2003); DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COM-
MUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 89 et seq. (1969).
166 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 177-78.
167 White, supra note 95, at 872-73.
168 See BLACK, supra note 156, at 302-03; Ginger, supra note 2. As John Flym put it,
I live with the people I represent. I represent very few people who are not friends, to
a greater or lesser degree. I participate in their activities. My life style is different
because I don't think of myself as a lawyer at all. I am a human being. I have a skill,
and I spend my time doing things among people that I like.
Note, supra note 2, at 1144; see also Muhammad I. Kenyatta, Community Organizing, Cli-
ent Involvement, and Poverty Law, 35 MONTHLY REVIEW 5, 23 (1983) ("genuine sense of
identification with the poor").
169 LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 148, at 277-78 (emphasis added).
170 See Wexler, supra note 35, at 1065 ("No lawyer has a right to deny them [ ] victory by
structuring the alternatives as he sees them or by denying [clients] the chance to choose
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the oppressed, they had no business leading them politically. To guard
against this, the people's and poverty lawyers sought to demystify
their professional status by training their clients to be paralegals and
to advocate for themselves. 171 Lawyers formed politicized legal collec-
tives that strived for equal office relationships. 172 They opened offices
close to where their clients lived and worked rather than staying in
downtown locales. Many flocked to the South to assist the civil rights
movement.
173
B. 'Access': America's 'Right Turn' and the Ascendance of Public
Interest Lawyering in the 1970s and Beyond
The political "right turn" that U.S. society underwent in the ensu-
ing years 174 fundamentally altered this orientation. As the new social
movements collapsed, movement lawyering collapsed with them-in
reality, if not in rhetoric. For long after these movements' twilight,
progressive lawyers continued to speak of them as if they still existed
or their revival were still a realistic possibility under the changed, in-
hospitable circumstances. In the reactionary period that began in the
mid-1970s, the truth was that the movements could not respond ade-
quately to the twin strategy against their political militancy-state re-
pression and its diversion into respectable institutional channels.
Consequently, the radicalism of the movement lawyers was eclipsed
by the liberalism of the "new public interest lawyers.' 75 With the as-
cendancy of public interest lawyering came a shift in focus away from
movement lawyers' open challenge to law and legal institutions to-
ward instead seeking "access"' 176 to those institutions-from radical
their own way and use their lawyer to achieve their end. A lawyer must help them do their
thing, or get out.")
171 See Kenyatta, supra note 168, at 18 (describing efforts of NWRO).
172 See KUNSTLER, supra note 151; Paul Harris, The San Francisco Community Law
Collective, 7 LAW & POL'Y 19 (1985); Sager, supra note 145; Santa Barbara Legal Collec-
tive, Is Anybody There? Notes on Collective Practice, in WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY & SO-
CIAL CHANGE 247-256 (Frank Lindenfield & Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, eds., 1982); Hilbink
Dissertation, supra note 29, at 308-20 (discussing formation and problems of law
communes).
173 See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 95, at 1334.
174 This phenomenon has been widely discussed. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF
THE AMERICAN DREAM (1986); THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 78-113 (1987);
ZINN, supra note 125, at 573-82.
175 See Note, supra note 2.
176 RALPH NADER & MARK GREEN, VERDICTS ON LAWYERS Vii (1976); see also Hal-
pern & Cunningham, supra note 114; Benjamin W. Heineman, In Pursuit of the Public
Interest, 84 YALE L. J. 182, 184 (1974) ("advancement of the public interest does not neces-
sarily depend upon substantive victories of the unrepresented but instead [upon] participa-
tion"); cf David Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE L.J.
327 (1996) (criticizing liberal notion of access as cause for crisis in public interest law).
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movementism to "professionalized reform. ' 177 The substantial litiga-
tion victories that continued even after the collapse of mass activism
only reinforced this reorientation. To many, those victories demon-
strated that legal institutions could be receptive to (self-preserving)
social change. This receptivity ushered the use of litigation (and legal
advocacy in general) to catalyze mass activism-a profound reversal
of roles. No longer were living, breathing mass movements using law-
yers to strengthen their politics and organization. Instead, beginning
in the mid-1970s, lawyers began to rely on legal advocacy to salvage
and revive the waning political movements. Rhetorically, client activ-
ism remained an essential component of public interest lawyering.
178
But it became secondary to legal reform, and its goal was now simply
institutional participation, not belligerence and radical change.
Four factors defined the ascendance of public interest lawyering
in this new era. First was the return of economic crisis to the U.S. (and
world) economy, which provided the ruling class the imperative to re-
group and reunite behind an economic and political counteroffensive
against the radicalism of the New Left. Second was the New Left's
inability to defeat this counteroffensive. In the face of a reconsolidat-
ing political and economic elite, the New Left was hampered by its
political and organizational orientation, and immaturity; once mighty,
it fragmented, dissipated and atomized. Third, the social movements
became victims of their own successes. The litigation brought by
movement and poverty lawyers flourished under a more receptive
state apparatus: public interest lawyers obtained institutional accept-
ance and ideological and financial support from state agencies, foun-
dations and the bar. Poverty lawyers achieved their greatest successes,
for example, after the welfare rights movement collapsed. Public inter-
est law was born in this double-edged period of receptivity and sup-
port. Finally, in the academy, the two progressive legal disciplines,
which arose out of the social ferment of the previous era-critical le-
gal studies (CLS) and the second wave of clinical legal education-
bifurcated, obscuring the dialectic between law reform and fundamen-
tal social change. Without challenging the foundations of capitalism,
the "constitutive theory of law," a cornerstone of radical legal theory
and practice, became the intellectual basis for a new reformist law-
yering project. As a consequence, progressive lawyering increasingly
emphasized professional competence over political substance, a pro-
177 See KATZ, supra note 62, at 172-178.
178 For example, leading public interest law advocate Ralph Nader insisted on the role
of "citizen action." See ROBERT F. BUCKHORN, NADER: THE PEOPLE'S LAWYER 37 (1972);
RALPH NADER, THE RALPH NADER READER 344 (2000); see also Note, supra note 2, at
1077, 1081, 1085, 1099 (various public interest lawyers discussing need for activism).
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cess-oriented liberalism over a substantive radical agenda.
1. The 'Employers' Offensive'17 9: America's Right Turn
The "system," writes the historian Howard Zinn, underwent a
"complex process of consolidation" in the 1970s. 180 It was a process
whose goal was not only the arrest and reversal of the gains of the new
social movements, but also the dismantling of the New Deal. And it
had far-reaching economic, political and social dimensions. There had
been powerful opposition to the new social movements all along, of
course. But the economic crisis of the mid-1970s compelled the U.S.
ruling class, which, until then, had been divided on its response to left-
wing militancy, to reconsolidate and mount a united counteroffensive.
a. Return of Economic Crisis
The post-war prosperity that doubled real incomes and dramati-
cally expanded and reshaped the American middle class came to a
halt in 1973. The recession that began in November that year and
lasted until March of 1975, was "by far the longest and deepest eco-
nomic downturn in the United States ... since the Great Depression;"
it was the time in which "the great developments that eventually
drove American politics to the right became dramatically evident. ' 181
Coupled with stiffer economic competition from Japan and Ger-
many,182 the recession formed the basis for a new employer consensus
179 Various authors have used this term to describe measures corporations undertook to
restore profitability in the mid-1970s. See, e.g., ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
GLOBAL TURBULENCE 146 (2006).
180 See ZINN, supra note 125, at 554.
181 See FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 174, at 78. The economic deterioration was
evident as far back as 1965, when the profits of U.S. firms began to decline, and, in the
ensuing 15 years, would fail to regain their 1960s levels:
Annual net investment in plant and equipment followed suit, falling from an average
4 percent of GNP during 1966-70 to 3.1 over 1971-75 and 2.9 percent over 1976-80.
As the baby-boom generation moved into the job market into the 1970s, the average
annual growth rate of net fixed investment per worker dropped even more sharply,
falling from 3.9 percent during 1966-70 to a bare 0.4 percent over 1976-80. Productiv-
ity suffered in turn, as the annual growth of output per worker employed in nonresi-
dential business fell from 2.45 percent over 1948-73 to 0.08 percent over 1973-79. Not
surprisingly, overall growth rates tumbled. Average annual growth in real GNP also
tumbled, from 4.1 percent over 1960-73 to 2.3 percent over 1973-80.
Id. See also WILLIAM C. BERMAN, AMERICA'S RIGHT TURN: FROM NIXON TO CLINTON (2d
ed. 1998); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY (1984)..
182 The United States emerged from World War 11 the dominant world economic power.
But because of the succeeding arms race with the former Soviet Union-developing what
commentators have called the "permanent arms economy"-it declined in relation to other
countries that pursued no such policy. By the early 1970s, Germany and Japan had caught
up economically with the U.S., in particular in the auto and electronics industries. See
Michael Kidron, A Permanent Arms Economy, 28 INT'L SOCIALIsM 8 (1967), available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/kidron/works/1967/xx/permarms.htm; see also DAVIS,
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to bust unions, lay off workers, and cut wages and benefits. It was the
dawn of American de-industrialization, a competitive retooling that
sought to recapture U.S. world economic dominance at the expense of
workers and the poor.
Thus began the (to-date largely unabated) economic and social
decline of the progressive lawyer's clientele. Poverty lawyers bore wit-
ness to their clients' worsening living conditions. Whereas poverty
rates declined continuously from 1959 to 1974, rate increases were evi-
dent by 1978. Between 1978 and 1980, the percentage of people in
poverty rose from 11.4 to 13. Between 1980 and 1983, it rose further to
15.2.183 Then, again, between 1990 and 1993, the poverty rate rose
from 13.5% to 15.1%.
184
The recession laid the basis for what then Secretary of the Trea-
sury John Conolly called a "new level of partnership" between big
business and government. 8 5 As a Business Week editorial put it:
Some people will have to do with less-cities and states, the home
mortgage market, small businesses and the consumer will all get less
than they want. It will be a hard pill for many Americans to swal-
supra note 174, at 181 ("military Keynesianism has strained the financial system to the
point of crisis and contributed to the virtual destruction of the competitive position of
American manufactures").
183 These are official rates, widely acknowledged to be a poor measure of real poverty.
See, e.g., William Julius Wilson & Robert Aponte, Urban Poverty, 11 ANN. REV. SOCIOL.
231 (1985); Carolyn J. Hill & Robert T. Michael, Measuring Poverty in the NLSY97, JCPR
WORKING PAPERS 210 (Northwestern U./U. Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research,
2000).
184 See FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 174, at 80. As John Calmore has noted:
From 1970 to 1990, the number of neighborhoods with at least forty percent poor
people more than doubled and the total number of persons residing in such neigh-
borhoods grew from 4.1 million to eight million people. The number of African
Americans in such neighborhoods increased from 2.4 million to 4.2 million, with
most of them living in highly segregated, ghetto neighborhoods. Latinos living in
barrios, or high-poverty areas, rose from 729,000 to two million.
John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the
Intersection of Race, Space, & Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1930 (1999) (internal
footnotes omitted). See also DAVIS, supra note 174, at 178 ("protracted stagflation pro-
duced chasms of inequality between working-class strata. In the 1970s, for instance, the
wage differential (not including supplementals) between steelworkers and apparel workers
virtually doubled; or in absolute terms, where the difference between their wages in 1970
was $83, in 1980 it was $277!") (citation omitted); Wilson & Aponte, supra note 183, at 235
("For workers, the picture became particularly gloomy. After averaging 3.8 percent over
1965-69, unemployment rose 5.4 percent over 1970-74 and 7 percent over 1975-79. Average
real gross weekly earnings for private nonagricultural workers moved erratically in the late
1960s and early 1970s, rising 3 percent between 1965 and 1969, then dropping in 1970 be-
low their 1968 level, then rising again to a postwar peak in 1972. After that they trended
sharply downward, and by 1980 reached their lowest level since 1962. Real median family
income also stagnated: after doubling between 1947 and 1973, it dropped 6 percent over
1973-80.").
185 See ROBERT FISHER, LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZING IN
AMERICA 122 et seq. (1994).
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low-the idea of doing with less so that big business can have more.
Nothing that this nation or any other nation has done in modern
history compares in difficulty with the selling job that must be done
to make people accept the new reality.' 86
b. Political Dimensions of the 'Employers' Offensive'
The Right had a blueprint for that "selling job" as early as 1971.
That year, upon the request of the National Chamber of Commerce,
American Bar Association president (and later Supreme Court Jus-
tice) Lewis F. Powell, Jr. sounded the alarm and penned a memoran-
dum laying out a strategy. "[B]usiness and the enterprise system are in
deep trouble," he wrote, "and the hour is late. ' 187 He declared: "We
are not dealing with sporadic or isolated attacks from a relatively few
extremists or even from the minority socialist cadre. Rather, the as-
sault on the enterprise system is broadly based and consistently pur-
sued. It is gaining momentum and converts. ' 188 Arguing that the
"survival" of capitalism was at stake, Powell observed that "[t]he most
disquieting voices joining the chorus of criticism come from perfectly
respectable elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit,
the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences,
and from politicians."' a8 9 Lamenting big business' response-"ap-
peasement, ineptitude and ignoring the problem"190-Powell argued
that "the time has come - indeed, it is long overdue - for the wisdom,
ingenuity and resources of American business to be marshaled against
those who would destroy it."' 91
The plan was for a systematic counteroffensive. Powell called for
the appointment of executive vice-presidents to implement his strat-
egy.192 Among other initiatives, he called for "staffs of eminent schol-
ars, writers and speakers, who will do the thinking, the analysis, the
writing and the speaking" for big business; the evaluation of textbooks
for political "balance"; equal time for pro-capitalist activists in campus
activities; and graduate courses extolling the virtues of capitalism and
186 Id.
187 Confidential Memorandum, "Attack on American Free Enterprise System," from
Lewis F. Powell to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, dated Aug. 23, 1971, at 1, http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate-ac-
countability/powell-memolewis.html [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. As an attorney,
Powell was known as someone who had advised all southern governors to ignore the deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education. See Arthur Kinoy, The Role of the People's Lawyer
in the 1990s, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 209, 218 (1993).
188 Powell Memorandum, supra note 187, at 1.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 2.
191 Id. at 3.
192 Id.
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"action programs" for secondary schools. 193 These initiatives would
lead to the establishment of right-wing public interest law organiza-
tions, such as the Heritage Foundation, Pacific Legal Foundation, and
others.'
94
Big business heeded Powell's advice. Partly in response to Na-
der's success in holding them accountable, corporations intensified
their lobbying. In 1970, for example, there were only 71 full-time cor-
porate lobbyists in Washington; by 1978, there were, 4,000.195 Busi-
nesses also set up hundreds of political action committees.
96
Similar efforts were underway in government, the courts and the
mainstream bar. The urban riots that roiled many cities in the late '60s
provided the Right with the opportunity to argue for "law and or-
der. ' 197 Richard Nixon campaigned and won on that platform. "No-
body is above the rule of law and nobody is below the rule of law," he
declared in a familiar stump speech.198 Later, the political shift would
result in the absorption of civil rights activists into the Democratic
Party and all levels of government, particularly in the Carter
Administration. 199
The Supreme Court, too, began shifting to the right. In the 1970s,
the Burger Court checked the liberal "judicial activism" that charac-
terized the previous Warren era as mainstream lawyers decried the
tactics of the new social movements and their lawyers. Worried about
how the latter's courtroom tactics undermined "public confidence in
193 See id. at 4-6.
194 See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT (2008); William H. Mellor III &
Clint Bolick, The Quest for Justice. Natural Rights and the Future of Public Interest Law
(Heritage Found. Lectures No. 342, 1991).
195 See KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note 122, at 439.
196 See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED 175 (Mark P. Pattaka,
ed., 1992).
197 There were riots in Watts in 1965, Cleveland in 1966, and Newark and Detroit in
1967. See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 221.
198 See id.
199 See DAVIS, supra note 174, at 256-60; see also Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein,
Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 483, 492-93 (1984) (discussing access of public interest law firms to Carter Adminis-
tration and Carter's recruitment of "large numbers of public interest advocates," including
former NAACP LDF attorney Drew Days III as Assistant Attorney General and Chief of
the Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice; former Nader associate Joan
Claybrook as head of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and former Center
for Law and Social Policy director Joseph Onek as White House Domestic Policy staff from
1977-1979). Carter also appointed "numerous movement attorneys to the federal bench,"
including Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was former head of the Women's Rights Project of
the ACLU, and Patricia Wald, formerly associated with the Mental Health Law Project. Id.
Among the other ways in which progressive lawyering flourished were the recognition of
the special role of group representation of minority interests, see NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963) and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), and the inclusion of attorneys' fees
award provision in several civil rights statutes. Id.
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the entire system," Chief Justice Warren Burger endorsed "ABA rec-
ommendations that placed stricter limits on attorney behavior in the
courtroom."
200
2. Ideological Disorientation and Organizational Collapse of the
New Left
The New Left found itself ill-equipped to respond. In the span of
just a few years, activists saw movements surge, then retreat. This dy-
namic-which exhausted many-sowed confusion. Without a unifying
political and organizational footing, such as an experienced, rooted,
mass political party might have provided, separatism and fragmenta-
tion took hold.20 1 By the turn of the decade, for example, the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) had become bitterly factionalized.
20 2
Similar developments were taking place in the women's movement. In
the civil rights movement, the split between those who sought partici-
pation in the electoral arena and those who sought revolution deep-
ened. Sharon Smith explains how separatism and "consciousness-
raising" (which were based on the theory of patriarchy) doomed the
women's movement:
As the radical feminist movement disintegrated over the years, the
assumption behind separatism took hold: that only those who suffer
a certain type of oppression can fight it. The concept of a unified
revolutionary movement was thus replaced by one in which each
oppressed group would form its own 'autonomous' movement. This
conception, 'movementism', was the precursor to identity
politics.
20 3
200 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 302 (citing Fred Graham, Burger Finds
Courts Imperiled by Breaches of Civility at Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1970). Chief Justice
Burger reportedly "lambasted 'young people who go into the law primarily on the theory
that they can change the world by litigating in the courts."' Id. at 419 (internal citation
omitted).
201 See Sharon Smith, Mistaken Identity - or Can Identity Politics Liberate the Op-
pressed, 62 INT'L SOCIALISM 3 et seq. (1994).
202 See, e.g., BERKELEY IN THE SIXTIES (Kitchell Films, 1992).
203 Smith, supra note 201, at 11. Consciousness-raising tended to lead women away from
activity, argues Smith. Id. at 10. As an end in itself, it focused on personalism rather than
on movement building: "changing one's lifestyle was what mattered, not changing the
world." Id. Patriarchy, on the other hand, she argues
targeted men - and men's need to dominate women - as the root of the problem.
This left the problem of women's oppression as one to be fought out at the level of
individual relationships. And it excluded men, whatever their social class, from play-
ing a role in fighting for women's liberation. Moreover, since separatism explains the
division between men and women as biologically rooted, this means that the rupture
must be permanent. However radical the concept of patriarchy may have sounded in
theory, in practice it was a recipe for passivity and divisiveness. Particularly when
combined with the high degree of personalism which existed, the logic of separatism
promoted fragmentation rather than unity on the basis of oppression.
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Leading activists, many of whom looked to Maoism as a guide, also
found themselves in crisis as China's revolutionary excesses came to
the fore and its leaders increasingly betrayed its "communist" orienta-
tion by accommodating Washington.20 4 Protest activity consequently
waned. Compared to the 1960s, when thousands of protest events
were recorded, 1974 saw less than half that number.
205
3. Litigation Successes of People's and Poverty Lawyers
The movements, too, became victims of their own successes.
Even as fragmentation and atomization beset them, movement attor-
neys were scoring landmark successes in court. In the area of poverty
law, for example, Jack Katz observes that "[a]s welfare litigators won
what organizers saw as 'stunning victories,' welfare organizations lost
members in droves. ' 20 6 Indeed, Katz reports that reform litigation by
Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") lawyers actually achieved its
greatest success after the dissolution of welfare recipients' organiza-
tions.20 7 Hence: "the impetus for reform, although symbolically
muted, became independent of a supporting social-movement context
... after the Legal Aid tradition had been broken by the dynamics of
the sixties, politically neutral standards of professional quality became
autonomous sources for an impetus toward reform[.]' '2
0 8
Radical movementism was supplanted by "professionalized re-
form. ' 20 9 Like the Legal Aid Society before it, the LSC "not only ban-
ished the earlier spirit of indignation over social-class injustice; they
managed to eradicate the memory of a more aggressive advocacy and
to socialize a staff that would regard its primarily passive representa-
tive role as fulfilling the profession's highest aspirations to equal jus-
tice. '210 As Katz noted:
Ever since its creation in 1974, the LSC has steered clear of indig-
nant commentary on the social reality of poverty in the United
States. The research projects funded by the corporation have em-
phasized standard professional and administrative concerns such as
how to keep the federal courts open to Legal Services litigation and
how to reduce staff turnover, not the development of a guiding phi-
losophy on the relation of law to social-class justice for the poor. One
of the consequences of the professional narrowing of reform con-
Id. at 10-11.
204 See ELBAUM, supra note 125, at 207-226.
205 See Soule & Earle, supra note 18, at 350-51.
206 KATZ, supra note 72, at 102.
207 See id. at 179 (internal citation omitted).
208 Id. at 89 (emphasis added); see also Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems:
The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 4 (1977).
209 See KATZ, supra note 72, at 69-70.
210 Id. at 10.
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cerns is that there has been little written commentary on the socio-
political implications of the process. 211
Legal Services lawyers sought to channel inner-city dissent and anger
to the "orderly processes of law."' 212 The outright restriction of Legal
Services attorneys from participating in organizing efforts only exacer-
bated this trend.213 The next-generation of public interest lawyers
crystallized this remarkable transformation of progressive legal prac-
tice from a political to a professional orientation. 214
4. Ascendance of Liberal Public Interest Law
Three features distinguished public interest lawyering from its
movement-lawyering antecedent: a fealty to the legal system and "Es-
tablishment," the representation of "causes" rather than organized cli-
ents, and the primacy of lawyers. Its rise would have-and continues
to have-wide-ranging and contradictory consequences for progres-
sive law practice. On the one hand, the public interest law movement
channeled and moderated the militancy of movement lawyering
within the confines of the very system that movement lawyers had
challenged. On the other hand, it also produced a new generation of
committed practitioners and, in the process, heralded the develop-
ment and maturation of progressive lawyering theory as such.
a. Fealty to the Legal System
Unlike movement lawyering, the goal of public interest lawyering
was not to radically reform or overthrow the state, but rather to de-
fend and perfect it through the creation of what Nader, one of its key
leaders, called the "public citizen. '215 For public interest lawyers, "the
system itself wasn't the problem. The problem lay in the imbalance"
of representation within its institutions.216 To correct this imbalance,
public interest lawyers sought access to 217 and representation of the
211 Id. at 179-80.
212 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 222-23 ("At least in the face it showed to
the public and the political world, Legal Services was serving the cause of social stability
and social control.").
213 Id. at 238-41.
214 See NADER & GREEN, supra note 176, at 162 (discussing how victories "came rela-
tively easily in the early years" because "[g]overnment agencies and the industries they
regulated, unaccustomed to having their actions challenged, had grown careless about the
ways they did business.").
215 See BUCKHORN, supra note 178; KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note 122; NADER,
supra note 178, at 336-53.
216 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 388-89.
217 See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 1016 ("Expanding access to legal services for the
disadvantaged was a much less controversial goal than broad-scale political and social
transformation."); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public In-
terest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 226-7 (1976) (public interest lawyers as "by-product of
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marginalized and underrepresented in legal and political processes. 218
In a word, they sought pluralism219-goals wholly in line with voices
seeking to divert New Left radicalism into institutional channels.
Hilbink contextualized its development this way:
Amidst the growing anti-war street protests against the nation's in-
volvement in Southeast Asia, amidst increasingly louder calls for
revolution by some and repression by others, amidst a civil rights
movement that was increasingly dominated (at least in the white
American mind) by nationalist calls for racial separation and violent
confrontation, there emerged a group of lawyers still willing to en-
gage with and use the system to achieve their goals. They sought
reform, but sought it within the bounds of legality.220
Nader and others recognized the need for client self-activity.221
But whereas the movement lawyers of the previous era envisioned it
for radical, even belligerent, purposes, public interest lawyers sought
merely a "perpetuation of that external presence" 222 that could exert
delimited pressure for legal reform, while still respecting institutional
processes. At the height of the new social movements, the militant
tactic of civil disobedience and direct action openly challenged state
authority; the new formulation tamped down that militant tendency.
No longer was it potentially part of the agenda to take over the state
apparatus or to challenge it through parallel institutions. Rather, pop-
ular activism devolved into outside pressure on legal institutions
whose legitimacy was again re-recognized-indeed whose re-legi-
timization was part of the agenda. Hence, while the public interest law
movement sprang from the new social movements,22 3 it became, in
essence, their exact opposite. As Thomas Hilbink put it, public inter-
est lawyers "were the establishment." 2
24
Nader himself distinguished process from outcome. "Having ac-
cess," he maintained, "does not ensure a fair outcome. ' 2 5 Robert Ra-
bin observed this transformation from substantive to procedural
justice:
the 'access explosion"').
218 See Note, supra note 2, at 1078, n.16.
219 See id. at 1070, n.3; Rabin, supra note 217, at 224-25 ("the fashioning of governmen-
tal policy out of demands of competing interest groups").
220 Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 325.
221 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
222 NADER & GREEN, supra note 176, at xvi (emphasis added).
223 See MICHAEL MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC IN-
TEREST LIBERALISM 20-30 (1986).
224 Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 342.
225 NADER & GREEN, supra note 176, at xvii; see also Rabin, supra note 217, at 207, 224,
n.53, 230, n.73 ("it is critical to keep separate the questions of formal access (standing) and
effective access ... [c]ompelling officials to hear unfamiliar arguments is not necessarily
tantamount to insuring that those officials will listen to the arguments").
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[T]he underlying commitment of the new practice is not to specific
social platforms, whether liberal or conservative; it is, rather, to the
adversary system itself, and specifically, to the principle that every-
one affected by corporate and bureaucratic decisions should have a
voice in those decisions, even if he cannot obtain conventional legal
representation.
226
It was a "deeply conservative enterprise," admitted another public in-
terest pioneer, Charles Halpern.227 Movement lawyers attempted to
show clients how the system did not work and therefore needed radi-
cal transformation through direct action and self-help. Limiting their
goal to representing the un- and under-represented, on the other
hand, public interest lawyers aimed to make sure that the system did
work-with themselves as self-appointed leaders and crusaders. And
in what movement lawyers would have considered heresy, corpora-
tions, Halpern argued, "cannot be condemned for having as their ma-
jor concerns production, profit and the maintenance of power" for
"the social benefits achieved by corporations seeking these goals are
obvious and impressive. '228 To movement lawyers, of course, the cor-
porate-government partnership was the enemy.
b. Representation of 'Causes'
"Cause" lawyering, or what Hillbink calls its "proceduralist"/
"elite/vanguard" variant,229 emerged out of this fealty to the legal sys-
tem and capitalism. The exit of mass social movements from the politi-
cal stage dovetailed perfectly with the public interest lawyers'
professed commitment to abstract social causes. Indeed, to the extent
it undermined these belligerent goals, public interest law hastened
these movements' decline. Unlike a people's lawyer, said Nader, a
public interest lawyer is "a lawyer without clients, whose goal would
be . . . advancing the public good. '230 In the aftermath of the decline
of the new social movements, this shift became a convenient
reorientation.
Public interest law funders, such as the LSC and the Ford Foun-
dation, also ensured that the new generation of poverty and public
interest lawyers excluded client involvement and organization from
their motivational calculus. The LSC sabotaged its own efforts to insti-
226 Rabin, supra note 217, at 1109.
227 See Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 114, at 1116.
228 Id. at 1096. Indeed, Kinoy objected to being called a "public interest lawyer." Kinoy,
supra note 187, at 209-210.
229 Hilbink, Categories of Cause Lawyering, supra note 1.
230 See KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note 122, at 418 (emphasis added). Nader's public
interest firms concentrated their work on consumer and environmental issues.
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tutionalize client involvement.231 At the Ford Foundation, an officer
noted that public interest law was a "significantly and perhaps ex-
traordinarily powerful ...means of enhancing the effectiveness of
government. '' 232 Alice O'Connor summarized the agenda of public in-
terest law's benefactors when she observed that Ford's "philanthropic
activism functioned on [the] assumption that 'a smooth-running foun-
dation-government partnership would-or should-displace political
struggle, ideological conflict, and grass roots organizing as a means of
influencing social policy .... *233
Increasingly detached from a grassroots advocacy, the new public
interest lawyers autonomously defined and led legal campaigns, cat-
apulting themselves to the forefront of political struggle. Thus was
born the rise of lawyer-driven movements, which was to be the reign-
ing model for progressive lawyering in the years to come. Eschewing
the social conflict on which movement lawyers thrived, it sought to
reconcile competing interests by representing an abstract version of
everyone-i.e. the "public." Liberal and conservative public interest
lawyers would subsequently battle over what precisely "public inter-
est" means. 2
34
c. Lawyer as Protagonist
Without the backbone of mass organizations and in an increas-
ingly hostile political environment, public interest lawyers became
self-appointed leaders of the various causes they and their predeces-
sors championed. In effect, public interest law became "a power base
through which young, dedicated lawyers may combat and eventually
control the corporate system. '235 This inverted movement lawyers'
conception of their role and relationship with their clients. Movement
lawyers were animated primarily by their political and moral, not pro-
fessional, commitments and saw themselves as co-equal to, indeed
even lesser activists than, their street counterparts. With the ascen-
dance of public interest lawyering, these commitments devolved into a
primarily professional undertaking, with the lawyer as principal pro-
tagonist. 236 As Hilbink captures:
231 See KATZ, supra note 72, at 170-71 (discussing LSC leadership's move away from
community representation in board).
232 See id. at 355 (internal citation omitted).
233 Id. at 356 (internal citation omitted).
234 See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of
"Public Interest Law," 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1223 (2005); Esquivel, supra note 176.
235 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 331 (quoting Bob Hernandez, The Lurk-
ing Danger of Naderism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1972, available at http://select.nytimes.com/
gst/abstract.html?res=F70C13F93C59107A93C2AA1788D85F468785F9&scp= 1 &sq %
221urking%20danger%20of%20naderism%22&st=cse).
236 See, e.g., Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 92-93 (discussing Lawyers Commit-
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"We have been counting all along on a massive citizen-action re-
sponse," Mark Green, a public interest law stalwart, told Simon
Lazarus. But there was no such response. Such a great expectation
in fact occurred precisely at the time in which the new social move-
ments began to atomize, leaving public interest lawyers as "elite agi-
tators" without power, leaders without followers. 237
It was a decisive shift in the role of the lawyer-the reclamation
of an elite role and elitist approach to social change-and one that
would have far-ranging and contradictory consequences for client ac-
tivism, lawyer-client relationships, and the very content of progressive
legal advocacy. On the one hand, as lawyers increasingly occupied the
leading role in movements that were in retreat, legal advocacy corre-
spondingly became the presumptive catalyst for client activism, in-
stead of the reverse. This shift enabled the rise of lawyer-led
organizing campaigns, which would be the subject of sharp criticism
later. At their high point, the new social movements checked the usual
power imbalance between lawyer and client; with their collapse, law-
yers once again dominated the lawyer-client relationship. This meant
the re-orientation of activism back to mainstream centers of power, in
particular Washington, D.C-a reversal of the movement lawyers' de-
centralized, community-based practices. As they collaborated with law
schools, public interest lawyers increasingly diverted attention away
from poor and working class communities and focused on institutional
decisionmakers and law students.
At the same time, however, the birth of public interest law pro-
duced a new generation of left-liberal lawyers and accelerated the de-
velopment of progressive lawyering theory-albeit with an
overemphasis on formal legal tools. New organizations were born and
multiplied rapidly. With a focus on administrative decision-making, 238
Nader established the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) in
1970-one of the first public interest law firms in the U.S. "Unlike
conventional law firms, PIRG did not have specific clients, but filed
petitions and sued corporations and government agencies on behalf of
whatever Nader and his followers regarded as in 'the public inter-
est.'1,239 As Hilbink observes, "'Nader's Raider's' grew quickly from a
tee for Civil Rights Under Law, whose mission "emanated from [its] professional orienta-
tion. It was, first and foremost, an animal of the legal profession and attempted to remain
such rather than become a civil rights organization. Its purpose was to serve not the cause
of civil rights, but rather the interests of 'the law,' for which the profession retained stew-
ardship. The members acted out of a professional duty and responsibility rather than politi-
cal or moral desire.").
237 Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
238 See Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 114, at 1096.
239 KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note 122, at 437.
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band of five law school interns in the summer of 1967, to 100 interns in
1969, and then to 200 in 1970."24o By the end of 1972, there were
PIRGs on 138 college campuses with a total membership of
400,000.241 A few years later, one survey estimated that there were
about 92 public interest law centers employing almost 600 lawyers and
litigating in a diversity of areas.242 Today, there are approximately a
thousand.
243
In partnership with law schools, the public interest movement
also trained-and continues to train-generations of progressive law-
yers. The growth of public interest law curricula in law schools, com-
bined with the concurrent and related rise of critical legal studies and
clinical legal education, led to the development of progressive law-
yering theory. The very first public interest law centers were explicitly
designed to provide clinical experiences for law students-usually at
elite law schools. 244 For example, the Center for Law and Social Pol-
icy, which was founded in 1968, was a joint project with five law
schools: Yale, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles, Stanford University and the University of
Michigan.245 This is still the case. Notwithstanding its contradictions,
the public interest law movement nonetheless has produced an ex-
traordinary wealth of material for the progressive practitioner or stu-
dent of law.
240 Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 329.
241 See id. Nader would found Public Citizen and under it the Litigation Group the
following year.
242 COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANC-
ING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 79-132 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest
Law: The Movement in Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2008); see also NADER &
GREEN, supra note 176, at 160-62 (discussing growth of public interest bar).
243 See Rhode, supra note 242, at 2032 (citing Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albis-
ton, The Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975-2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591 (2006)).
244 In the 1960s and '70s, law students demanded "social relevance" in legal education,
which fueled the expansion of clinical legal education. In turn, the expansion and matura-
tion of clinical legal education contributed enormously to reorienting progressive law-
yering theory. As Dean Hill Rivkin has observed, "It was the societal legacy of the sixties
• . . that most shaped clinical legal education. The fervor of the sixties penetrated law
schools quite passionately." Symposium on Clinical Legal Education: Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 CAmI. U. L.
REV. 337, 340 (1987). See generally Barry et al., supra note 29. Many programs also re-
sponded to Kinoy's exhortation to "take on major cases and situations involving the rela-
tionship of the processes of the law to the fundamental problems of contemporary society"
so as to "provide a fascinating teaching tool for probing into the most fundamental theoret-
ical, substantive, and conceptual problems, all within the context of the throbbing excite-
ment of reality." Arthur Kinoy, The Present Crisis in Legal Education, 24 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 7 (1969).
245 See Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 114, at 1103, n.23.
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d. Role of Foundations
Private foundations played a significant role in this reorientation
of progressive lawyering as well. As commentators have noted:
It cannot be overemphasized how important the availability of foun-
dation funding has proven for the rapid development of public in-
terest law. Not only were new groups able to form . . . but older
organizations were able to expand their activities, often on a large
scale, as a result of the availability of foundation funding.
246
Rabin put it much more bluntly: "The phenomenon that made
public interest law possible was the commitment of a handful of pri-
vate foundations, particularly the Ford Foundation, to the new enter-
prise. ' '247 In turn, "[tihe work of these centers quickly led to
widespread acceptance of the view that administrative bodies and de-
cision-making agencies function better when those who are affected
are adequately represented before them. '2 48 The Ford Foundation
funded the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Citizens Communication Center, the Mexican
American Legal Defense Fund, the Center for Law and Social Policy,
Public Advocates, and the Center for Law in the Public Interest.
2 49
Foundations also played a critical role in the maturation and insti-
tutionalization of clinical legal education. "From 1959 to 1965, the
Ford Foundation provided intermittent grants totaling $500,000 to
nineteen law schools through.., the National Council on Legal Clin-
ics (NCLC). ' 250 In 1965, it "made an additional grant of $950,000...
and [the] NCLC was renamed the Council on Education in Profes-
sional Responsibility (COEPR), and then later renamed Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) in 1968."251
Thereafter, from 1968-1978, it "granted an additional $11 million to
CLEPR ... [which] awarded 209 grants to 107 ABA-approved law
schools, totaling approximately $7 million.
252
246 COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 242, at 41; see also LEE EPSTEIN,
TRACEY E. GEORGE & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH GUIDE 13-14 (1992) (availability of funding accounted for
growth of public interest organizations). According to Epstein, George and Kobylka, the
Supreme Court decisions allowing civil rights attorneys to recover attorneys' fees also ac-
counted for the increase in the number of public interest organizations. Id. at 14-15.
247 Rabin, supra note 217, at 260. Hilbink also observes that "[w]hile Ford was not new
to the legal field in the late 1970s, prior to [McGeorge] Bundy's arrival, the foundation had
provided no support for groups using litigation in the field of civil rights." Hilbink Disser-
tation, supra note 29, at 358 (internal citation omitted).
248 COUNCIL OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 242, at 58.
249 See Rabin, supra note 217, at 228-29.
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When the Ford Foundation stopped supporting CLEPR and
clinical legal education, the Department of Education took over. From
1978-97, Congress appropriated more than $87 million to the en-
deavor. As commentators have noted:
If the nearly $13 million from the Ford Foundation was instrumental
in jump-starting clinical legal education in most of the law schools in
the United States during the first twenty years of the second wave
of clinical legal education, then the $87 million from the Title IX
program over the last twenty years of the second wave of clinical
education was responsible for developing these budding clinical
programs into integral parts of the curriculum at almost every law
school in the United States. While there were and continue to be
other sources of private foundation and government funds for
clinical legal education programs, no other external funding pro-
grams have been as important to the proliferation of clinical legal
education programs as the Ford Foundation and Title IX programs.
By the end of the Title IX program in September of 1997, there
were real-client in-house law school clinical programs in at least 147
law schools.25
3
At the same time, representatives of the practicing bar were calling
for greater emphasis on lawyering skills and professional values as
taught in clinical courses.
254
The Ford Foundation's objective was to relegitimize "the Sys-
tem." McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor to Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson-and principal architect of the Vietnam War-
who became Ford Foundation President in 1966, saw the survival of
capitalism and, as one commentator put it, "of the democratic process
in the United States," as his main objective. 255 Again, Hilbink: "the
vetting process at Ford made extra sure that public interest lawyers
would not do something unpalatable to the establishment. Thus did
they keep public interest law firmly in the center defending the
system. "256
e. Birthing Pains
The political shift did not come easily. Halpern spoke of an at-
mosphere of "distrust" during a two-day working seminar between
poverty and public interest lawyers in early 1971, in which the former
attacked the latter for catering to the middle class and siphoning re-
sources away from the poor. 257 In one meeting, George Wiley, the
253 Id. at 19-20.
254 See id. at 20.
255 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 358.
256 Id. at 381(emphasis added).
257 See Charles R. Halpern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future, 58 JUDICATURE 118
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founder of the NWRO, "made it vehemently clear that he viewed en-
vironmentalists [whose cause public interest lawyers championed]
more as enemies than as allies ... [t]he only thing peaceful about the
meeting was the landscape. ''258 So different was the notion of public
interest lawyering from people's or poverty lawyering that, as late as
1970, Senator Edward Kennedy observed that "we were able to fit
almost the entire public interest bar of Washington around a single
table. '259 In time, however, the LSC-and many poverty lawyers-
caved in and followed suit by "changing ideological course, explicitly
denounc[ing] the goal of 'achieving social change." 260
5. Critical Legal Studies, Clinical Legal Education, and the
Constitutive Theory of Law
Parallel developments occurred in the academy. William Simon
observes how a "growing frustration and demoralization" in the face
of declining political activism and militancy drove many activist law-
yers to law teaching, particularly in clinics.261 As a result, two progres-
sive projects emerged: critical legal studies (CLS) and clinical legal
education. "While clinical teachers were working with law students to
use the law as an instrument for social justice and change," write Mar-
garet Martin Barry, Jon Dubin and Peter Joy, "proponents of CLS
were using the classroom to demystify the law and to teach students
that 'political conviction' plays an important role in adjudication and
that the shape of the law at any time reflects ideology and power as
well as what is wrongly called 'logic.' ' 262 Even though these move-
(1974).
258 NADER & GREEN, supra note 176, at 158. See also Halpern & Cunningham, supra
note 114, at 1107. The debate centered on the new public interest firms' siphoning re-
sources from organizations that served people of color and the poor. Critics of the new
public interest lawyers argued that the issues they espoused were "middle class" issues,
which could be solved through "majoritarian politics" - i.e. Congress. The concerns of
minorities and the poor, by contrast, were not a concern to the majority. See also Edgar S.
Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest in
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1005 (1969-70) (criticizing public interest law as divert-
ing resources from poor Blacks to "middle-class, white concerns").
259 See NADER & GREEN, supra note 176, at 161; see also Halpern & Cunningham,
supra note 114, at 1114 ("public interest bar is very small; the entire membership ... in
Washington, where most public interest firms are presently based, can - and frequently
does - assemble comfortably in one modest-sized room.").
260 See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 180 (2001).
261 See Simon, supra note 29, at 556.
262 Barry et al., supra note 29, at 13. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies surfaced
in 1976, led by such scholars as Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, Peter Gabel and Mark
Tushnet. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515
(1991). For a succinct description of the CLS movement, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW & JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 106-127 (1996).
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ments arose at around the same time and "grew out of the same
zeitgeist," according to one commentator, "clinical teachers and criti-
cal theorists have never quite found common cause or joined forces"
to the extent one might have hoped or expected. 263 On the one hand,
CLS proponents leveled a powerful indictment against the neutrality
of legal doctrine. "As CLS proponents exposed the politicized nature
of legal doctrine in order to create space for the discussion of alterna-
tive institutional arrangements," Cummings and Eagly explain,
they simultaneously laid the groundwork for a new orientation to-
ward social change practice that privileged mass mobilization over
law reform efforts. The CLS contention that the law merely codified
the outcome of struggles over political power supported the view
that real institutional change was possible only through direct
action.26
4
On the other hand, critiquing CLS for lacking practical application,265
many legal clinicians deemphasized direct political activism and fa-
vored a professional orientation trained on legal practice and the law-
yer-client relationship. "[U]nlike some CLS adherents whose critique
of law and the legal system leads them to skepticism and nihilism,"
noted Barry, Dubin and Joy, "clinical faculty struggled to maximize
law's potential for remedying injustice and inequity. '266 At many
schools, CLS became primarily the province of "politics," while
clinical education concerned itself with "practice."
Notwithstanding these divergent orientations, both camps con-
fronted a political reality hostile to activism. This drove the CLS
movement further into political and legal theory and the clinical legal
education movement further into lawyering practice-a formal bifur-
cation that lasted until quite recently: no formal dialogue would occur
between these two groups until the AALS conference in January
2004.267
This is not to say, however, that the CLS movement was com-
pletely divorced from practice-hence the term "critical lawyering."
263 Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting Macro Theory into Practice, 5
CLIN. L. REV. 95, 99 (1998).
264 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 453.
265 See MINDA, supra note 262; Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What's
a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201(1999) (discussing need for critical race praxis);
see also Kotkin, supra note 263, at 100.
266 Barry et al., supra note 29, at 13.
267 See Katherine Hessler, Theory Meet Praxis: The Impact of Clinical Legal Theory on
Lawyering Strategy and Experiential Learning, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 429 (2004).
But see Phyllis Goldfarb, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought
and Action: Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal The-
ory, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 717 (1992) (discussing similarities between Critical Legal Studies
and clinical legal education and arguing for CLS-based clinical practice).
Fall 2009]
HeinOnline  -- 16 Clinical L. Rev. 157 2009
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
Nor was clinical legal education-and in particular lawyering theory,
which it forged and continues to develop-uninformed by critical the-
ory. To the contrary, many clinicians explicitly sought to put critical
legal theory into practice. 268 Indeed, a cornerstone of clinical practice
has always been the understanding that law is "constitutive" of the
social order.
In an influential article, Karl Klare argued that law did not only
express the will of the ruling class or protect capitalism during crisis,
but rather "contributed to defining what the character of capitalism
would become and creat[ed] the institutional social relationships of
the late capitalist workplace. ' '269 Lawyers should thus "conceive of
law-making as, in theory, a form of expressive social practice in which
the community participates in shaping the moral, allocative and adju-
dicatory texture of social life, [even though] in class society, this pro-
cess is alienated. ' 270 He urged: "We must not confuse the concept of
law with the historically specific forms that law assumed with the rise
of capitalism."'271 As he argued:
The purely instrumental pursuit of client interest cannot serve as an
adequate model of political lawyering. We must begin to see our
work, our relationship to our clients, our self-definition in counsel-
ing and in the courtroom, as itself part of the process of articulating
and foreshadowing the legal forms of the future. The fact that we
must live and work within alien institutions we do not control,
which do not permit us collectively to guide our own destiny, ought
not prevent us from conceiving of our own participation in the legal
process to the extent possible as an experiment in the possibility of
our freedom. This cannot but make us better, more sensitive and
more political lawyers, and help us to avoid the long-term occupa-
tional hazards of 'radical lawyering': the slide into reformism or
cynicism.27
2
With the ascendancy of public interest lawyering, which sought to
re-legitimize rather than challenge the economic, political and social
order, this constitutive theory of law became the theoretical basis for
the reformist project of perfecting, rather than overthrowing, the law
of capitalism.
268 See Buchanan & Trubek, supra, note 5; Goldfarb, supra note 267; Tremblay, supra,
notes 38 and 87.
269 See Kare, supra note 1, at 131.
270 Id. at 132.
271 Id. at 134.
272 Id. at 135.
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C. 'On the Margins': The 'New Right' and
Critical Lawyering in the 1980s
The right-wing backlash that began in the mid-1970s crystallized
in Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency in 1980, which forged a
Republican "New Right" coalition that would dominate American
politics for the rest of the century. Among the policies the new Re-
publican coalition cemented:
a reversal in the composition of the federal courts that ... limited
liberal rights claims; a weakening of the regulatory power of admin-
istrative agencies; the decline of the welfare state; major restrictions
on the federal legal services program; and, most recently, the con-
striction of civil rights and civil liberties, particularly for noncitizens,
in the name of counterterrorism.2 73
The Democratic Party's collusion with key elements of this pro-
gram bolstered this onslaught on progressive lawyers' clientele, push-
ing progressive lawyering, in the words of White and others, to "the
margins. '274 At the same time, conservative law groups challenged lib-
eral dominance of the public interest law field.275 Challenging public
interest law's approach to lawyering-particularly its reliance on liti-
gation and policy advocacy and inattention to the ways in which it
actively discouraged (and made more difficult) client activism-pro-
gressive lawyering theory refocused inward, to raising political con-
sciousness among clients, and looked outward, to inspiring struggles
abroad, in the hopes of renewing social struggle in the United States.
Despite opposition to the conservative backlash, however, progressive
politics-and therefore progressive lawyering theory-would remain
marginalized in the Reagan era.
1. Reaganism
The fawning eulogies Ronald Reagan received upon his death in
June 2004 bore little resemblance to the man who personified the
broad-scale attack against progressive lawyers' clientele in the 1980s.
Under Reagan, U.S. domestic and international policy became a bare-
knuckled assault on the constituencies that propelled the mass activ-
ism of the previous era: the poor, the working class, women, people of
color, immigrants, gays and lesbians and anti-war activists. Among
other policies, Reagan supported racist, dictatorial regimes abroad,
slashed social spending, and attacked progressive and liberal lawyers,
in particular, Legal Services lawyers.
Reagan, argued The Nation magazine, "was the worst American
273 Cummings, supra note 25, at 66.
274 See, e.g., White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note 98.
275 See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 199; Southworth, supra note 234.
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leader since Herbert Hoover." 276 In foreign policy:
After Democrats and Republicans in Congress passed sanctions
against the apartheid government of South Africa, Reagan vetoed
the measure. His administration cuddled up with the fascistic and
anti-Semitic junta of Argentina and backed militaries in El Salvador
and Guatemala that massacred civilians. It moved to normalize rela-
tions with Augusto Pinochet, the tyrant of Chile. Reagan sent
George Bush the First to the Philippines, where the Vice President
toasted dictator Ferdinand Marcos for fostering "democracy." Pur-
suing a quasi-secret war against the Sandinista government in Nica-
ragua, the Reagan Administration violated international law and
circumvented Congress to support contra rebels engaged in human
rights abuses and, according to the CIA's own Inspector General,
worked with suspected drug dealers. Reagan covertly sent arms to
the mullahs of Iran and courted Saddam Hussein, even after his use
of chemical weapons. He appointed officials who claimed nuclear
war was winnable, thus raising the chances that miscalculations by
the Soviet Union or the United States would plunge the world into
chaos.27
7
Domestically, Reagan expressed deep hostility to the gains of the
civil rights movement. 278 Economically, "Reagonomics," or what his
successor George H.W. Bush (Bush I) described as "voodoo econom-
ics," lavished tax cuts on the rich at the expense of the poor.279 During
Reagan's two terms, the official poverty rate remained at 12.8 per-
cent.280 Sending a message to unions and prefiguring his labor policy,
Reagan fired 10,000 striking air traffic controllers upon assuming of-
fice.281 He deregulated and privatized the state sector, cut welfare and
social spending, started the "wars" on crime and drugs, opposed abor-
tion rights, and disregarded the AIDS pandemic. 282 These policies
276 See Editorial, The Reagan Legacy, THE NATION, June 28, 2004, available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20040628/editors.
277 Id.
278 See, e.g., NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
(1988); George J. Church, Ted Gup & Barrett Seaman, A Futile Veto on Civil Rights, TIME,
Mar. 28, 1988, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967068,00.
html; John Herbers, Reagan's Changes on Rights Are Starting to Have Impact, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1982, at 1; Howell Raines, Reagan Sends Mixed Signal on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16,1981, at Al; Stuart Taylor, Marshall Puts Reagan at "Bottom" Among Presidents on
Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1987, at Al.
279 See BBC News, Reagonomics or 'Voodoo Economics'? June 5, 2004, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/270292.stm.
280 See U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 2. Poverty Status
of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2006, http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
281 See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Controllers Strike, Halting 7,000 Flights: Reagan
Gives 48-Hour Notice of Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1981, at Al.
282 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us about
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 301 (1994); David A. Domansky, Abusing
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have had disastrous consequences. For example, the United States
now imprisons more people than any other country on the planet (one
out of every 99 Americans is in prison283) and has no abortion services
in more than three out of four counties.
284
On the legal front, Reagan's attitude towards liberal and progres-
sive lawyers is best summarized by his dismissal of legal services law-
yers as "a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own
thing at the expense of the poor who actually need help. '285 Reagan
repeatedly sought to eliminate the LSC.286 Bush I, who lost to Reagan
in the Republican primaries of 1980, extended most of these policies,
including ordering military operations against Panama and starting
the first Gulf War in 1991.287
2. Fragmentary Flashpoints: The Absence of Sustained Mass
Opposition
Reagan's and Bush I's policies met with strong opposition.
Throughout the 1980s, hundreds of thousands protested against U.S.
military intervention in Central America-in particular El Salvador
and Nicaragua;288 U.S. support for South Africa's apartheid regime;2 89
nuclear proliferation;290 deep cuts in social programs and changes in
Standing: Furthering the Conservative Agenda, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 391-392
(1988); Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight a
Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 525 (1990).
283 See Roy Walmsley, International Centre for Prison Studies: World Prison Population
List (8th ed.), http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th41.pdf
(last visited June 9, 2009).
284 See Guttmacher Institute, In Brief Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,
July 2008, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-inducedabortion.html.
285 Michael S. Greve, Why 'Defunding the Left' Failed, 89 NAT'L AFFAIRS (1987), http://
www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080708_1987897whydefundingtheleftfailedmichaels
greve.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
286 See David S. Jackson & Michael S. Serrill, An Organization at War with Itself, TIME,
Oct. 3, 1983; Evan Thomas & Bennett H. Beach, One More Narrow Escape, TIME, Nov. 23,
1981.
287 See Fighting in Panama: The President; A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Deci-
sion to Use Force in Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A19; Andrew Rosenthal, War
in the Gulf- The Overview, Bush Demands Iraq Start Pullout Today Despite Its Assent to 3-
Week Soviet Plan; Oilflelds and Trenches Aflame in Kuwait, Ground War Vowed, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1991, at 1; Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf The President; Bush Halts
Offensive Combat; Kuwait Freed, Iraqis Crushed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 28, 1991, at. Al.
288 See, e.g., Stephen Engelberg, Thousands Protest in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1985, at 22; Nathaniel Shappard, Jr., Antiwar Coalition Plans Protests on Diverse Interests,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1981, at 30; Mary Tabor, Marchers Protest Aid to El Salvador, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1989, at 17; Martin Tolchin, Thousands in Washington March to Pro-
test U.S. Policy in El Salvador, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1982, at 18.
289 See, e.g., Associated Press, Thousands Rally in Newark to Protest Apartheid Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1985, at 29; Crystal Nix, Many in U.S. Protest on South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct 12, 1985, at 11.
290 See, e.g., Associated Press, 1,100 Antinuclear Protesters Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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job safety rules;291 the administration's policies on civil rights, 292
AIDS,293 women, abortion,294 homelessness 295 and others. 296 There
was also significant strike activity in this period.2 97
25, 1983, at A20; Associated Press, Thousands Stage Protest, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1987, at
A22; Ben Franklin, Labor Rift Accompanies Three Mile Island Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1981, at 28; Paul L. Robert Lindsey, Almost 1,000 Arrested in Nuclear Weapons Protest,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1983, at A14; Paul L. Montgomery, Throngs Fill Manhattan to Protest
Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1982, at 1.
291 See, e.g., THOMAS R. PEAKE, KEEPING THE DREAM ALIVE: A HISTORY OF THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE FROM KING TO THE NINETEEN-EIGHT-
IES 381 (1987); 260,000 in Capital Rally for Protest to Reagan's Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1981, at 1.
292 See, e.g., PEAKE, supra note 291, at 396-97; Kenneth B. Noble, March in Capitol Is
Seen Spurring Vast Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1983, at A12; Thousands March in Civil
Rights Protest, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1989, at 6B; see also Thousands Turn
Out for Georgia Racial Protest, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1987, at 2.
293 See, e.g., Bruce Lambert, 3,000 Assailing Policy on AIDS Ring City Hall, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1989, at B3; Robert Manor, Protest Holds Up Start of AIDS Conference,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 5, 1989, at 7A; Thorn O'Connor, Candle-light Demonstra-
tion for Federal Funding of AIDS Research, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1983, at B4; Protesters
Disrupt Mass in New York, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 11, 1989, at 9A; David Tller,
60 Arrests at AIDS Rally in SF, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 1989, at C10.
294 See, e.g., Associated Press, 12 Illinois Women Jailed for Equal Rights Protest, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 3, 1982, at 6; Associated Press, 150 Arrested at Pentagon In Protest by 1,300
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1980, at A18; 10 Women Arrested After Scaling Fence to
White House Grounds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1982, at A12; Feminists Arrested in Washing-
ton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1981, at A14; Ethan Bronner, Throngs Rally in D.C. to Keep
Abortion Legal; 'Political Army' Vows Action, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1989, at 1; Nathan-
iel Sheppard, Jr., Women Say They'll End Fast But Not Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1982, at A16; United Press International, Feminists Rally on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1985, at 28; Evelyn C. White, A Huge, Spirited Abortion-Rights Rally in SF, S.F. CHRONI-
CLE, Oct. 16, 1989, at Al; but see Associated Press, Thousands Rally Against Abortion,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1984, at A8; United Press International, Demonstrations Mark 10
Years of Legal Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1983, at 18. See also Polikoff, supra note 5, at
444-445.
295 See, e.g., Allan R. Gold, March on Washington in Protest Against Homelessness, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at 24.
296 See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Fifth Avenue Marchers Celebrate Labor and Demand
Work for All, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1982, at Al; Michael Oreskes, 100,000 March Up Fifth
Avenue to Celebrate Centennial of Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1981, at Al; Lena Williams,
600 in Gay Demonstration Arrested at Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1987, at B8
(protesting Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick).
297 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Stoppages In-
volving 1,000 or More Workers, 1947-2008, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
wkstp.t01.htm (showing significant decrease in strike activities from previous decades, but
significant activity during the years 1980-81, 1983, 1986 and 1989); see also Associated
Press, 4,000 More Strikers Return as Casino Pacts Continue, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1984, at
A14; Associated Press, Minnesota State Workers Strike for Contract, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1981, at B8; Samuel G. Freeman, Congestion Growing on 2d Day of Metro-North Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1983, at B2; Les Ledbetter, 16,000 Workers At Con Edison Go Out on
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1983, at 25; Andrew H. Malcolm, Walkout Snarls Travel and
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1982, at B8; Robert D. McFadden, All Travel Free as Metro-
North Resumes Service, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1983, at B1; McFadden, supra note 268;
Michael Oreskes, Uniformed Unions Rally to Protest City's Wage Offer, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
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Despite these organizing efforts, however, no sustained mass op-
position emerged. Mike Davis sought to explain this absence:
The... fragmentation of the class structure facilitated the recompo-
sition of politics around the selfishly 'survivalist' axis favored by the
New Right: The complexity of the 'restratification' of the working
class has aggravated the tendency in American politics for class is-
sues to become lost in a welter of sectoral and stratum divisions.
This, in turn, has helped promote a politics that is not only more
than usually self-interested and short-sighted, but also centered in-
creasingly on a narrowed range of 'social' issues, especially those of
home and family. Where relative prosperity or impoverishment may
hang on the timing of a house purchase or the fact of working in
(say) the aerospace rather than the auto industry or having been
born in 1940 rather than 1950, the sense of commonality of experi-
ence and needs disintegrates.
298
Julie Bindell, Kate Cook and Liz Kelly expressed the sentiment
of many activists when they observed that "[t]he 1980s were a period
of uncertainty and loss of faith for feminist activism. The impact of
simplistic identity politics fuelled divisions among women, and created
tension and mistrust.
'2 99
"How does one function as a lawyer for the people when there
appears to be no immediate prospect of struggle other than in the
arena of formal legal defense?" lamented Kinoy. "If the driving moti-
vation of a people's lawyer ought to be the use of skills and legal tech-
niques to help create an atmosphere in which the people themselves
can better organize, function, and move forward, how does one meet
this responsibility when the people's movements seem to have lost
their own sense of struggle?"
300
3. Pessimism and Turn Inward
As the 1980s progressed, progressive lawyering theorists an-
swered Kinoy's question by simultaneously looking inward and to
"the margins."' 30 1 Realizing the limits of formal, institutionalized re-
form under hostile political conditions and an arid organizing land-
scape, progressive lawyers sought to rebuild client activism by
1982, at Al; Damon Stetson, Greyhound Strikers Receive Backing from Other Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1983, at A16.
298 DAVIs, supra note 174, at 178.
299 Julie Bindell, Kate Cook & Liz Kelly, Trials and Tribulations-Justice for Women: A
Campaign for the 1990s in FEMINIST ACriVISM IN THE 1990s, at 65 (Gabrielle Griffin, ed.,
1995).
300 Kinoy, supra note 33, at 90.
301 White, supra note 98 (using these words to describe use of litigation in educating and
mobilizing clients); see also Bachmann, supra note 15, at 4 ("role that lawyers play in the
development and articulation of value and law in society is rather marginal").
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concentrating on its ideological dimensions. Promising political move-
ments abroad, too, provided a source for inspiration, strategy and tac-
tics. Ironically, the pessimism wrought by the Reagan/Bush era
birthed a necessary complement to progressive lawyering theory.
Heretofore, scholars had focused primarily on the political economy
(movement lawyers) and legal system (public interest lawyers). With a
constricted political landscape, however, the theoretical lens narrowed
and shifted to lawyering and the lawyer-client relationship. 30 2 The the-
oretical turn was, at bottom, about reclaiming the centrality of client
activism. Even though the focal shift led to a preoccupation with the
lawyer's role and dangers of lawyer domination, the renewed atten-
tion to the lawyer and lawyer-client relationship also induced lawyers
to use legal tactics more creatively to catalyze such activism.
a. Ideological Turn
The focus on the ideological dimension of political activism was
an unavoidable turn for progressive lawyers in this period. With the
possibility of actual activism delimited by hostile political conditions,
they had no choice but to use the granular, professional interactions in
which they took part to concentrate on the precursor for political mo-
bilization: raising political consciousness. In the 1980s, scholars ex-
horted clients to "refus[e] to succumb,"'303 "reimagine the world, 30 4
and look to the "power of consciousness '30 5 in defending against
right-wing policies. While the goals remained the same-the abolition
of poverty, for example-the strategy, under these circumstances,
summarized by Anthony Alfieri in 1987, was to "empower[] the
poor" through "dialogue. '30 6
Yet the theoretical transformation went further. The pessimism 3
0 7
302 See Simon, supra note 29 (discussing ideological shift from economic and sociologi-
cal to psychological, therapeutic paradigm in lawyering).
303 See David Hoffman, The Politics of Lawyering, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 279
(1985).
304 See id. at 280.
305 See id.
306 See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 665 (1988).
307 See HANDLER, supra note 14, at 233 ("law reform activity by social-reform groups
will not result in any great transformation of American society... [and] will not disturb the
basic political and economic organization of modern American society"); Bachmann, supra
note 15, at 4 ("[t]he role that lawyers play in the development and articulation of value and
law in society is rather marginal"); Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 369 ("[m]ost lawyers
on the left have a pessimistic view of their own political role in bringing about fundamental
social change"); White, Creating Models, supra note 79, at 304 ("most of my work is pretty
gloomy"); Fred C. Zacharias, Five Lessons for Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2002) ("lawyers - even well-meaning lawyers - must accept
our own insignificance").
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wrought by the ascendancy of the New Right pierced through the core
of the progressive lawyering project, changing fundamental premises
and aims. Even though the movement and public interest lawyers dif-
fered on whether to seek revolution or reform, at an elementary level
both traditions saw the problem as the excesses of capitalism and the
state. Influenced by "post-modernism" and "neo-Marxism," progres-
sive scholars in the 1980s began redefining the problem in terms more
abstract, as one of "hierarchy" and "subordination. ' 308 Classical
Marxism, some of these scholars argued, reduced social issues to eco-
nomic or structural factors, and focused too much on the state. In con-
trast, while not disregarding the economy, "neo-Marxist theory
place[d] much greater emphasis on the role of social alienation in
shaping the contours of social life and argue[d] for a theory of politics
that makes the overcoming of alienation a central political
objective."
309
From this perspective, the progressive lawyer's role was to
demystify the legal process. In the 1980s, scholars began to argue that
all hierarchy and subordination were the problem. (This, in turn,
would become the basis for the critique by some that lawyers, in their
position of power over their clients, necessarily oppress them.) "A
first principle of 'counter-hegemonic' legal practice must be to
subordinate the goal of getting people their rights to the goal of build-
ing an authentic or unalienated political consciousness," argued Peter
Gabel and Paul Harris.310 Gabel and Harris argued that progressive
lawyers in every case should be guided by three major objectives: de-
veloping a genuinely equal and respectful relationship with their cli-
ents; demystifying the symbolic authority of the state; and reshaping
legal conflicts by "revealing the limiting character of legal ideology
and bringing out the true socioeconomic and political foundations of
legal disputes."'311 They explained:
The predominance of hierarchy in both public and private life leads
to a profound loss of this sense of social connection because it
breaks down any possibility of real community, and forces people
into a life-long series of isolating roles and routines within which
they are unable to fully recognize one another in an empowering
and mutually confirming way. Instead, people come to experience
one another as powerless and passive in relation to the hierarchies
within which they live and work, and, because this collective
powerlessness is manifested throughout the social order, individuals
internalize this powerlessness in the formation of themselves. Alien-
308 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38; White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 39.
309 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 371.
310 Id. at 375.
311 See id. at 376.
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ation and powerlessness therefore become a self-generating source
of social repression that leads to the reproduction of class, race and
sex hierarchies from generation to generation.
312
White argued for a method she called "third-dimensional law-
yering, '' 313 which would combine the teachings of Paulo Freire with
the feminist methodology of consciousness-raising. 314 Third-dimen-
sional lawyering, she explained, was a way "to design context-specific
acts of public resistance, which work, not by overpowering the oppres-
sor, but by revealing the wrongness and vulnerability of its positions
to itself and to a wider public. '315 Echoing many of the prescriptions
made by their predecessors, this generation of scholars argued for law-
yers to develop genuinely equal and mutually respectful relationships
with their clients, and involve them in legal advocacy, practicing in
such a way as to demystify the symbolic authority of the state, and
"politicizing" cases. 316
In some cases, the shift led to the disregard of real, objective real-
ities. Some, like Gabel and Harris, even went so far as to dismiss the
importance of rights, and counterpose them to the struggle for
"power," arguing that "hierarchies of the legal system are sustained
only by people's belief in them"-a claim patently at odds with the
real force (and violence) that compelled participation in the legal sys-
tem.317 Indeed, even at the height of the new social movements in the
1960s and '70s, circumstances in which the courtroom was or could be
used as a political platform were rare.318 Using courts to empower
clients, as Gabel and Harris argued, was, at best, limited.
b. Lawyering Theory
Nonetheless, the shift paved the way for the theorizing of lawyer-
client relations to a degree theretofore foreign to the progressive law-
312 Id. at 371.
313 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 39. It should be noted, however, that
White demurred from calling her approach a "theory" of lawyering. Id. at 746 ("I do not
offer this three-tiered schema as a 'theory' of social change lawyering").
314 See id. at 760.
315 Id. at 763.
316 See, e.g., White, Creating Models, supra note 79, at 309 (cause lawyers "always
seek[ ] to activate political action, and thus build the capacity for more powerful political
intervention").
317 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 374. For critiques of this approach, see Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal
Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
318 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 293 (internal citation omitted). According
to Hilbink, only the Chicago Eight, Oakland Seven and Panther 21 trials garnered national
media attention. See id. at 294.
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yering project. In looking to the inspirational struggles against
Apartheid in South Africa, White's detailed description of a lawyer-
organizer partnership produced invaluable insight on the process.
319
White also talked about the ad-hoc use of litigation as a way to mobil-
ize clients, arguing that litigation could provide opportunities for edu-
cation and motivation.320 Richard Klawiter discussed similar work
with campesinos in El Salvador. 321 White talked about "parallel
spaces" in which lawyers engaged clients in transformative dia-
logue.322 Bachmann looked to the histories of the labor and civil rights
movements in the 1930s and '60s as examples, as did Gabel and Har-
ris, who argued that "honest spontaneity and moral authenticity"
could alter their clients' circumstances. 323 The struggles of the 1930s
and '60s bore lessons, of course. But they occurred in periods very
much unlike the 1980s.
Thus, the turn inward laid the seeds for both a preoccupation
with an internal or ideological method for catalyzing social struggle
and a localized-almost personalized- delimited approach to legal
activism. Both these trends laid the basis for the profession-blaming
that would be notorious in the field some years later.
D. 'Rebellious': Neoliberalism and Postmodernist
Lawyering in the 1990s
From the standpoint of progressive lawyers' clientele, Bill Clin-
ton's election to the presidency in 1992 initially seemed promising.
Clinton won the election on the pledge that he would, among other
things, change the Reagan-Bush I Administrations' "12 years of
trickle-down economics," pass universal health care and pursue a hu-
mane foreign policy. 324 Instead, the two terms of the Clinton Adminis-
tration represented more continuity than break from the policies of
the Reagan/Bush I Administrations. As Lance Selfa put it, the Clin-
ton-Gore Administration "hid its pro-corporate agenda behind a fog
of populist rhetoric. ' 325 He continued: "Public disappointment ran so
high that the 1994 election delivered the Congress-a Democratic
bastion for 60 years-into the hands of the Gingrich Republicans. '326
319 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 39.
320 See White, supra note 98.
321 See Richard F. Klawiter, iLa Tierra Es Nuestra! Campesino Struggle in El Salvador
and a Vision of Community-Based Lawyering, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1625 (1990).
322 See White, supra note 98, at 546.
323 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 38, at 405.
324 See, e.g., Lance Selfa, The Price of Lesser Evilism: Eight Years of Clinton-Gore, 13
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Progressive lawyering theory blossomed during the 1990s.
Buoyed perhaps by more promising signs of grassroots organizing, this
period saw a proliferation of scholarship aimed specifically at reacti-
vating client activism. However, the influence of post-modernism in
the academy would confine that theorizing within autonomous, local-
ized spheres.
1. Dashed Hopes Under Clinton
Clinton took office riding a wave of hope. Disillusioned by the
Reagan-Bush I agenda, the Clinton-Gore slogan of "It's the economy,
stupid" 32 7 resonated with voters. Among other promises, he vowed to
champion the interests of working people, end the repatriation of Hai-
tian refugees, overhaul the health care system and oppose the tempo-
rary replacement of striking workers.32 8
But upon assuming office, Clinton pushed harder for the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)329 and the 1994 crime bill
than for any of the other promises that won him office.330 NAFTA
resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of U.S. jobs.331 The 1994
crime bill expanded the death penalty to 60 federal crimes, targeted
immigrants, curtailed habeas corpus petitions and laid the ground-
work for the more draconian anti-terrorism legislation that would fol-
low the attacks of September 11, 2001.332 This "New Democrat" and
former chair of the conservative Democratic Leadership Council
(whose agenda was to break the Democratic Party's identification
with organized labor, civil rights and other traditionally liberal
causes), adopted many of the fiscal and, at times, social planks of the
Republican Party: among them budget balancing, deficit reduction
and welfare reform.
Piece by piece, Clinton compromised his signature health care bill
and backed the military's homophobic "don't-ask-don't-tell policy,"
which has resulted in the discharge of hundreds of gays and lesbians
327 Richard Alleyne, Gordon Brown: It's the economy, stupid!, TELEGRAPH (London),
May 23, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/byelection/2015038/
Gordon-Brown-Its-the-economy-stupid.html.
328 See Robert Pear, The 1992 Campaign: Platform; In a Final Draft; Democrats Reject a
Part of Their Past, N.Y.TIMES, June 26, 1992, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/
26/us/1992-campaign-platform-final-draft-democrats-reject-part-their-past.html.
329 See Pub. L. 103-122, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
330 See Selfa, supra note 324, at 7.
331 See Economic Policy Institute, NAFTA-Related Job Losses Have Piled up since 1993,
Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.epi.org/economic-snapshots/entry/webfeatures-snapshots-
archive_12102003/.
332 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994); U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act, Oct. 24, 1994, http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt.
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from service. 333 In 1997, Clinton signed off on a budget agreement
that slashed billions from Medicaid and Medicare. 334 He also betrayed
organized labor, barely lifting a finger to rescue the "strikers bill of
rights" (or "anti-scab bill") from a Republican filibuster in 1994.
335
The mid-1990s were the time of Newt Gingrich and the extremist
"Contract with America," which proposed a draconian pro-business
agenda. Instead of fighting this program, Clinton co-opted key sec-
tions of it.336 He also oversaw the swelling of the prison population,
retreated on civil rights and, expanding the military budget, sent U.S.
forces to combat a record 46 times, including the 1999 bombing of the
former Yugoslavia.
337
For progressive lawyers, perhaps his greatest betrayal was pas-
sage of the 1996 welfare reform bill,338 which his own advisers esti-
mated would result in the impoverishment of more than one million
children. 339 "Welfare reform" ended the New Deal's 61-year-old guar-
antee of cash assistance for the poorest Americans. Peter Edelman,
then a senior official at the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, resigned over passage of the bill, observing: "so many of those
who would have shouted their opposition from the rooftops if a Re-
publican president had done this were boxed in by their desire to see
the president re-elected and in some cases by their own votes for the
bill. ' 340 Only a sustained (if shallow) economic recovery saved those
millions from complete immiseration.
341
2. The Politics of Identity
The activist response to the Clinton agenda showed the worst of
identity politics. Identity politics is based on the idea that only those
who suffer a particular oppression can define and lead the fight
against it; everyone else may play a supporting role, but they are "out-
333 See Mark Thompson, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Turns 15, TIME, Jan 28, 2008, available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1707545,00.html.
334 See Selfa, supra note 324.
335 S. 55, 103rd Congress (1994); see id.
336 See id.
337 See id.
338 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
339 See Alison Mitchel, Two Clinton Aides Resign to Protest New Welfare Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at Al.
340 Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar.1997, at 43.
341 For an excellent discussion of the economic boom during the Clinton years, and how
it pales when compared to previous booms in the American economy, see Joel Geier &Ah-
med Shawki , Contradictions of a Miracle Economy, 2 INT'L SOCIALIST REV. 5 (1997),
available at http:l/www.isreview.orglissues/02/miracle-economy.shtml.
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siders.' 342 Rooted in the fragmentation of the new social movements
in the 1970s-which was brought about, in part, by sexism, racism and
homophobia among the New Left's own ranks-identity politics re-
jects the centrality of class and class struggle, and instead subscribes to
the (cross-class) notion that oppressed groups should organize
autonomously.
The oppressed have a right to do so, of course, that is, to self-
determination. 343 And it should go without saying that those who are
oppressed should fight their own oppression. But identity politics goes
much further. Through the theories of patriarchy, "white-skin privi-
lege," and heterosexism, it elevates these failings and the understand-
able responses to them into a pessimistic strategy that holds that those
outside particular identity-based "communities" are, by extension,
part of the-or even the-problem. For example, the LGBT 344 group
Queer Nation, which was founded in 1990, argued, "It is easier to fight
when you know who your enemy is. Straight people are you[r] en-
emy. '345 In its founding manifesto, distributed during the New York
Gay Pride march in 1990, it proclaims: "Go tell [straights to] go away
until they have spent a month walking hand in hand in public with
someone of the same sex. After they survive that, then you'll hear
what they have to say about queer anger. Otherwise, tell them to shut
up and listen. '346
342 See Smith, supra, note 201. For a succinct summary of identity politics, see Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Identity Politics, Nov. 2, 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/identity-politics/.
343 As Bernice Johnson Reagon, a longtime member of the music group, Sweet Honey
in the Rock, has explained, many incipient movements begin with adherents trying to meet
in a metaphorical "barred room"-with only those deemed "one of us" admitted at first.
But others do inevitably enter (who think or act differently) and community members
relatively quickly realize that they will have to venture out of their "barred room" and
enter into coalitions if they are to survive and accomplish their goals. See Coalition Politics:
Turning the Century, in HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 356-68 (Barbara
Smith, ed., 1983). I thank Ascanio Piomelli for directing me to her work.
344 Lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender.
345 The Queer Nation Manifesto (1990), http://www.digenia.se/andras%20texter/
THE%20QUEER%20NATION%20MANIFESTO.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
346 ld. This sentiment was mirrored in the women's movement two decades earlier. As
activist and writer Rita Mae Brown argued in 1975:
If you can't find it in yourself to love another woman, and that includes physical love,
then how can you truly say you care about women's liberation ... Straight women
are confused by men, don't put women first, they betray lesbians and in its deepest
form, they betray their own selves. You can't build a strong movement if your sisters
are out there fucking the oppressor.
Smith, supra note 201, at 14 (quoting Brown). Ambalavaner Sivanandan observed an anal-
ogous phenomenon in the anti-racist organizing at the time: "[T]he enemy of the black is
the white as the enemy of the woman is the man. And all whites are racist like all men are
sexist." A. Sivanandan, All that Melts into Air Is Solid: The Hokum of New Times, in COM-
MUNITIES OF RESISTANCE: WRITINGS ON BLACK STRUGGLES FOR SOCIALISM (1990).
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At the same time, by personalizing power, Ambalavaner Siva-
nandan argues in the context of racism, "the fight against racism be-
came reduced to a fight against prejudice, the fight against institutions
and practices to a fight against individuals and attitudes.'
347
Carried to its logical conclusion, just to be black, for instance, was
politics enough: because it was in one's blackness that one was ag-
gressed, just to be black was to make a statement against such ag-
gression. If, in addition, you 'came out' black, by wearing
dreadlocks, say, then you could be making several statements ....
Equally, you could make a statement by just being ethnic, against
Englishness, for instance; by being gay, against heterosexism; by be-
ing a woman, against male domination. Only the white straight
male, it would appear, had to go and find his own politics of resis-
tance somewhere out there in the world (as a consumer perhaps?).
Everyone else could say: I am, therefore I resist.
348
These politics undermined the building of a unified, lasting move-
ment. As Sharon Smith found, "[tlhe tendency among groups organ-
ized around identity politics has been to grow-sometimes
substantially-for a short period of time, and then fairly rapidly to
shrink to a much smaller 'core' membership. ' 349 Organizations such as
ACT-UP, which spearheaded activism around AIDS policy, and the
Women's Action Coalition in New York, exemplified this trend.
350
3. Postmodern Lawyering
Progressive lawyering underwent parallel developments in this
period. In the more promising political landscape came attempts to
challenge the status quo in local rather than regional or national set-
tings. Postmodern and poststructural theorists referred to these as
"microsites" of struggle. As Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold ex-
plain, progressive lawyers often had to choose between defensive
work on the one hand and likely futile transformative/organizing ef-
forts on the other:
347 See id.
348 Id. at 16.
349 Smith, supra note 201, at 17-18 (discussing New York chapter of Women's Action
Coalition and Queer Nation).
350 ACT-UP, which stands for "AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power," is "a diverse, non-
partisan group of individuals united in anger and committed to direct action to end the
AIDS crisis." It was founded in 1987. See ACT-UP/New York, http://www.actupny.org/
(last visited Sept. 17, 2009). The Women's Action Coalition was founded in 1992, after
Clarence Thomas' confirmation as Supreme Court Justice, and was active until 1995. See
New York Public Library, Inventory of the Women's Action Coalition's Records, 1992-97,
http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/spe/rbk/faids/wac.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2009)
(describing quick rise to several hundred members attending meetings, dwindling within 3
years to 7-8 members).
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A poststructural rethinking of the democratic project . . . afford[ed]
some respite from this double bind. Poststructural theories locate
domination in cross-cutting social cleavages (race, gender, sexual
orientation, age, etc.) and at microsites of power (the family, the
workplace, schools, social service agencies and the like). These
microsites present less daunting targets for cause lawyers, who in
effect turn away from high-impact, class action litigation and/or
frontal assault on the institutions of the state. They focus instead on
the empowerment of individual, or perhaps small groups of, clients.
With less at stake politically and more at stake legally, legal institu-
tions may well come closer to living up to their professed ideals.35 1
In this period, the ideological focus of the 1980s translated into
more practical projects. Fueled by local, community organizing efforts
and influenced by postmodern, identity-based social theory,35 2 the lib-
eral professionalism that took hold in the 1970s and the progressive
theoretical gaze that turned inward the decade thereafter flowered
into a set of approaches that addressed the limits of litigation;353 dy-
namics of legislative advocacy;354 educational 355 and organizing cam-
paigns;356 use of the media;357 collaboration with other professionals
(and other multidisciplinary approaches); 35 the optimal delivery of
legal services to the indigent;359 community economic development; 360
351 Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 27, at 9 (citations omitted).
352 For a succinct review of postmodernism in the legal academy, see Joel Handler, The
Presidential Address, 1992: Postmodernism, Protest and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 4 (1992). But see Piomelli, supra, note 44, at 445 et seq. (critiquing Han-
dler's-and others'-critique of L6pez, White and Alfieri); Piomelli, supra note 9 (arguing
that collaborative lawyering is influenced primarily by democratic theory-in particular by
Ella Baker and John Dewey-rather than postmodernism) & id. at n.17 (summarizing
postmodernist thought). For a Marxist argument against postmodernism, see ALEX CAL-
LINICOS, AGAINST POSTMODERNISM: A MARXIST CRITIQUE (1989).
353 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
354 See Stoddard, supra, note 116.
355 See Loffredo, supra note 260; Eagly, supra note 117.
356 See, e.g., Hina Shah, Attorneys as Organizers, 6 ASIAN L. J. 217 (1999).
357 See Anna Maria Marshall, Social Movement Strategies & the Participatory Potential
of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERING III, supra note 1, at 172-73; Deborah J. Cantrell, Sen-
sational Reports: The Ethical Duty of Cause Lawyers to be Competent in Public Advocacy,
30 HAMLINE L. REV. 567 (2007).
358 See, e.g., Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-
Examining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123 (1999);
Leigh Goodmark, Can Poverty Lawyers Play Well With Others? Including Legal Services in
Integrated, School-Based Service Delivery Programs, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 243
(1997); Randye Retkin, Gary L. Stein & Barbara Hermie Draimin, Attorneys and Social
Workers Collaborating in HIV Care: Breaking New Ground, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 533
(1997).
359 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional
Conflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2339 (1999).
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and client relations-among a variety of other investigations.
Scholars arrayed these approaches as alternatives to traditional
public interest lawyering, which, some scholars argued, had privileged
litigation over all other legal tools. 361 Many shared the critique of pub-
lic interest law practice as being in an "identity crisis. '362 But the cri-
tique went much farther. Scholars actually blamed "older models of
lawyering [for not] bringing about promised change. '363 Indeed, some
scholars blamed lawyering itself. The very act of representing the cli-
ent, argued Alfieri (and in at least one instance, White) does "vio-
lence" to the client, and "falsifies" her story.364 The implication is that
a particular professional approach-or in L6pez's case, deprofession-
alized relationship-would solve the problem. Either way, law-
yering-either itself or as typically practiced by liberal-legalist public
interest lawyers-was the problem. Ironically, this was public interest
lawyering's professional focus extended to organizing clients. Thus,
with the client reclaiming center stage, the various approaches es-
chewed isolated litigation (or minimized it as an option),365 urged "di-
alogue," and considered how traditional action could "complement
and encourage-not replace-community activism and political
involvement. '3
66
L6pez's 1992 book, Rebellious Lawyering, was perhaps the most
influential work to offer a systematic approach in this regard. Criticiz-
ing what he termed "regnant" lawyering, he argued for a vision of
"teaching self-help and lay lawyering" and of "co-eminent" practition-
ers of lawyers and clients. 367 The "rebellious lawyer," L6pez argued,
must know how to work with (not just on behalf of) women, low-
income people, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and
the elderly. They must know how to collaborate with other profes-
sional and lay allies rather than ignoring the help that these other
problem-solvers may provide in a given situation. They must under-
stand how to educate those with whom they work, particularly
about law and professional lawyering, and, at the same time, they
must open themselves up to being educated by all those with whom
they come in contact, particularly about the traditions and exper-
360 See, e.g., Shah, supra note 65.
361 See Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 5, at 688-89.
362 See Esquivel, supra note 176.
363 See Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 5, at 688.
364 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991).
365 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
366 See Johnson, supra note 265, at 205.
367 LOPEZ, supra note 8, at 70. As discussed in Section II.A, supra notes 122-73 and
accompanying text, earlier writers prefigured this advice. See, e.g., Ginger, supra note 2, at
15 (lawyers should "help in the development of organizations of lay counselors").
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iences of life on the bottom and at the margins. 368
L6pez argued that rebellious lawyers must ground themselves in
the communities and lives of the subordinated, continually evaluate
legal and nonlegal approaches, know how to strategize, build coali-
tions-and
appreciate how all that they do with others requires attention not
only to international, national, and regional matters but also to their
interplay with seemingly more mundane local affairs. At bottom,
the rebellious idea of lawyering demands that lawyers (and those
with whom they work) nurture sensibilities and skills compatible
with a collective fight for social change.
3 69
As Angelo Ancheta summarized in his review essay of L6pez's book:
Lopez's rebellious lawyers ... are deeply rooted in the communities
in which they live and work. They collaborate with other service
agencies and with the clients themselves; they try to educate mem-
bers of the community about their rights; they explore the possibili-
ties of change and continually reexamine their own work in order to
help their clients best. Rebellious lawyering thus redefines the law-
yer-client relationship as a cooperative partnership in which knowl-
edge and power are shared, rejecting a relationship limited to an
active professional working on behalf of the passive, relatively pow-
erless layperson. 3
70
L6pez anchored his theory on a narrative-based understanding of
persuasive problem-solving. The use of narrative and story-telling be-
came a dominant feature of postmodern scholarship in the 1990s. Es-
chewing structuralism and "meta-theory, 371 some proponents-
though not L6pez-even argued that the very act of telling marginal-
ized and silenced stories would destabilize existing institutional ar-
rangements. Persuasion was key. As L6pez himself explained:
We see and understand the world through "stock stories." These
stories help us interpret the everyday world with limited informa-
tion and help us make choices about asserting our own needs and
responding to other people. These stock stories embody our deepest
human, social and political values. At the same time, they help us
carry out the routine activities of life without constantly having to
analyze or question what we are doing .... To solve a problem
through persuasion of another, we therefore must understand and
368 LOPEZ, supra note 8, at 37.
369 Id. at 38.
370 Ancheta, supra note 41, at 1370.
371 Ian McEwan describes the sentiment in passing in one of his novels: "After the ruin-
ous experiments of the lately deceased century, after so much vile behavior, so many
deaths, a queasy agnosticism has settled around these matters of justice and redistributed
wealth. No more big ideas. The world must improve, if at all, by tiny steps." IAN McEWAN,
SATURDAY 74 (2005).
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manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a
plausible and compelling story - one that moves that person to
grant the remedy we want.
372
Lopez's approach was very influential. Indeed, his approach crys-
tallized the progressive critique of liberal public interest law practice
as undermining, rather than furthering, client activism. Many activist
lawyers now self-consciously aspire to practice "rebelliously. '373
But L6pez's prescriptions had a number of weaknesses. For one,
even as he called for an appreciation of the larger context, he called
for theory that is useful only for "specific purposes" that would last
only for "a reasonable period of time. '374 For L6pez, grand narratives
were suspect.375 His larger project emanated simply from the lawyer-
client collaboration and "as an instrument of practical problem-solv-
ing and daily living. '376 In place of systematic analysis, then, we are
left with impressionism. A related weakness was that L6pez demurred
on articulating an alternative normative vision.
377
No sooner had L6pez's ideological influence spread than did it
come under criticism. "[T]he defects in poverty lawyering," Paul
Tremblay argued, "are structural, institutional, political, economic,
and ethical. '378 Similarly, Ancheta criticized L6pez's focus on the
"microdynamics of lawyering. '379 The key questions, he argued, are
"how much more effective is rebellious lawyering than regnant law-
yering in achieving social change?" 380 and "[c]an rebellious lawyering
help bring about the shifts in institutional power that are also neces-
sary to construct a social reality that alleviates subordination? ' 381 In
another critique, Southworth argued that L6pez was "taking the law-
372 Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
373 See, e.g., Hing, supra note 117; Yale Law School's annual "Rebellious Lawyering"
conference, http://islandia.law.yale.edu/reblaw/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
374 LOPEZ, supra note 8, at 66.
375 See id. (rebellious lawyers "don't expect (and in fact are suspicious of) too long a
reign for any particular formulation of what they and others experience").
376 See id.
377 See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Power From the People, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1725, 1735-36
(1994). But see Piomelli, supra note 44, at 477-85 (arguing that L6pez's vision is implicit in
his depiction of "regnant" and "rebellious" actors in his book); see also Piomelli, supra
note 9.
378 Tremblay, supra note 87, at 950; see also Gary L. Blasi, What's a Theory For?: Notes
on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1089 (1994) ("im-
plicit suggestion" of postmodern lawyering scholarship "is that the main problem faced by
the poor and subordinated people is not unemployment, illness, hunger, homelessness,
degradation, or racist oppression, but rather the 'interpretive violence' done to their narra-
tives by poverty lawyers").
379 See Ancheta, supra note 41, at 1388.
380 Id. at 1375.
381 Id. at 1388.
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yer out of progressive lawyering." 382 L6pez's prescription, she argued,
offered "an excessively pessimistic assessment of the range and value
of the skills that lawyers can provide. '383 In her estimation, "[h]is al-
ternative vision of lawyering imagines a relatively minor role for law-
yers' specialized knowledge and skills. '3
84
Others leveled more scathing critiques of postmodernism gener-
ally. In his 1992 presidential address to the Law and Society Associa-
tion, for example, Joel Handler questioned the political value of
postmodernism writ large.385 Comparing them to the scholars of the
1960s and '70s who spoke of solidarity and struggle-"collective iden-
tity and collective strength"-postmodernist scholars, he argued, were
pessimistic and isolated.
386
Simon summed up the situation succinctly in 1994:
The new poverty lawyers write at a time when practitioners feel be-
sieged by hostile politicians and rebuffed by the judiciary, and the
idea that lawyering might serve ambitious goals seems less plausible
than ever.
Thus, we find ourselves in the peculiar situation of having for the
first time an extensive and rich literature on poverty law - a litera-
ture that makes substantial progress toward the goal of bringing
theory to bear on practice - at a time when the general state of
poverty law practice is so depressing. 387
As a result, the focus of much progressive lawyering theory in this
period became, in Sameer Ashar's words, "therapeutics. '388 As Simon
elaborated in an earlier essay, in this paradigm,
power is obscured by psychologism, the reduction of the social to
the personal ... It resists understanding power as a product of class,
property, or institutions and collapses power into the personal
needs and dispositions of the individuals who command and obey.
From this perspective, it becomes difficult to distinguish the power-
ful from the powerless. In every case, both the exercise of power
and submission to it are portrayed as a matter of personal accom-
modation and adjustment.389
Ashar has observed how this paradigm coincided with the clinical
field's focus on client-centered representation, eclipsing even further
382 See Southworth, supra note 88.
383 Id. at 215.
384 Id.
385 See Handler, supra note 352.
386 Id.
387 William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Pov-
erty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099,
1100 (1994).
388 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 380-383.
389 Simon, supra, note 29, at 495.
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the progressive bar's consideration of larger social context. 390
Nonetheless, this tradition-in particular its specific variant in the
"law and organizing" literature391-reclaimed client, or popular, activ-
ism as central to the progressive lawyering project. Even though there
is more continuity between the aspirations of movement lawyers of
the 1960s and "law and organizing" practitioners of today than some-
times has been acknowledged, "law and organizing has fundamentally
altered the terrain of progressive legal practice. By highlighting the
value of organizing ... proponents have reclaimed the centrality of
community members in shaping social change. ''392
E. 'Revolution' Redux?: Reascendant Left-Liberalism and Law and
Organizing Lawyering in the Millenium
In reclaiming the centrality of client activism, the most recent
wave of scholarship appears to have shifted theoretical focus once
again. In the new millennium, scholarly preoccupation with the inter-
nal dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship has given way to re-
newed emphasis on external, structural issues of activist strategy and
political economy. Since the turn of the century, scholars, among
other issues, have rehearsed the structural causes of poverty, wealth,
racism, materialism and militarism;393 urged practitioners to take
"macro historical factors" into account; 394 examined the political
foundations of progressive lawyering theory;395 interrogated the
meaning of "organizing; ' 396 exhorted lawyers to "pass through the
door" of social movement theory,397 and even led organizing cam-
paigns 398-a prescription that would have been considered heresy
only years ago. This outward turn, I would argue, is not coincidental,
as it occurs amidst heightened popular activism and a reascendant
left-liberalism. As in the preceding subsections, I sketch in this subsec-
tion what I believe to be the central dynamic animating client activism
and progressive lawyering theory in the current period.
390 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 387 (criticizing client-centered approach as "inculcat[ing]
a narrow vision of professional role amongst law students") (citation omitted).
391 See supra note 4
392 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 479.
393 See Quigley, supra note 17.
394 See McCann & Dudas, supra note 11
395 See Piomelli, supra note 9.
396 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4.
397 See Rubin, supra note 13; see also Price & Davis, supra note 4.
398 See Narro, supra note 13.
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1. Mass Activism, September 11, the Obama Presidency and
Economic Crisis
It would be foolish, of course, to talk about the first decade of the
millennium as a monolithic historical period. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the gravity of the Bush II Administration's
response to them;399 the improbable election of Barack Obama as the
first African-American U.S. president; and the worldwide economic
crisis are only three of many world-altering events this decade. None-
theless, there is one discernable trend: greater popular activism
animated by reascendant left-liberal politics. This was evident even
before the turn of the century, when tens of thousands of "anti-global-
ization" protesters shut down the ministerial meeting of the World
Trade Organization in Seattle in November 1999. The "Battle of Seat-
tle" 400 and its aftermath-including mass demonstrations against both
the Democratic and Republican National Conventions in Los Angeles
and Philadelphia in 2000,401 and the Group of Eight summit in Genoa
in 2001-featured an unprecedented alliance between organized labor
and environmental activists-"Teamsters and Turtles"-some forma-
tions of whom allied with the insurgent campaign of Green Party pres-
idential candidate Ralph Nader. The subsequent demonstrations
against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq mobilized millions.402 In-
deed, the depth of anti-war sentiment propelled Howard Dean's presi-
dential candidacy in 2004 and arguably catapulted Barack Obama to
the presidency in 2008. Many see Obama's election as the end of the
399 The heinousness of the Bush II Administration's conduct includes: stealing an elec-
tion, deploying and justifying torture, mounting a systematic assault on privacy and civil
liberties, and fabricating evidence for and waging pre-emptive war.
400 See ALEXANDER COCKBURN, JEFFREY ST. CLAIR & ALLAN SEKULA, 5 DAYS THAT
SHOOK THE WORLD: SEATTLE AND BEYOND (2000).
401 See, e.g., Juan Gonzalez, From Seattle to South Central: What the Movement Needs to
Do Next, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/
24/21/gonzalez2421.html; Mass Protest at Democratic Convention, SOCIALIST WORKER
(UK), Aug. 19, 2000; CNN.com Allpolitics, Ten Arrested in Protests at Democratic Conven-
tion, Aug. 14, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/08/14/campaign.
protest.02/index.html; World Socialist Web Site, Jerry White, Los Angeles Police Attack
Protesters at Democratic Convention, Aug. 17, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug
2000/la-al7.shtml.
402 See, e.g., BBC News, "Million" March against Iraq War, Feb. 16, 2003, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2765041.stm; Alan Cowell, Threats and Responses: Protests; 1.5 Million
Demonstrators in Cities Across Europe Oppose a War against Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/world/threats-responses-protests-1.5-
m inion-demonstrators-cities-across-europe-oppose.html?sec=&spon=&emc=etal. One
publication reports the following numbers of anti-war protesters: October 26, 2002:150,000
in Washington, 75,000 in San Francisco and "tens of thousands" in other cities; Oct. 6, 2002,
25,000 in Central Park, New York. The Antiwar Movement A Great Beginning, 26 INT'L
SOCIALIST REV. 2 (2002).
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neo-conservative era that defined U.S. society the past 30 years.40 3 As
Hendrik Hertzberg observed of the Obama victory: "Empathically,
comprehensively, the public has turned against conservatism at home
and neoconservatism abroad. The faith that unfettered markets and
minimal taxes on the rich will solve every domestic problem, and that
unilateral arrogance and American arms will solve every foreign one,
is dead for a generation or more. ' 404
On the civil rights front, activism has also surged around gay mar-
riage and immigrant rights issues.40 5 The gravity of the current eco-
nomic crisis-not to mention climate change-has forced a
reconsideration of grand narratives.
2. Revolutionary Lawyering?
In progressive lawyering theory, there appear to be analogous de-
velopments as well. In the millennium, the new appellation "law and
organizing" suggested more promising activist prospects. 406 Similarly,
Edward Rubin called for the application of social movement theory to
lawyering practice.407 More recently, Piomelli sought to make more
explicit the political bases of critical lawyering theory.
40 8
"Revolution" has also reentered the lexicon. 40 9 Bill Quigley-
now legal director for the Center for Constitutional Rights-has
called for "revolutionary lawyering" in a recent article. 410 Although he
tempers his call by counterposing a vision of "restrained capitalism,"
Quigley argues:
We need revolutionaries ... Revolutionaries are called not just to
test the limits of the current legal system or to reform the current
403 See, e.g., George Packer, The Fall of Conservatism, THE NEW YORKER, May 26,
2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/05/26/080526fa-fact packer;
Lance Selfa, End of the Reagan-Bush Era? SOCIALIST WORKER, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.
socialistworker.org/2008-1/661/661_07_Era.shtml; Lance Selfa, Election 2008: Beginning of
a New Era?, 58 INT'L SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at http://www.isreview.org/issues/
58/feat-elections.shtml; Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The End of Republican America?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 30, 2008, at 44.
404 See Hendrick Hertzberg, Obama Wins, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 17, 2008, at 39-40.
405 See Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and
the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007);
Jesse McKinley, Across U.S., Big Rallies for Same-Sex Marriage, Nov. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/us/16protest.html?_r=l&emc=etal.
406 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4; Price & Davis, supra note 4.
407 See Rubin, supra note 13.
408 See Piomelli, supra note 9; see also Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power:
Its Allure & Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395 (2004).
409 See Quigley, supra note 17; Panel Discussion, Rights, Religion, Revolution: Theories
of Advocacy for the Poor, Annual Meeting Program, Association of American Law
Schools, "Reassessing our Roles as Scholars and Educators in Light of Change," Jan. 2-6,
2008, at 76.
410 See Quigley, supra note 17.
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law, but also to join in the destruction of unjust structures and sys-
tems and to tear them up by their roots. We are called to replace
them with new systems based on fairness and justice.
411
Echoing Quigley's argument, a 2008 AALS conference discussed
revolution as a theory of advocacy.
4 12
In a sense, we have come full circle: from the revolutionary pro-
ject of the movement lawyers of the 1960s to the nascent radical if not
revolutionary project of social justice and "law and organizing" law-
yers of the millennium. Along the way, public interest lawyering pop-
ularized activist lawyering (and, indeed, won the institutional "access"
it had sought), critical lawyering gave voice to a neglected ideological
dimension and to aspects of social alienation in the period of political
reaction, and postmodern lawyering crystallized a reorientation to the
lawyer-client relationship and reclaimed the centrality of clients'
grassroots efforts in the process of social change. What's next? In the
following section, I return to the three themes that, I argue, have been
underdeveloped in the theoretical literature-the definition of funda-
mental social change, analyses of social context and use of various ac-
tivist methods-and raise fundamental questions that require further
study.
III. CLIENT ACTIVISM: AIMS, CONTEXTS AND METHODS
As I hope I have demonstrated in Part II, ultimate political aims,
societal analyses and activist strategies define progressive lawyering
theory more than the claimed superiority of any one style of practice.
Indeed, from the early (and more recent) articulation of radical social
visions to the enduring commitment to client empowerment and self-
determination, progressive legal practice has exhibited steady con-
tinuity when disaggregated along these three axes. In this Part, I dis-
cuss the extent to which progressive lawyering scholars have
addressed these three questions and offer baseline considerations for
analyzing them. These three fundamentals may be thought of as con-
stituting what some scholars refer to as "theories of social change,"
and they remain under-theorized in progressive lawyering scholarship.
Simply put, as progressive lawyers, we need to deepen our grounding
in three overarching political questions: what is happening now, where
we are going, and how we are going to get from here to there. This
project is particularly imperative given a new era that many believe
heralds major shifts and opportunities in the American and interna-
tional economic and political landscape, redefining even the very way
411 Id. at 105-07.
412 See Panel Discussion, supra note 409.
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we think of the future of the planet.
A. 'Fundamental Social Change': Articulating
Alternative Normative Visions
One one level, progressive legal work is necessarily about re-
form-the enforcement of workplace safety laws, for example, or de-
feat of anti-immigrant legislation. At the same time, it is also about
social alternatives. Underlying-and beyond-individual cases and
advocacy campaigns are, as some recent initiatives put it, notions of
"substantive justice. '413 "[A]bsent an affirmative political and social
vision," observes Ashar, "even self-conscious practitioners reproduce
the status quo. '4 14 We need to be clear about what we're fighting for
as much as what we're fighting against.
In progressive lawyering scholarship, these alternative normative
visions are either exclusively process-oriented 415 or euphemistically or
rhetorically articulated, and, in both instances, infrequently elabo-
rated.416 The common use of the term "fundamental social change"
exemplifies this tendency.417 What exactly does fundamental social
change mean? The vagueness and tentativeness with which lawyering
scholars have answered this question is, of course, understandable. It
is the question-and enormously difficult to answer. Moreover, for
lawyers committed to change from below, meaningful alternatives can
only arise from creative, participatory, collective struggle. Finally, be-
yond these hesitations, it can mean many things, depending upon
413 See University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Conceptualizing Substantive Justice,
Apr. 18, 2009, http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/conceptualizing-substantive-justice; Global
Alliance for Justice Education, Justice Education in a Community Context, Dec. 7-13, 2008,
http://law.gsu.edu/gaje/index/conference (5th Worldwide Conference of the Global Alli-
ance for Justice Education).
414 Ashar, supra note 1, at 389 (paraphrasing Bellow).
415 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 430 ("end goal" as "organizing immigrant
workers").
416 1 count myself as among those who have done so. See Eduardo R.C. Capulong,
Which Side Are You On? Unionization in Social Service Nonprofits, 9 N.Y.C. L. Rev. 373,
402-404 (2006) (mentioning, but not elaborating on, goal of "fundamental social change");
see also Barbara Ehrenreich & Bill Fletcher, Jr., Reimagining Socialism, THE NATnON,
Mar. 23, 2009, at 14 et seq. (admitting they don't have "plan" and "don't even have a plan
for the deliberative process that we know has to replace the anarchic madness of capital-
ism"); but see Bachmann, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining his vision as "'communitarian,'
'social democratic,' 'democratic socialist,' or 'populist'" and characterized by "(1) a respect
for personhood ('individuality'); (2) an appreciation of community; (3) a commitment to
democracy (social, economic, and political); (4) realizability") (internal citations omitted).
417 See, e.g., Cdsar Cuauhtdmoc Garcfa Hern~ndez, Radical Environmentalism: The
New Civil Disobedience?, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 289, 299 (2007); Gerald P. L6pez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,
77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1606 (1989); Emma F. Phillips, "Maybe Tomorrow I'll Turn Capitalist:
Cuentapropismo in a Workers' State, 41 LAW & Soc'y REV. 305, 306 (2007).
Fall 2009)
HeinOnline  -- 16 Clinical L. Rev. 181 2009
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
whom you ask. For example, the movement lawyers of the 1960s
sought equality and an "end to poverty." Many rejected capitalism
and liberal democracy altogether and sought a radical democratic or
socialist future. 418 For them, the problem was both "the System," i.e.,
capitalism, and "the Establishment," i.e., the liberal-democratic state.
The succeeding generation of liberal public interest lawyers, by con-
trast, sought to rehabilitate the very "System" their predecessors re-
belled against. For them, the problem lay not in capitalism itself, but
in its corruption; "the System" was basically sound, so long as it al-
lowed them to participate in it. Indeed, as Hilbink astutely observed,
these lawyers "were the establishment. ' 419 Later, as progressive law-
yers' aspirations failed to come to fruition, the next generation of
community and rebellious lawyers chose to rearticulate a normative
vision that, they insisted, could not be foreordained.420 Equating
Marxism and socialism with the Soviet Union, for example, White ar-
gued that the Soviet collapse marked "the demise of socialism as a
plausible way to organize a complex society. '421 In the 1980s and '90s,
many scholars rejected a structuralist analysis and refocused change
on what skeptics called the "microdynamics of lawyering, ''422 arguing
for "problem-solving," 423 "community building" 424 and "building
power '425 in the belief that only through such efforts could new and
genuine affirmative political and social visions organically develop.
However elaborated, the main fault line in the quest to articulate
such alternative normative visions centers on the age-old debate be-
tween reform-more accurately reformism-and revolution. The nec-
essary choice is between incremental change within the prevailing
social and economic order-i.e., reforming capitalism and liberal de-
mocracy-and a dynamic conception of social change beyond it- i.e.,
a post-capitalist, revolutionary alternative.426 Should client activism
418 See JAMES, supra note 122; LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, supra note 148.
419 See Hilbink Dissertation, supra note 29, at 342 (emphasis in original).
420 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 358-59, 361; Peter H. Shuck, Public Law Litigation &
Soc'l Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1767 (1993) (criticizing L6pez's failure to elaborate what
"constitutes and causes social change" as "an astonishing omission").
421 See White, supra note 7, at 827.
422 See Ancheta, supra note 41, at 1390.
423 See LOPEZ, supra note 8.
424 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 460 (noting goal of community organizing is
community building).
425 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 406.
426 See, e.g., LUXEMBURG, supra note 17, for a classic statement of the difference be-
tween these two goals; Hilbink, Categories of Cause Lawyering, supra note 1 (comparing
visions of "the System," "the Cause," and lawyer's role of "proceduralist", "elite/van-
guard" and "grassroots" lawyers); see also Ashar, supra note 1, at 409 (citing James
Bohman and Habermas's "vision of radical democracy[as] marked by a commitment to
long-term incremental change rather than outmoded stories of revolutionary social
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simply reform existing institutional structures and social relations
within the present system? Or should it strive to completely replace
the system itself? Even though reformists and revolutionaries often
travel the same path, they ultimately do not have the same goals. Pro-
gressive lawyering devoted to one or the other project therefore has
differing imperatives; we need to be clear about our orientations. This
is especially true today as legal liberalism and radicalism, both recog-
nizing crisis and opportunity and claiming the mantle of "progres-
sive," retool their strategies. Orienting to the political moment, for
example, liberal thinkers have articulated the incrementalist strategy
of "democratic constitutionalism," in which courts would "pursue
many of the same social-justice ends that the Warren Court sought to
advance, only using more modest, less uniformly activist means-al-
ways acting in conjunction with progressive political movements. '427
Similarly, radicals have begun to more openly interrogate what "so-
cialism" means.428 Both projects are anchored in mass activism-but
to what end?
1. Reformism
There are, of course, compelling reasons to hold on to existing
institutional arrangements and pursue change from within. First of all,
lawyers are, by definition, ethically bound to work within the law and
legal system. Secondly, because law is relatively autonomous from
politics, the legal system has been and can be receptive to progressive,
indeed sweeping, social change-albeit only when challenged and
threatened sufficiently. 429 Despite many shortcomings, it is undeniable
that capitalism and liberal democracy provide real economic, political,
social and cultural benefits, and seem inexhaustibly capable of adapt-
ing and surviving deep crises-albeit "at the expense of the majority it
exploits '430 . Compared to these gains, the revolutionary experiences
of, say, the former Soviet Union, China, Cuba and other "socialist"
countries offer questionable alternatives at best. Given such historical
experiences, it is understandable to think that revolutionary transfor-
mation is utopian. If it is, then of course we should accept working
within the system-reformism-as the only meaningful strategy for
social change.
transformation").
427 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, What's a Liberal Justice Now?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 31,
2009, at 52.
428 See, e.g., Ehrenreich & Fletcher, supra note 416.
429 See, e.g., supra note 109 (describing reforms of the 1960s).
430 See Tariq Ali, Capitalism's Deadly Logic, THE NATION, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20090323/ali.
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2. Revolution
Yet despite its risks, the case for a revolutionary, post-capitalist
alternative is just as-and, in fact, can be more-compelling, because
reforms are clearly not enough. Reformism is a Sisyphean task in a
market economy. One need only look at the reversal of gains of the
social movements of the 1960s and early '70s, or even the 1930s, to at
least see the argument for revolution. That is, if we do not alter the
structural bases for poverty, war, racism, sexism, homophobia and
other social ills, we forever will be consigned to fighting them.
Capitalism, argues Bertell Ollman, produces values wholly in-
compatible with those required to overcome these inequities. In dis-
cussing a revolutionary socialist alternative, Ollman observes that our
daily, "live[d]" experience in a market economy "leads to certain
ideas about oneself, money, products, social relations, and the nature
of the society[,] which have to do with individualism, freedom to
choose, the power of money, greed, competition, and mutual indiffer-
ence .... -431 These ideas, he continues, "as well as [ ] their accompa-
nying emotions are the exact opposite of those-like cooperation,
solidarity, and mutual concern-that are required by life in socialism,
that is, if such a society is to work. '432 Ollman argues:
[M]ost people .. .think of the market as a tool. Tools generally
function as they do because of who is holding them and how he or
she chooses to use them. Basing themselves on this metaphor, many
on the left think of the market as a kind of can opener. It's in our
hands and we can use it to open cans if we want. However, if we
change the metaphor from can opener to meat grinder and instead
of seeing ourselves holding it we view ourselves as being inside it, all
of a sudden the market appears to be doing something quite differ-
ent. Rather than moving in ways we direct, it is us that gets moved
about according to its rhythm, and it will eventually turn us into
ground meat. This is a really the best metaphor with which to think
of the market. The market is not an instrument in our hands like a
can opener. It's more like a meat grinder and we're inside it.
433
431 Political Affairs Magazine, Joel Wendland, Marx, Markets and Meatgrinders: An In-
terview with Bertell Oilman, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/108/l/28/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2009).
432 Id.
433 Id. In the words of Bill Quigley:
We have been taught to believe that radical change is impossible, or at least very,
very dangerous. People exploring the possibility for serious change must constantly
contend with false messages: "This is the best we can do;" "We live in the most
generous and best nation in the history of the world;" "Unrestrained capitalism is the
ultimate and only way of solving all our problems;" "Our problems are too big for
anyone to handle;" "Go slowly;" "Just look out for number one;" "Do not be a radi-
cal;" "Do not be a revolutionary;" and most importantly, "Be afraid, be very afraid,
of terrorists, illegal immigrants, black men, pushy women, of people who are trying
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Notwithstanding its nature, continues Ollman:
It doesn't follow that we should try to abolish the market over night.
I think we should make serious inroads on the market as soon as we
have the chance to do so, expanding public ownership and creating
a democratic central plan for producing and distributing our most
important goods. That wouldn't include everything. It is terribly im-
portant, however, that we keep clearly in mind the ultimate goal of
doing away with private ownership and market exchanges com-
pletely, that public education for it - particularly as the crucial step
in overcoming alienation - never falters, and that the pace toward
attaining this goal remains steady.
434
Despite this difference between reformist and revolutionary so-
cial change strategies, there is a dynamic between them. "[I]t is in the
collective fight for reforms," observes Paul D'Amato, "that ordinary
people are radicalized and are infused with class consciousness and a
sense of their own power .... [A] mass struggle can, under the right
circumstances, pass over into an insurrectionary struggle that chal-
lenges for power. '435 Nonetheless, the revolutionary alternative is not
simply an accumulation of reforms. In a debate with fellow German
Social Democratic Party leader, Eduard Bernstein, the Polish socialist
Rosa Luxemburg argued:
It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long
drawn-out revolution, and revolution as a condensed series of re-
forms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ
according to their duration, but according to their content. The se-
cret of historic change through the utilization of political power re-
sides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative
modification into a new quality-or to speak more concretely, in
the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to
another.
That is why people who pronounce themselves in favor of the
method of legislative reform in place of and in contradistinction to
the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really
choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal,
but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment
of a new society, they take a stand for surface modifications of the
old society.436
For those espousing revolutionary change, however, the main chal-
to take advantage of us, of international cooperation, of accountability, and most of
all, of big change."
Quigley, supra note 17, at 115-16.
434 Wendland, supra note 431.
435 See Paul D'Amato, Reform Struggles and the Road to Revolution, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://socialistworker.org/2008/02/15/reform-revolution.
436 LUXEMBURG, supra note 17, at 74-75.
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lenge is reckoning with past attempts at such efforts.
B. Analyzing a Dynamic Social Context and Attuning a
Political Perspective
Regardless of our political orientations, we operate under the
same dynamic circumstances. Buchanan captures this fluid context:
Social change lawyering is not static; it changes over time. Whether
certain lawyering practices are enabling or disempowering, or
whether they transform or reinforce the status quo, are not ques-
tions that can be discussed meaningfully without reference to a
complex web of social, political, and cultural norms that situate and
give meaning to a set of practices in a particular place and time.
437
Hence, "adherence to theory of any sort, even critical theory, will not
stand the progressive lawyer in good stead unless she also develops a
sensitivity to the political context in which we act on and test those
theories. '438 Unfortunately, as Gordon observes, progressive law-
yering literature fails "to answer the larger question of how social
change occurs.
'439
Karl Marx observed that political consciousness-which he
termed "subjective"-is the product of social conditions-which he
termed "objective. '4 40 When translated into action, consciousness in
turn can change those conditions. Therein lies the dialectic among
consciousness, action and social conditions. Consciousness may turn
into action-or it may not. When it does, such action can take forms
that are either organized (as in strikes) or unorganized (as in riot-
ing).441 For political activists and their lawyers, therefore, the question
437 Buchanan, supra note 1, at 1003; see also Nan Hunter, Lawyering for Social Justice,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1997) ("Breakthrough moments in law occur rarely but not
randomly, regardless of arena. They usually follow long periods of incremental, often
nearly imperceptible, social change occurring at a glacial pace. When they do occur, they
crystallize what has gone before at the same instant that they propel social structures for-
ward."); McCann & Dudas, supra note 11, at 37-38 ("potential contributions of cause law-
yers to movement activity everywhere are variously enhanced or constrained by key
features of the historical context").
438 See Hoffman, supra note 303, at 285; see also Bellow, supra note 8, at 306 ("The
process of linking strategy to political vision always requires adaptation and a detailed
understanding of particular contexts for its effectiveness.")
439 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 446.
440 KARL MARX, A CoNTRmIUroN TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 12-13
(Nahum Isaac Stone trans., Int'l Lib. Pub. Co. 1904) (1859), available at http://marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface-abs.htm.
441 As Hal Draper has put it:
To engage in class struggle it is not necessary to 'believe in' the class struggle any
more than it is necessary to believe in Newton in order to fall from an airplane ....
The working class moves toward class struggle insofar as capitalism fails to satisfy its
economic and social needs and aspirations, not insofar as it is told about struggle by
Marxists. There is no evidence that workers like to struggle any more than anyone
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is two-fold: how prevailing and ever-changing social conditions-"the
complex web of social, political, and cultural norms" of which
Buchanan speaks-affect individual and collective political conscious-
ness, and how and when such consciousness is likely to translate into
action and, in turn, change those conditions.
As with articulating alternative normative visions, here, too, our
approaches have been under-theorized. Like Buchanan, many schol-
ars enjoin lawyers to be cognizant of the dynamic social context in
which they work.442 L6pez, for example, acknowledges the need to
pay "attention not only to international, national, and regional mat-
ters but also to their interplay with seemingly more mundane local
affairs. '443 Framing progressive lawyering within these multiple, inter-
related, dynamic contexts is, of course, essential. But what are our
analyses of the governing historical, social, economic and political
context? And how might they inform potential action?
With notable exceptions,444 progressive lawyering theorists have
tended to answer these questions tangentially, recently within the con-
text of community-based campaigns. At times, the answers come in
the form of transhistorical rules to which a lawyer ought to con-
form.445 At other times, they are delimited within and detail the law-
yer's tasks in local advocacy efforts.446 In those instances, one might
say that larger political analyses are implicit. Rarely do such analyses
directly address the overarching political context.
Yet it is only through a grasp of such macro circumstances that we
prioritize and calibrate activist strategy and tactics. Our clients are
steeped in communities of victimization and resistance. As Ashar
points out in his critique of the prototypical law clinic that represents
only individual clients, "[i]ndividual clients are part of formal and in-
formal movements of resistance. '447 Such "client-centered" lawyering
approaches
[a]ssume that clients reach the lawyers in a state of defeat, devoid of
resistance and easily subject to manipulation. As clinicians are be-
ginning to discover, the starting analysis may be defective. The as-
sumption of defeat is an analysis made without looking at the real
else; the evidence is that capitalism compels and accustoms them to do so.
HAL DRAPER, 2 KARL MARX's THEORY OF REVOLUTION: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CLAS-
SES 42 (1978).
442 See supra note 437.
443 LOPEZ, supra note 8, at 38.
44 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8 (contextualizing Workplace Project's work in 1980s-
90s historical period); Kinoy, supra note 187, at 276-99 (analyzing political period of late
1960s and early '70s); White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 39 (analyzing apartheid);.
445 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 15; Lai et al., supra note 117; Quigley, supra note 46.
446 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 32; Hing, supra note 117.
447 See Ashar, supra note 1, at 379; see also LOPEZ, supra note 8.
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client in her full context-culturally, politically and economically. It
is an assumption made.., without considering the counterbalancing
force which allows the client to survive under incredibly oppressive
conditions. It may simply be that lawyers..., even well-intentioned
ones, do not have the tools by which to recognize and measure the
skills and the power of resistance.448
Motivating client activism under dynamic social conditions re-
quires the development and constant assessment and reassessment of
a political perspective that measures that resistance and its possibili-
ties. That task in turn requires the development of specific activist
goals within the context of such analyses, and perhaps broader, na-
tional and international strategy-what some call the political "next
step." This is particularly true today, when the economic crisis plagu-
ing capitalism, the "war on terror" and climate change undeniably
have world-wide dimensions. Instances of failure, too, need to be part
of that analysis, because they teach us much about why otherwise
promising activist efforts do not become sustained mass movements of
the sort to which we all aspire.
Thus, the theoretical need is two-fold: to construct a broader or-
ganizing perspective from a political standpoint, and to consider activ-
ism writ large. Without reading the pulse of prevailing social
conditions, it is easy to miscalculate what that next step ought to be.
We will not build a mass movement though sheer perseverance-a
linear, idealist conception of change at odds with dynamic social con-
ditions. By the same token, we may underestimate the potential of
such mass activism if we focus simply on the local dimensions of our
work.
The dialectic between a dynamic social context and political con-
sciousness and action requires a constant organizational and political
calibration and modulation often missing from theoretical scholarship.
Without such a working perspective, we are apt to be either ultra-left
or overly conservative. As Jim Pope put it recently in the context of
new forms of labor organizing: "If we limit our vision of the future to
include only approaches that work within the prevailing legal regime
and balance of forces, then we are likely to be irrelevant when and if
the opportunity for a paradigm shift arises. '449 The cyclical nature of
labor organizing, he argues, mirrors politics generally:
American political life as a whole has likewise alternated between
periods characterized by public action, idealism, and reform on the
448 Ashar, supra note 1, at 378, quoting Michelle Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The
Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 345, 352-53
(1997) (emphasis added).
449 James Gray Pope, Next-Wave Organizing and the Transition to a New Paradigm of
Labor Law, 50 N.Y. LAW SCH. L.R. 515, 521(2006).
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one hand, and periods of private interest, materialism, and retrench-
ment on the other. A prolonged private period spawns orgies of cor-
ruption and extremes of wealth and poverty that, sooner or later,
ignite passionate movements for reform.
450
C. 'Activism': Towards a Broader, Deeper, Systematic Framework
In progressive lawyering theory, grassroots activism is frequently
equated with "community organizing" and "movement" or "mobiliza-
tion" politics. 451 Indeed, these methods have come to predominate ac-
tivist lawyering in much the same way as "public interest law" has
come for many to encompass all forms of progressive practice. "Activ-
ism" is, of course, broader still. Even on its own terms, the history of
community organizing and social movements in the United States in-
cludes two vitally important traditions frequently given short shrift in
this realm: industrial union organizing and alternative political party-
building.452 In this section, my aim is not to catalogue the myriad ways
in which lawyers and clients can and do become active (methodically
or institutionally)-which, given human creativity and progress, in any
event may be impossible to do-but rather to problematize three as-
sumptions: first, the tendency to define grassroots activity narrowly;
second, the notion that certain groups-for example "the poor" or the
"subordinated"-are the definitive agents of social change; and fi-
nally, the conviction that mass mobilization or movement-building, by
itself, is key to social transformation.
1. Grassroots Activism
There are countless ways in which people become socially or po-
litically active. Yet even the more expansive and sophisticated consid-
erations of activism in progressive lawyering theory tend to
unnecessarily circumscribe activism. For example, Cummings and
Eagly argue that we need to "unpack" the term "organizing. ' 453 Con-
trasting two strategies of the welfare rights movement in the 1960s,
these authors distinguish between "mobilization as short-term com-
munity action and organizing as an effort to build long-term institu-
tional power. ' 454 In the same breath, however, they define organizing
"as shorthand for a range of community-based practices, '455 even
though at least some activism, for example union organizing or, say,
450 Id. at 533.
451 See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 1; Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4; Ginger, supra note
2.
452 See, e.g., Price & Davis, supra note 4.
453 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 480.
454 Id. at 481.
455 Id. (emphasis added).
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fasting, might not be best characterized as "community-based."
What is required is a larger framework that takes into account the
sum total of activist initiatives. Lucie White argues that we need to
"map out the internal microdynamics of progressive grassroots initia-
tives ... observe the multiple impacts of different kinds of initiatives
on wide spheres of social and political life ... and devise typologies, or
models, or theories that map out a range of opportunities for collabo-
ration. '456 This map would be inadequate-and therefore inaccu-
rate-if we include certain activist initiatives and not others. But that
is precisely what the progressive lawyering literature has done by fail-
ing to regularly consider, for example, union organizing or alternative
political party-building.
2. Agents of Social Change: Identity, Class and Political Ideology
As with our definition of activism, here, too, the problem is a lack
of clarity, breadth or scope, which leads to misorientation. Have we
defined, with theoretical precision, the social-change agents to whom
we are orienting-e.g., the "people," the "poor," the "subordinated,"
"low-income communities" or "communities of color?" And if so, are
these groupings, so defined, the primary agents of social change?
By attempting to harmonize three interrelated (yet divergent) ap-
proaches to client activism-organizing on the bases of geography and
identity, class and the workplace, and political ideology-modern
community organizing simultaneously blurs and balkanizes the social-
change agents to whom we need to orient. What, after all, is "commu-
nity?" In geographic terms, local efforts alone cannot address social
problems with global dimensions. 457 As Pope observed of workers'
centers: "the tension between the local and particularistic focus of
community unionism and the global scope of trendsetting corpora-
tions like Wal-Mart makes it highly unlikely that community unionism
will displace industrial unionism as 'the' next paradigm of worker
organization. 458
On the other hand, members of cross-class, identity-based "com-
munities" may not necessarily share the same interests. In the "Asian
American community," Ancheta explains:
[u]sing the word "community" in its singular form is often a misno-
mer, because Asian Pacific Americans comprise many communities,
each with its own history, culture and language: Filipino, Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, Lao-Mien,
456 White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 39, at 160-61.
457 See, e.g., Cummings & Eagly, supra note 4, at 484-488. This is poignantly illustrated
today with the collapse of the international financial markets.
458 Pope, supra note 449, at 528.
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Hmong, Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Samoan, Tongan,
Guamanian, Native Hawaiian, and more. The legal problems facing
individuals from different communities defy simple categorization.
The problems of a fourth-generation Japanese American victim of
job discrimination, a monolingual refugee from Laos seeking shelter
from domestic violence, an elderly immigrant from the Philippines
trying to keep a job, and a newcomer from Western Samoa trying to
reunite with relatives living abroad all present unique challenges.
Add in factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and disabil-
ity, and the problems become even more complex.
459
Angela Harris echoes this observation by pointing out how some
feminist legal theory assumes "a unitary, 'essential' women's experi-
ence [that] can be isolated and described independently of race, class,
sexual orientation, and other realities of experience. '460 The same
might be said of the "people," which, like the "working class," may be
too broad. Other categorizations-such as "low-income workers,"
"immigrants", and the "poor", for example-may be too narrow to
have the social weight to fundamentally transform society.
In practice, progressive lawyers orient to the politically advanced
among these various "communities." In so doing, then, we need to
acknowledge that we are organizing on the basis of political ideology,
and not simply geography, identity or class. Building the strongest
possible mass movement, therefore, requires an orientation not only
towards certain "subordinated" communities, but to the politically ad-
vanced generally. Otherwise, we may be undermining activism writ
large.
This is not to denigrate autonomous community efforts. As I have
mentioned, subordinated communities of course have the right to self-
determination, i.e. to organize separately. But the point is not simply
to organize groups of people who experience a particular oppression,
but rather to identify those who have the social power to transform
society. Arguing that these agents are the collective, multi-racial
working class, Smith explains:
The Marxist definition of the working class has little in common
with those of sociologists. Neither income level nor self-definition
are [sic] what determine social class. Although income levels obvi-
ously bear some relationship to class, some workers earn the same
or higher salaries than some people who fall into the category of
middle class. And many people who consider themselves "middle
459 Ancheta, supra note 41 at 1379.
460 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581, 585 (1990); see also Simon, supra note 385, at 1104 ("When lawyers are portrayed as
having responsibilities to collectivities or 'communities,' the communities are described as
if they were fully constituted with homogeneous interests.")
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class" are in fact workers. Nor is class defined by categories such as
white and blue collar. For Marx the working class is defined by its
relationship to the means of production. Broadly speaking, those
who do not control the means of production and are forced to sell
their labor power to capitalists are workers.
46 1
The practical consequence of this very well may be that we redefine
who we represent as clients and consider activism or potential activ-
ism outside subordinated communities, for example union activity and
alternative political-party building, as part of our work.
3. From Movementism to Political Organization
Dogged as our work is in the activist realm, any effort at funda-
mental social transformation is doomed without effective political
leadership. Such leadership, in turn, requires work not often associ-
ated with "activism," such as, for example, theoretical study. 462
"Movementism," 463 by which I mean the conviction that building a
mass movement is the answer to oppression and exploitation, has its
limitations. Even though activism itself is perhaps the best school for
political education, we have an enormous amount to learn from our
predecessors. In the final analysis, fundamental social transformation
will only come about if there are political organizations clear enough,
motivated enough, experienced enough, large enough, embedded
enough and agile enough to respond to the twists and turns endemic
in any struggle for power. "The problem," as Bellow astutely ob-
served, "is not our analytic weaknesses, but the opportunistic, strate-
gic, and political character of our subject. ' 464 Such opportunities
typically occur when there is a confluence of three factors: a social
crisis; a socio-economic elite that finds itself divided over how to over-
come it; and a powerful mass movement from below. As I understand
the nature of social change, successful social transformations occur
when there is a fourth element: political organization.
CONCLUSION
Client activism is not a monolithic, mechanical object. Most of
the time, it is neither the gathering mass movement many of us wish
for, nor the inert, atomized few in need of external, professional moti-
vation. Rather, activism is a phenomenon in constant ebb and flow, a
461 Smith, supra note 201, at 37-38.
462 But see, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8 (discussing use of workers' course in workers
center activism).
463 For an explanation of "movementism" as a political phenomenon, see Chris Harman,
Women's Liberation & Revolutionary Socialism, in 23 INT'L SOCIALISM 3 (1984); see also
Smith, supra note 201, at 6-9.
464 Bellow, supra note 8, at 297.
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mercurial, fluid complex shaped by an unremitting diversity of factors.
The key through the maze of lawyering advice and precaution is
therefore to take a hard, sober look at the overarching state of activ-
ism. Are our clients in fact active or are they not? How many are and
who are they? What is the nature of this period? Economically? Politi-
cally? Culturally? What are the defining issues? What political and
organizing trends can be discerned? With which organizations are our
clients active, if any? What demands are they articulating, and how
are they articulating them?
This is a complex evaluation, one requiring the formulation, de-
velopment and constant assessment and reassessment of an overarch-
ing political perspective. My aim in this Article is to begin to theorize
the various approaches to this evaluation. In essence, I am arguing for
the elaboration of a systematic macropolitical analysis in progressive
lawyering theory. Here, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive
set of political considerations, but rather to develop a framework for,
and to investigate the limitations of, present considerations in three
areas: strategic aims; prevailing social conditions; and methods of ac-
tivism. Consciously or not, admittedly or not, informed and systematic
or not, progressive lawyers undertake their work with certain assump-
tions, perspectives and biases. Progressive lawyering theory would be
a much more effective and concrete guide to action-to defining the
lawyer's role in fostering activism-if it would elaborate on these con-
siderations and transform implicit and perhaps delimited assumptions
and approaches into explicit and hopefully broader choices.
Over the past four decades, there has been remarkable continuity
and consistency in progressive lawyers' use of litigation, legislation,
direct services, education and organizing to stimulate and support cli-
ent activism. The theoretical "breaks" to which Buchanan has re-
ferred465 have not been so much about the practice of lawyering itself,
but rather about unarticulated shifts in ultimate goals, societal analy-
ses, and activist priorities, each necessitated by changes in the social,
economic, and political context. That simply is another way of stating
the obvious: that progressive lawyers change their practices to adapt
to changing circumstances. The recurrent problem in progressive law-
yering theory is that many commentators have tended to generalize
these practice changes to apply across social circumstances. In so do-
ing, they displace and often replace more fundamental differences
over strategic goals, interpretation of social contexts, and organizing
priorities with debates over the mechanics of lawyering practice.
The argument is turned on its head: we often assume or tend to
465 See Buchanan, supra note 6.
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assume agreement over the meanings and underlying conceptual
frameworks relating to "fundamental social change," current political
analysis, and "community organizing," and debate lawyering strategy
and tactics; but instead we should be elaborating and clarifying these
threshold political considerations as a prerequisite to using what we
ultimately agree to be a broad and flexible set of lawyering tools. In
effect, the various approaches to lawyering have become the currency
by which scholars have debated politics and activism. The irony is that
our disagreements are less about lawyering approaches per se, I be-
lieve, than they are about our ultimate political objectives, our analy-
ses of contemporary opportunities, and our views of the optimal paths
from the latter to the former. The myriad lawyering descriptions and
prescriptions progressive lawyering theory offers are of limited use
unless they are anchored in these primary considerations. How do we
decide if we should subscribe to "rebellious" and not traditional "pub-
lic interest" lawyering, for example, or "collaborative" over "critical"
lawyering, if we do not interrogate these questions and instead rush
too quickly into practical questions? The differences among these ap-
proaches matter precisely because they have different political goals,
are based on different political analyses, and employ different political
activist strategies.
Activist lawyers already engage in these analyses-necessarily so.
To foster client activism, they must read prevailing social conditions
and strategize with their clients about the political next step, often
with an eye toward a long-term goal. But I don't think we necessarily
engage in these analyses as consciously, or with as full a picture of the
history and dynamics involved or options available, as we could. Often
this is because there simply isn't time to engage these questions. Or
perhaps not wanting to dominate our clients, we squelch our own po-
litical analysis and agenda to allow for organic, indigenous leadership
from below. But if we are truly collaborative-and when we feel
strongly enough about certain political issues-we engage on issues
and argue them out. In either event, we undertake an unsystematic
engagement of these fundamental issues at our peril.
If we adhere to the belief that only organized, politicized masses
of people can alter or replace exploitative and oppressive institutions
and bring about lasting fundamental social change, then, as progres-
sive lawyers, we need to be clear about which legal tactics can bring
about such a sustained effort in each historical moment. Without con-
crete and comprehensive diagnoses of ultimate political goals, social
and economic contexts, and organizing priorities, progressive legal
practice will fail to live up to its potential.
[Vol. 16:109
HeinOnline  -- 16 Clinical L. Rev. 194 2009
